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camps and acceptance of UNHCR representative in reception centers across the borders.
The argument for is that an effective UNHCR facilitative role could be an important measure for assuring the refugees about the safety in going home.
The argument against is that the Indians are not inclined to have UN representatives in the refugee camps and pressure on them to do so could be abrasive to our bilateral relations.
7. Resort to Security Council. We would seek an even-handed Security Council resolution calling on both parties to reduce tensions and urging all states to promote peace and stability in South Asia.
The argument for is that it might help deter dramatic actions on the ground, demonstrate our parallel interests with the Soviets and, with the UN in the middle, preserve U.S. credentials and leverage and provide a basis for a further UN mediation effort.
The argument against is that it would be an empty gesture with no enforcement capability and the session could easily degenerate into an Indo-Pak shouting match. It might also detract from more productive quiet diplomacy. Finally, the Pakistanis might oppose the whole affair on the grounds that it constituted interference in internal affairs. IV. Military and Economic Programs (pp. 26–30)
Our military and economic aid programs take on considerable significance in view of our desire to develop cooperative relations with both India and Pakistan.
A. Military supply. Our military sales to Pakistan are of paramount psychological and practical significance to the West Pakistanis. Our current even limited supply of arms to Pakistan has been strongly criticized by India and our handling of this issue has further damaged our capacity to influence India in the direction we desire. At the same time the West Pakistanis are likely to become increasingly dissatisfied with our current policy and it is highly vulnerable with the Congress.
The paper recommends a "suspension” of all shipments of arms to Pakistan, "in order to restore a degree of credibility to our calls for restraint and to support the relative preeminence of our interests in India.” Once peaceful conditions are restored and a satisfactory political settlement achieved, we could review this suspension. The paper notes that if we wished to stop short of public announcement of such a suspension, we might simply say we had decided to review the remaining items in the pipeline, clearly implying that the more sensitive items would not be shipped.
The arguments for are that such a policy would:
-support our primary interest in influencing India to act with restraint;
-significantly improve relations with India;
-remove a difficult issue with Congress and lessen public criticism;
-have a positive impact on the Bengalis and ultimately on any future relations with East Pakistan.
The arguments against such a policy include that it would:
-seriously irritate the West Paks and greatly reduce our influence with them;
-increase Chinese influence as the major arms suppliers;
-perhaps lead to more intransigent West Pakistani positions on military actions against the Bengalis and political accommodation;
-perhaps encourage India to take military action against Pakistan.
B. Economic Assistance. The paper recommends that we continue to adhere to a policy of not conditioning aid politically but insisting on developmental criteria which will ensure that both East as well as West Pakistan will benefit from our resources. Economic aid, within this context, is viewed as a carrot which we are holding out before the Pakistanis and which may be important if we are to have an effect in dealing with sensitive political subjects such as political accommodation with Mujib.
The arguments for include:
-make non-political and less controversial economic aid the major positive ingredient in our relations with Pakistan;
-is consistent with worldwide policies we follow;
-indicates our continuing concern for Pakistan's developmental prospects and protects our past inputs;
-to a degree counters Chinese influence;
-developmental criteria if strictly imposed could result in very little aid and ultimately the erosion of our credibility and influence in Pakistan;
- if we do not ease his foreign exchange problems, Yahya may be forced into intransigent political positions;
-any aid to Pakistan will be resented by India, although if it was clearly conditioned on developmental terms would not necessarily be a major negative factor in our relations. V. Options in the Event of Hostilities (pp. 32–35)
The policies suggested in the paper and outlined above would reinforce the intrinsic negative factors working against an Indian decision to attack Pakistan. Nonetheless there is still a significant possibility that a war could erupt between India and Pakistan during the next three to six months. The judgment of the paper is that if no progress is made toward political accommodation between East and West Pakistan or on the repatriation of the refugees by September or October the chances for hostilities will increase.
Our actions in the event of another Indo-Pak war would in part be determined by the circumstances in which hostilities broke out. The most likely scenarios are an Indian attack on East Pakistan to “liberate" the area or a gradual process of escalations involving border incidents on both sides. In any event it would be in the U.S. interest to see that hostilities do not expand to include third parties, particularly China. It would also, according to the paper, be in our interest:
—to see that the hostilities were not protracted since a prolonged war could do profound damage to the political, economic and social fabric of both India and Pakistan.
-If India attacked, our interests would be best served by a rapid Indian victory in East Pakistan followed by a swift withdrawal and installation of a Bangla Desh government and a stalemate on the Western front which left West Pakistan intact. The problem would be how to insure Indian withdrawal and limitation of the conflict in the West.
Irrespective of our political posture toward hostilities, various U.S. programs in India and Pakistan would be immediately affected. The paper recommends that contingency planning by appropriate U.S. agencies should be undertaken along the following lines:
1. U.S. ships destined to India and Pakistan should be warned not to call at belligerent ports if carrying cargo for both belligerents, since it will most likely be confiscated. (Confiscated cargoes caused considerable problems in 1965 which we are still trying to straighten out.)
2. MAC and commercial air carriers should have contingency arrangements for overflying the area without stopping in either India or Pakistan, since the fighting may include the bombing of air fields.
3. Evacuation plans should be reviewed for all posts in India and Pakistan for implementation on short notice.
4. Intelligence collection should be increased to provide the maximum advance warning of Chinese intentions. [2 lines of source text not declassified]
The U.S., according to the paper, could pursue one of the following three broad strategies in the event of hostilities between India and Pakistan:
1. Passive international role. The U.S. would assume an essentially passive role toward the conflict indicating our basic neutrality. This would be most appropriate in circumstances where the responsibility for the outbreak of war was unclear or where we judged the likelihood of Chinese military involvement to be small. It would not do irreparable harm to our interests in either country. This posture would also allow us to adopt a mediating position encouraging a negotiated political set
tlement when circumstances made such a role possible. Such an approach would not be appropriate if there were a prolonged conflict. In pursuing these options we could
-adopt a public posture of neutrality;
The argument for is that U.S. involvement would be at a minimum and we would at the same time maintain maximum flexibility as events unfolded. Also our relationship with both India and Pakistan would be preserved.
The argument against is that we would risk serious damage to our interests if the conflict were protracted. Indian dependence on the Soviets and Pakistani dependence on the Chinese could be increased without any significant gain for the U.S.
2. Military Support. At the other extreme would be a decision to support with military assistance either India or Pakistan. We have limited commitments to both sides (through SEATO and CENTO to Pakistan and the 1964 Air Defense Agreement with India) although there is no provision for automatic U.S. involvement.
(a) To Pakistan. If the U.S. decided to assist Pakistan in the case of clear Indian aggression we could:
-develop an emergency military supply program;
-take lead in mobilizing international effort to pressure India to halt aggression;
-support a Security Council resolution condemning India.
The argument for: we would be supporting our interest in Pakistan's national unity, diminishing Chinese influence and generally strengthening our relations with the whole Muslim world.
The argument against is that we would severely damage our relations with India who would move closer to the Soviets. There would also be no room for a U.S. conciliatory role.
(b) To India. The judgment of the paper is that military support to India is a "less likely" strategy in the context of a limited Indo-Pak conflict, but if China were to intervene we would want to consider military assistance to India. It might even be possible, if China intervened, to mil
6 In his memoirs, Kissinger points to the contingencies considered in the planning paper in the event of Chinese intervention in a conflict between India and Pakistan and concludes: “Nothing more contrary to the President's foreign policy could have been imagined." (White House Years, p. 865)
itarily support India and launch peacemaking efforts that would allow us to maintain a viable future relationship with the West Pakistanis. Specific action we might take would include:
-consultation with India under the 1964 Air Defense Agreement;
- coordinate with British and Soviets on additional military assistance measures.
The argument for is that it would be consistent with our overall Asian policy and would establish a firm basis for a close relationship with India, perhaps at the expense of the Soviets.
The argument against is that severe strains would be created in our relations with Pakistan and China. There would also be the risk of creeping involvement leading to a more extensive commitment involving a direct U.S. confrontation with one or more outside powers.
3. Political intervention. The main purpose of political efforts would be to localize and end hostilities. We would also work vigorously for a negotiated settlement that would remove the basic causes for tension in South Asia. Such an effort would involve:
-an immediate call for Security Council consideration of the crisis.
-support of a Security Council resolution calling for an immediate cease-fire and direct negotiations on the terms of withdrawal and political settlement.
-immediate Presidential message to Yahya and/or Mrs. Gandhi calling for end of hostilities and/or a negotiated settlement.
-immediate consultations with British and Soviets.
If there were a clear case of Indian aggression we would also want to cut off all military shipments to India and hold economic assistance in abeyance.
If the circumstances surrounding the outbreak of war were unclear, we would want to cut off military supply and consider suspending all economic aid to both India and Pakistan. We would urge other major powers to follow suit.
The arguments for include:
-would maximize use of U.S. programs and leverage to shorter hostilities and prevent third party intervention;
-would make it possible to maintain relations with both India and Pakistan (and perhaps Bangla Desh as well) in the aftermath of hostilities.