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(2) As all the judgments in law were held in the same right and against the same parties, and as their validity depended upon the same facts, the defendant therein, in order to avoid a multiplicity of actions, and the vexation and costs arising from numerous executions and levies, was entitled to bring one suit for a final decree determining the matter in dispute that was common to all the parties; and as, under the rules of equity, such a suit could be brought in a court of the United States, the aggregate amount of all the judgments sought to be annulled was the value of the matter in dispute; consequently, the cause was removable so far as the amount involved was concerned;
(3) A Circuit Court of the United States in the exercise of its equity powers, and where divers citizenship gives jurisdiction over the parties, may deprive a party of the benefit of a judgment fraudulently obtained by him in a state court, if the circumstances are such as would authorize relief by a Federal court if the judgment had been rendered by it and not by a state court, as a decree to that effect does not operate upon the state court, but upon the party;
(4) Where a suit in equity is, in its general nature, one of which a Circuit Court of the United States may rightfully take cognizance, upon removal, it is not for a state court to disregard the right of removal upon the ground simply that the averments of the petition or bill in equity are insufficient or too vague to justify a court of equity in granting the relief asked. It is for the Federal court, after the cause is docketed there, and upon final hearing, to determine whether, under the allegations and proof, a case is made which entitles the plaintiff to the relief asked. Marshall v. Holmes, 589.
RESCISSION OF CONTRACTS.
See EQUITY, 5;
SHIPS AND SHIPPING.
See LIMITED LIABILITY.
See REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
A. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 3;
COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES;
LIMITED LIABILITY, 2, 4, 6;
PUBLIC LAND, 1;
JURISDICTION, A, 3, 10; B, 1, 2; C, 8; RECEIVER, 2.
1. Where a tax deed in Illinois is relied on as evidence of paramount title, it is indispensable that it be supported by a valid judgment for the taxes, and a proper precept authorizing the sale. Gage v. Bani, 344. 2. It is well settled in that State that a tax title is purely technical, and depends upon a strict compliance with the statute; and that the giving of the particular notice required by the statute is an indispensable condition precedent to the right to make a deed to the purchaser or his assignee. Ib.
3. The owner of land in Illinois, sold for the non-payment of taxes, or of special assessments, is entitled to be informed in the statutory notice whether the sale was for the non-payment of a tax, or of such an assessment; and a notice which informs him that the sale was made "for taxes and special assessments, authorized by the laws of the State of Illinois" is a defective notice.
4. The right of an occupant of land in Illinois, sold for the non-payment of taxes or special assessments, to personal notice of the fact of sale, before the time of redemption expires, is expressly given by the Constitution of Illinois, and is fundamental: and upon a direct issue whether such notice was given, the owner testifying that he did not receive
notice, the evidence should be clear and convincing that it was
TRUST. A trust deed, covering real estate, provided that in the case of a sale by
the trustee, at public auction, upon advertisement, all costs, charges and expenses of such advertisement, sale and conveyance, including commissions, such as were at the time of the sale allowed by the laws of Illinois to sheriffs on sale of real estate on execution, should be paid out of the proceeds. Held, (1) that this provision did not impose upon the borrower the burden of paying to a lender a solicitor's fee where a suit was brought for foreclosure; (2) that the commissions referred to in the deed are allowed only where the property is sold, upon advertisement, by the trustee, without suit. Fowler v. Equitable Trust Co., 384.
USURY. 1. The question of usury, in a loan made in 1873 to a citizen of Illinois by
a Connecticut corporation — the loan being evidenced by notes of the borrower payable in New York, and secured by mortgage upon real estate in Illinois, is to be determined by the laws of the latter State pursuant to its statute providing, in substance, that where any contract or loan shall be made in Illinois, or between citizens of that State and any other State or country, at a rate legal under the laws of Illinois, it shall be lawful to make the principal and interest payable in any other State or Territory, or in London, in which cases the contract or loan shall be governed by the laws of Illinois, unaffected by the laws of the State or country where the same shall be made payable.
Fowler v. Equitable Trust Co., 384. 2. It is settled doctrine in Illinois that the mere taking of interest in ad
vance does not bring a loan within the prohibition against usury; but whether that doctrine would apply where the loan was for such period that the exaction by the lender of interest in advance would, at the outset, absorb so much of the principal as to leave the borrower very
little of the amount agreed to be loaned to him is not decided. Ib. 3. A contract for the loan or forbearance of money at the highest legal
rate is not usury in Illinois, merely because the broker who obtains a loan but who has no legal or established connection with the lender as agent and no arrangement with the lender in respect to compensa
tion for his services - exacts and receives, in addition to the interest
to be paid to the lender, commissions from the borrower. 16. 4. If a corporation of another State, through one of its local agents in
Illinois, negotiates a loan of money to a citizen of the latter State, at the highest rate allowed by its laws, and the agent charges the borrower, in addition, commissions for his services pursuant to a general arrangement made with the company, at the time he became agent, that he was to get pay for his services as agent in commissions from borrowers, such loan is usurious under the law of Illinois, although the company was not informed, in the particular case, that the agent
exacted and received commissions from the borrower. 16. 5. In Illinois, when the contract of loan is usurious, the lender, suing the
borrower for the balance due, can only recover the principal sum, diminished by applying as credits thereon all payments made on account of interest. In such cases, whatever the borrower pays on
account of the loan goes as a credit on the principal sum. Ib. 6. A Connecticut corporation made in 1876 a loan of ten thousand dollars
for five years at nine per cent to a citizen of Illinois, the loan being evidenced by note, secured by deed of trust on real estate in the latter State, providing that nothing contained in it should be so construed as to prevent a foreclosure by legal process, and that upon any foreclosure the corporation should recover in addition to the principal, interest and ordinary costs, a reasonable attorney's or solicitor's fee, not exceeding five per cent for the collection thereof. It was also stipulated in the deed, that the decree or order for foreclosure should direct and require that the expenses of such foreclosure and sale, including the fees of solicitor and counsel, be taxed by the court at a reasonable amount, and paid out of the proceeds of the sale. The highest rate allowed by the laws of Illinois at the time of the loan was ten per cent. The borrower paid the agent of the company a commission of $150 under such an arrangement as that referred to in the case of Fowler v. Equitable Trust Co., 141 U. S. 384. Held, (1) that the payment of these commissions to the company's agent did not make the contract usurious, because if that sum was added to the nine per cent stipulated to be paid, the total amount of the interest exacted was less than the highest rate then allowed by law; (2) the stipulation in the deed of trust providing for the payment by the borrower, in addition to ordinary costs, of a reasonable solicitor's fee, not exceeding five per cent, for collection in the event of a suit to foreclose, did not make the contract usurious under the law of Illinois. Fowler v. Equitable Trust Co., 411.
term of twenty years, “in trust, and for the uses, objects and pur-