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Mr. Kissinger: We must be clear in our own minds what constitutes a desirable outcome. What do we want the Pakistanis to do precisely?
Mr. Irwin: We want to reduce the flow of refugees to a trickle.
Mr. Kissinger: The Pakistanis will agree with that objective but we will have to tell them what to do to bring it about. Both the President and I have some money in the bank with them. We might get them to do something if we know what we want them to do.
Mr. Sisco: In approaching the Pakistanis I think we should say that we are prepared to take certain actions with the Indians. We will tell India to hold down its logistic support of the guerrillas. I think we should draw a distinction between logistical support and actual border crossings. We will tell India to accept a UN presence and to cooperate with it. If we do this with India, what will you—the Pakistanis-do to create more normal conditions in East Pakistan? We could suggest to them that they cut down Pakistani army activities in East Pakistan, even get the army back in their barracks. We could say that we assume Pakistan will cooperate with the UN. We also think Pakistan should implement what Yahya has said they will do about the refugees. We also think that they should do what they can in terms of the political process. For example, Yahya has said he will transfer power to East Pakistan within four months. Could they speed this transfer to two months? Could they try to get as many Awami League people back as possible?
Mr. Williams: As long as the Pakistani army is both fighting and running the country they won't be able to do much. It is absolutely necessary to get the army out of the civil administration. They don't give a damn and they aren't very good at it. That means speed up the process at least to get a quasi-Bengali political apparatus in East Pakistan.
Mr. Kissinger (to Mr. Selden): What does Defense think?
Adm. Moorer: Before we can get the Pakistanis to do something, India must give some visible evidence that they are not engaging in these border crossings. Just the other day they destroyed a bunch of powerhouses and they are attacking the soldiers in their barracks. As long as there is military activity by India, Pakistan won't move. It has to be simultaneous. I am not sure India does not want to see this turmoil continue.
Mr. Selden: Where do we get these refugee figures from? Are these Indian figures?
Mr. Waller: They are fairly accurate.
Mr. Sisco: They are using the figure of 7 million but it wouldn't make much difference if it were 5 million. The Pakistanis don't seriously question the figures.
Mr. Kissinger: If we have only three plus months and plan on talking to Hilaly and Jha, we must come up with some concrete ideas on what we want each side to do. If we then make this a yardstick for what we will do, we might have a chance.
Mr. Irwin: We will put something down on paper.
Mr. Kissinger: There is a related problem. Mr. Williams has pointed out that the food situation in East Pakistan may generate a new flood of refugees. Can we set up something now to help in a food crisis? Can we do something to help them return to normal distribution procedures?
Mr. Williams: This is why I am stressing the weaknesses in the administrative structure.
Mr. Kissinger: Can we express what we want in terms of an administrative structure? Can we internationalize food relief? We shouldn't just let this famine hit us unprepared.
Mr. Helms: The difficulty is that they need 3.5 million tons of food and can only distribute 2 million.
Mr. Kissinger: Can we put them in a position to distribute more? Mr. Helms: They have put a very weak man in charge of this. Mr. Van Hollen: They have recently appointed Malik who has only limited competence. The best thing in his favor is that he is a Bengali.
Mr. Sisco (to Mr. Williams): Can you tell Henry what we have done specifically?
Mr. Williams: When M.M. Ahmad was here we told him he had a serious food problem coming up. We had a whole list of concrete steps that could be taken, including giving them $2 million to charter transport, but the army just doesn't give a damn and isn't good at this kind of thing anyhow, and the Bengalis won't level with the army about what the problems really are.
Mr. Kissinger: We can expect that every one of these problems will get worse over the next few weeks. If famine is inevitable with the resulting increase in the outflow of refugees, there will be strong pressures here at home. Should we be prepared to squeeze the Pakistanis on this? Maybe if we organize ourselves here, we can get them to do something there.
Mr. Williams: One of the big problems, of course, is that most food relief operations are close to the border and susceptible to Indian interdiction.
Mr. Kissinger: But if the food programs are internationalized, this might be a way of restraining the Indians. They may be less likely to blow up an international transport. (to Mr. Irwin) Put into your paper a detailed program of what you want. We in this building are prepared
to press Pakistan to do whatever will help but we need to put our greatest weight on the things that matter.
Mr. Williams: The Pakistani Army is very thinly stretched in East Pakistan. They are extremely short of transport and they have been commandeering trucks. The real problem is in getting an effective operation going.
Mr. Sisco: We might think in terms of a massive emergency movement of transport which could be monitored by us or by an international group to see that it gets to the right place. We have two problems: the food that is getting there is not adequate for three months from now and the administrative structure cannot cope with its distribution.
Mr. Irwin: (to Mr. Williams): Have we got all the food into the port that the warehouses can take?
Mr. Williams: Yes.
Mr. Kissinger: We need a statement of their requirements, what is actually there, and what the shortfall will be. The food situation can only get tougher. We should start to do our part now.
Mr. Helms: This will make Biafra look like a cocktail party.
Mr. McDonald: We have prepared a detailed plan on this. A Department of Agriculture man came out and did a detailed study" which we understand Yahya read personally. It spelled out specific policies and actions but none of its recommendations have been carried out.
Mr. Kissinger: Maybe Yahya can't do it; maybe it requires an international effort. If Yahya were willing to have international observers in the villages maybe he could get the refugees back.
Mr. Williams: A UN structure has begun to be staffed.
Mr. Kissinger: It is true that the UN was very slow in supplying personnel?
Mr. Sisco: Yes, but it is moving pretty well now.
Mr. Williams: They are getting some people there and beginning to build a structure.
Mr. Sisco: They are still trying to get Indian agreement, of course. Mr. Kissinger: Let's get a scenario early next week and have another meeting on this later in the week.
Let's talk about military assistance now.
Mr. Irwin: You know our views. However, we now only have $14-$15 million to go and that's not going to go in the next two weeks. We would have originally recommended a complete embargo but
5 Reference is to the port of Chittagong in East Pakistan.
6 See footnote 3, Document 102.
now this may not be so significant. By August 10, $10 million of the outstanding licenses will have expired, with only $4 million left outstanding.
Mr. Sisco: We can let the pipeline slowly dry out. In part, of course, we will be influenced by the degree of success we have in modifying the Gallagher Amendment to permit us sufficient latitude.
Mr. Noyes: If we are talking about a confrontation with Pakistan over military supply, the fat's already in the fire.
Mr. Sisco: We have put a hold on the one-time exception to our arms policy involving 300 APCs and some aircraft. We believe this hold should be maintained. Nothing has been delivered and nothing is scheduled to be delivered. Since March 25 no new licenses have been issued and we do not intend to issue any new licenses, although we have a hundred requests. There is about $15 million in the pipeline based on licenses issued before March 25.
Mr. Kissinger: I am not aware of any Presidential decision not to issue licenses.
Mr. Sisco: This was considered at your last SRG meeting. Mr. Selden: I think we need a definition of "arms." Mr. Sisco: We will put in our paper what we think the policy is. Mr. Kissinger: The Pakistanis complained specifically to me about a motor for some experimental tank. I just want to be sure we understand where we are. I agree the Pakistanis are not upset about arms now. Mr. Sisco: Not at all; they are grateful that we haven't stopped entirely.
Mr. Kissinger: What happens when the licenses expire?
Mr. Sisco: It will be a year before everything that is in the pipeline has been delivered. But we have agreed that we will not renew licenses or issue new ones.
Mr. Selden: We still need a definition of "arms." Are we talking about such things as tires and spark plugs?
7 Congressman Cornelius E. Gallagher (D-New Jersey) offered an amendment to pending foreign assistance legislation that called for the suspension of all military sales and economic assistance to Pakistan until the President could report to Congress that Pakistan was facilitating a return to stability in East Pakistan, and until the refugees from East Pakistan were permitted to return to their homes and to reclaim their lands and property. (Subsection (V) (1) of Section 620 of Chapter 2 of Part III of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended) The House Foreign Affairs Committee voted in favor of the Gallagher amendment on July 15. On October 5 the Senate Foreign Relations Committee adopted the language approved by the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
8 See Document 32.
MONITZ LAW LIBRARY
Mr. Kissinger: I don't want to reopen the whole question of arms for Pakistan.
Mr. Sisco: It would be suicide to resume deliveries.
Mr. Kissinger: And the Pakistanis don't want it.
Mr. Sisco: We will get a statement of our position on paper.
Mr. Kissinger: Do the Pakistanis understand that the pipeline is closing on August 10?
Mr. Sisco: Let me be sure you understand. By the middle of August $11 million of the $15 million worth of licenses will have been used or will have expired. This does not mean that the material will have been delivered. It will be somewhere in the pipeline.
Mr. Kissinger: Can it be delivered after August 10?
Mr. Van Hollen: Some of it will have been shipped by August 10. Mr. Irwin: But if it isn't shipped by August 10 it would not be permitted to be shipped.
Mr. Kissinger: How much of the $10 million will be shipped? Do the Pakistanis know they are under the guillotine?
Mr. Sisco: They will still have $4 million left.
Mr. Kissinger: Not even the Indians can make something out of that. In other words, by August 15 we will have done exactly what the President did not want to do in June except for $4 million.
Mr. Saunders: I don't think anyone here understood what the effect would be.
Mr. Noyes: You understand that everything from the Defense Department is still under a complete hold.
Mr. Irwin: We hope that when the military supply fades out, we can get the same effect from humanitarian and food assistance.
Mr. Kissinger: Isn't this a stricter embargo than 1965?
Mr. Van Hollen: No, we had a complete embargo for some months in 1965–66. In 1966 we began providing non-lethal equipment and in 1967 we began giving them spares for equipment that was considered lethal.
Mr. Irwin: Of course, they can buy spark plugs and things commercially. They are only barred from getting them out of FMS stocks.
Mr. Kissinger: So we have cut off economic and, in effect, we are cutting off military assistance by indirection. All we did was give them an additional six weeks.
Mr. Sisco: What do you mean "six weeks"?
Mr. Kissinger: In June the President specifically did not approve cutting off the supply of military equipment. Now you are getting it by indirection.