« PreviousContinue »
8. Ambassador referred to suggestion he had made to Yahya on June 24 that President appoint full-time high-level refugee coordinator. Yahya referred to appointment of H.R. Malik3 who would be working with "Kittani's people." He said another man would be working with UNHCR rep, but did not give any details and did not seem in mood to concentrate on that aspect.
9. Referring to fighting in border areas, Kellogg asked whether some persons were fleeing into interior of East Pakistan. Yahya said some had, and referred vaguely to number of Beharis whom government was looking after.
10. Ambassador used occasion to inform Yahya that USG had just authorized additional $1 million for coasters that could help meet urgent transport needs not only in cyclone areas but elsewhere in East Pakistan. Also informed Yahya of authorization for $4.7 million for variety of relief and reconstruction activities in cyclone area, to cover such needs as housing, shelters, and embankments. Ambassador pointed out that agreements would have to be concluded within two days, i.e. by end of fiscal year. Yahya expressed appreciation, although his mind was obviously focused primarily on problems with India which he recounted.
11. Reverting for at least third time near end of conversation of value of Kellogg's seeing situation for himself in East Pakistan, Yahya asked that we inform FonSec Sultan Khan and have him arrange trip. Kellogg said he accepted Yahya's suggestion, and Ambassador undertook inform FonSec soonest. (Ambassador did so in meeting FonSec about one hour later. FonSec assured that arrangements will be laid on. Kellogg and DCM are planning depart Islamabad June 29 and arrive Dacca morning June 30.)
12. Comment: Yahya was obviously in disturbed mood, and wished to focus only on urgency of what India rather than Pakistan must do to ease refugee problem. (In that regard he seemed reflect some of same concerns which Prince Sadruddin voiced in discussion with Secretary and Sisco June 24-ref State 115314.)5 In brief tete-à-tete following Yahya's discussion with Kellogg, Ambassador found Yahya disturbed over report from Ambassador Hilaly concerning former Consul General Blood's testimony before SFRC last week. Yahya was also disturbed over
3 H.R. Malik, chairman of the East Pakistan Agriculture Development Corporation, charged with responsibility for administering the distribution of food.
Ismat Kittani, UN Assistant Secretary-General for Inter-Agency Affairs, appointed Special Representative of the Secretary-General to establish guidelines for United Nations assistance for East Pakistan in May 1971.
5 Document 79.
latest report of statement by FonSec Douglas-Home on need for political settlement prior to aid. This is day on which Yahya's most awaited speech is being made to nation on his plans for political accommodation and "transfer of power." We found him a very harried man.
Letter From Pakistani President Yahya to President Nixon1
Islamabad, June 28, 1971.
Dear Mr. President,
I was greatly encouraged by report given to me by Mr. M.M. Ahmed after his meeting with you in Washington last month. I deeply appreciate your continuing interest in our development and particularly your assurance that United States would not wish to do anything that would aggravate Pakistan's difficulties and United States would like World Bank and other members of Consortium to adopt a similar helpful posture.
2. The proceedings of the informal meeting of the Consortium held at Paris on 21st June have however come to us as a disappointment. The official communiqué issued after the meeting is bare and negative. The same day British Broadcasting Corporation and New York Times carried stories that the Consortium had decided to withhold further aid to Pakistan until the Pakistan Government reveals what sort of political settlement it envisages for East Pakistan. The veracity of the newspaper reports has been enhanced by a statement of the British Foreign Secretary that "there can be no question of new British aid to Pakistan until we have firm evidence that real progress is being made towards a political settlement".
3. All these developments have led to a strong and widespread public reaction in Pakistan. It is most unfortunate that all this should have happened at this juncture. It can only make more difficult the task of a political settlement.
4. In response to these developments I had no choice but to declare in unequivocal terms in my broadcast of today that external assistance with political strings will be unacceptable to Pakistan.
1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 759, Presidential Correspondence File, Pakistan (1971). Secret. Sent to Kissinger on June 29 under cover of a letter from Pakistan Ambassador Hilaly which indicated that the text of the letter had been transmitted by telegram from Islamabad. (Ibid.)
5. It is important that the general impression about the present attitude of the Consortium countries to Pakistan is fully clarified. The adjournment of the Paris discussions without announcing a date to take up our requirements is being interpreted as a consequence of Indian pressure tactics.
6. I hope Mr. President that in view of the friendly relations between our two countries and your personal interest in Pakistan's integrity and well-being, you will prevent the present ambiguity and misunderstanding from becoming a source of further strains in Pakistan's relations with the Western world. This is something which we should in our joint interest try to prevent.
7. Your sympathetic approach to the problems that Pakistan is facing today and the understanding you have shown of our efforts to resolve the crisis in East Pakistan continue to be a source of strength to me. I hope Mr. President that your personal interest and support in this regard will be maintained.
With warm personal regards,
A.M. Yahya Khan
83. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)1
Washington, June 29, 1971, 10:40 a.m.
S: I am going to send you over a copy of the bureaucratic talking papers for your trip to India and Pakistan. I have written a personal chit on each one and said what I think you need to do and said it in direct language and what the problems are with India and Pakistan. K: India wants to attack Pakistan.
1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 368, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.
2 Briefing materials for Kissinger's trip to South Asia in July are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1072, Briefing Books for HAK's SEA and PRC trips.
S: India eating its cake and wanting it too. They are supporting the guerrillas. In East Pakistan. They call on Pakistan to put army in barracks but how can they with the guerrillas. Then they say the international community must give maximum support but they tell the refugees you cannot return to Pakistan until Yahya lets [omission in the source text]. When the High Commissioner went to Delhi (?) he tried to get them to insure a U.N. presence on border so the Pakistanis could cross and this would hurt their efforts with [omission in the source text] and get the Indians [omission in the source text]. The Indians turned him down. They said it would [not?] create tensions [conditions?] where people can return and feel they will not be hurt. Get the U.N. on Pakistan side of the line. That's fine. Indians keeping the pot boiling. It's difficult from the telegrams to get this and you won't get it from Keating.
K: Does the Secy. agree with you?
S: I don't know but it's true. On Pakistan side, one thing you to get across. Yahya is trying. He is surrounded by the military and not entirely free agent. He made that speech yesterday and the emphasis is fine wants the people back. Major weakness is that while announcing program on putting together a new constitution and people elected in provisional election will come in the assembly if free elections but he has barred Awami League. It's like telling Ted Kennedy not to be a Democrat. For him to maintain ban on Awami League there will be no political solution.
K: What about the AID program.
S: We tried to clarify the article3 on Sat.* Made it appear that all consortium members had decided not to give aid. Not true. The World Bank representative gave a report but nothing done. A hardy defense in [omission in the source text] of Kennedy committee in favor.
K: Won't we run out soon? Won't we have to [omission in the source text].
S: It's key and we will have to do it.
K: When? I don't think India should tell [us?] how to deal with Pakistan.
S: A problem on both sides. When do you leave?
K: Thurs.5 night.
S: You will come away with one thing. The impression of how serious this situation is. I have the feeling that you people in the WH don't understand how serious it is.
K: We know.
S: Not that it will explode in the end of the week.
K: No at the end of the monsoons, India will attack.
S: You have to be more pointed than Keating. Say we know you are supporting the guerrillas.
K: I will say that.
S: You will. There's too much kiss ass on this thing.
K: That's not my specialty.
Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Washington, June 30, 1971.
Pakistan: Yahya's June 28 Address on Political Formula
Pakistani President Yahya Khan, in a long-awaited nationwide broadcast on June 28, outlined his plans for a conditional return to representative government within approximately four months. Yahya stated, however, that even after the promulgation of a new constitution and the convening of national and provincial legislatures, martial law would continue to be "at their disposal for a period of time.”
Yahya has given up his original intention to have an elected constituent assembly adopt a constitution for him to "authenticate." Pakistan's new constitution will be written by a group of experts after consultation with political leaders and can be amended by the National Assembly, which would function as a legislature immediately upon being convened. This new constitution would follow the outline of Yahya's Legal Framework Order of 1970, i.e., an Islamic Republic, a federal state with adequate financial, administrative and legislative
1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, NEA/PAB Files: Lot 77 D 91, POL 15-1, Head of State. Confidential. Drafted on June 29 by Joel M. Woldman (NEA/PAF) with the concurrence of Van Hollen. The memorandum is stamped June 29, but Sisco corrected the date by hand.