The Ambassador said that there would be a consortium dealing with the aid question. He hoped that some conditions could be set for any resumption of economic assistance. We have to have some way that our aid is not used to suppress East Pakistan. Dr. Kissinger said that he would put the Ambassador's views to the President. He said that he would be seeing the Ambassador during the week that Indian Foreign Minister Swaran Singh is here. He also said that the President would want to see the Ambassador during that week. Ambassador Keating said that he wanted to see the President, too. 65. Editorial Note President Nixon and Henry Kissinger discussed Ambassador Keating and his approach to the crisis developing in South Asia in a conversation in the Oval Office of the White House on June 4, 1971. Nixon said that he had seen Keating at a social function the previous evening and agreed to meet with him later in the month. That opened a discussion of the extent to which Nixon and Kissinger felt that Keating had effectively become an advocate of the government to which he was accredited. Nixon said that he told Keating that the United States should not become involved in an internal conflict. He was skeptical about Keating holding to that line: "What the hell does he think we should do?" Kissinger responded: "He thinks we should cut off all military aid, all economic aid, and in effect help the Indians to push the Pakistanis out." Nixon and Kissinger took exception to Keating's outlook, with Kissinger observing that it was important to buoy up Yahya for at least another month while Pakistan served as the gateway to China. Nixon said: "Even apart from the Chinese thing, I wouldn't do that to help the Indians, the Indians are no goddamn good." He noted that it seemed as though every U.S. Ambassador who went to India got "sucked in," Keating included. Kissinger said that it made no sense to follow Keating's advice and get involved in the conflict in East Pakistan. "If East Pakistan becomes independent, it is going to become a cesspool. It is going to be 100 million people, they have the lowest standard of living in Asia, no resources. They're going to become a ripe field for communist infiltration. And then they're going to bring pressure on India because of West Bengal. So that the Indians in their usual idiotic way are playing for little stakes, unless they have in the back of their minds that they could turn East Pakistan into a sort of protectorate that they could control from Calcutta." Nixon concluded that all the Indians had in mind was to damage Pakistan. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, June 4, 1971, 9:42–9:51 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 512-4) A transcript of this conversation is published in Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 136. 66. Telegram From the Embassy in Pakistan to the Department of State1 Islamabad, June 5, 1971, 1123Z. 5530. Subj: General Refugee Situation. Ref: Islamabad 5528.2 1. I met with President Yahya Khan at his office in Rawalpindi on Saturday, June 5 at 1200 hours. During the 50 minute conversation which ensued I discussed with Yahya, among other subjects which are reported by septels,3 the general refugee situation and the multitudinous problems which it presented. 2. I introduced this subject by underscoring President Nixon's satisfaction with the May 24 statement* which Yahya had issued. Noting that Washington was encouraged by GOP's plan to set up refugee reception centers in East Pakistan," I expressed the hope that these 1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, REF PAK. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Calcutta, Dacca, Geneva, Karachi, Lahore, New Delhi, and USUN. 2 In telegram 5528 from Islamabad, June 5, Farland reported that he began his meeting with Yahya by conveying a copy of President Nixon's letter of May 28. Yahya reacted positively to the letter and agreed that a restoration of conditions in the east wing which would be conducive to the return of refugees from India was essential and should be effected as soon as possible. (Ibid., POL 15–1 US/NIXON) 3 Telegram 5532 from Islamabad, June 5, reported on Farland's discussion with Yahya of the international relief efforts Yahya had agreed to countenance, and the measures that could be taken to try to prevent famine in East Pakistan. (Ibid., SOC 10 PAK) * In a press interview in Karachi on May 24, President Yahya renewed his appeal to East Pakistani refugees in India to return to their homes. He announced an amnesty for all except those who had committed serious crimes. (Letter from Hilaly to Van Hollen, June 1; ibid., REF PAK) 5 On May 31 the Government of Pakistan announced that it was setting up 20 reception and relief camps in East Pakistan to facilitate the return of refugees. (Ibid.) centers would quickly be activated. I also pointed out that there had been a most favorable reaction to his indicated willingness to repatriate all except "criminals" who, presumably, would be but a very small percentage. In this connection I expressed my belief that it would be most helpful if he would specifically indicate that Hindus would also be welcomed back, suggesting that this could be done by emphasizing publicly that all bona fide refugees regardless of religious origin could and should return to their homes. I suggested that this type of pronouncement would be favorably received by the GOI and should also have a salutary impact on world opinion. Yahya's immediate answer was to the effect that his May 24 statement was all inclusive and that there was no differentiation between Muslims and Hindus. He added, however, that he had no objection whatsoever in making a statement as suggested, and that he would most certainly do so. After thinking aloud for a few moments as to the timing of such a statement, he said he felt that it most appropriately could be incorporated into his major radio address to the nation which was being formulated and which would be broadcast soon. 3. I went on to note that the flow of refugees continued and that this flow is symptomatic of the serious situation in East Pakistan. I pointed out that the Embassy continued to receive reports of Hindu villages being attacked by the army, that fear is pervasive, and that until this situation changes the refugees will continue to cross over into India. And I reiterated the USG's concern that at some point the Hindu exodus, if not checked, could lead to a military clash with India. I said that the continued massive flow of refugees remains the most explosive aspect of the East Pakistan situation. Observing that the USG had urged restraint on the GOI, I said that nevertheless a heavy responsibility still rests on Pakistan. Realistically speaking, I observed that one could hardly expect the flow to cease until the level of military activity by the army is reduced and repressive measures against the local population, especially the Hindus, was ended. 4. While in no way admitting definite Hindu repression, Yahya said that he was equally seized with concern over the refugee situation and realized all of its ramifications and its potential for the direst of developments. He declared that in a continuing effort to alleviate the problems generally, to minimize the outward movement of East Pakistanis, and to restore a climate of normalcy, he had already sent specific orders to East Pakistan and in addition had dispatched a number of officers charged with the carrying out of these specifics: both actions he thought would have a salutary effect on the situation. He said every effort was being made to seal the borders and to expedite the return soonest of those persons dislocated by the conflict. He added that most assuredly he would give this matter his continuing attention. He concluded his comments by saying that his information indicated that the outflow had substantially decreased and that conversely many were moving back into East Pakistan and that processing of those individuals for onward movement to their homes had already begun. 67. Farland Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Washington, June 7, 1971. SUBJECT Relief Assistance for East Pakistan Refugees You will recall that your recent letter2 to Mrs. Gandhi included informing her that we would be providing an additional $15 million in relief assistance for the almost 4 million East Pakistanis who have so far fled to India. Now the paper work has caught up with this action and you are being asked by Secretary Rogers [Tab A]3 to sign the determination which would complete the legal requirements for transferring $5 million in Foreign Assistance funds to refugee relief so your decision can be implemented. The determination is to the effect that it is "important to the national interest" to use these funds this way. In view of our interest in alleviating the tensions caused by this large refugee problem, this is a reasonable finding. The Office of Management and Budget concurs [Tab A].4 State has also sent over a suggested White House press release [Tab B]5 although he does not indicate his thoughts on the desirability of making the announcement here rather than at the State Department. I understand, however, that the Department simply thought you might 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 370, Subject Files, Presidential Determinations, 71-11-72-09/71. Confidential. Sent for action. 2 Document 62. 3 All brackets in the source text. Attached as Tab A but not printed was a May 29 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon. 4 * OMB Director George Shultz concurred in the attached but not printed June 2 memorandum to Nixon. 5 Attached but not printed. prefer to take full credit through a special White House announcement as has been done with other major relief programs. As I see it, from a strictly foreign policy point of view it does not really make much difference but, on balance, I would prefer letting State do it. This will be a complex and difficult program, and I think you should not dramatize White House responsibility for it now. You may at this point be interested in a balance sheet of the major actions that have been taken so far on the relief and related problems. In response to the situation in India: -Of the initial $2.5 million in relief assistance to the refugees that you authorized, $1.5 million has gone to feeding programs by U.S. voluntary agencies and $500,000 has been contributed directly to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to assist in meeting immediate needs for shelter, medical aid and other non-food supplies. -Of the additional $15 million, $10 million will be devoted to satisfying about half of the estimated food needs for around 2.5 million refugees over the next three months. This will be coordinated through the UNHCR but administered through US voluntary agencies, international organizations, and Indian relief agencies. -We have encouraged and supported U Thant and the UNHCR in internationalizing the refugee relief program. -Informed the Indians that in response to their request through the UNHCR we are willing to provide four C-130s for the airlift of refugees from overcrowded border areas and to deliver relief supplies to the remaining refugees. -Briefed the Indians on what we are doing to get relief operations started in East Pakistan and to encourage political accommodation. -Urged the Indians to act with restraint toward Pakistan and have warned them against taking direct action against the source of the refugee problem. With Pakistan we have: -Encouraged acceptance of U Thant's representative as the coordinator of a large program of international relief assistance for the people of East Pakistan. -Urged President Yahya to restore peaceful conditions in East Pakistan, to look into reports of actions against the Hindu minority and to encourage the return of refugees. He has made one statement guaranteeing safety for those non-criminals who return. -Encouraged Yahya to create a political situation that will permit restoration of economic normality. -Urged that the port and inland distribution facilities be repaired to permit distribution of relief and other commodities to the populace |
