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Mr. Williams: There doesn't have to be political accommodation to get the civilians in.

Mr. Van Hollen: But the two things are directly related. We should be and are preparing a relief program, but its implementation depends on the governmental situation in East Pakistan-not on the US or on the UN. The way to get some organizational arrangement in East Pakistan to prevent famine and restore some normality is through some political accommodation.

Mr. Helms: Our problem is to provide the food and get it in place. How can we assume the responsibility for its distribution? We should confine ourselves to doing the things we can do. It's up to Yahya to decide how the food should be distributed. He has an interest in keeping East Pakistan with West Pakistan. He's not interested in helping India by letting a famine develop in East Pakistan.

Mr. Williams: We can get the food there.

Mr. Kissinger: We can go further than that. (to Williams) You made a good presentation at the last meeting on the necessity to marshal water transport and things like that. The resources seem to be more under Army control than civilian control. If we told Yahya these things were required for distribution and we will help, we might make real progress. But if, on top of that, we tell him he must end the insurgency and have some sort of political accommodation, we won't make it in time for October. Yahya's mind just doesn't work that fast and the structure isn't there.

Mr. Irwin: I agree we should do all you say, but we would go a step further. We would point out that there should be a start in a direction that might accomplish political accommodation.

Mr. Kissinger: What do we mean by "political accommodation?” India considers political accommodation as splitting off East Pakistan from West Pakistan.

Mr. Van Hollen: We shouldn't have a blue print. But, in order to create a viable institution, Yahya must agree to deal with the true political representatives in East Pakistan.

Mr. Kissinger: The question is whether we have to have political accommodation before we can get a relief program.

Mr. Irwin: Not before the relief program starts. But if there is not some effort in this direction, the cross-border operations will intensify and there will be more disruption of the relief efforts. If we can stop the cross-border operations by India, the relief effort might have a better chance of success.

Mr. Kissinger: Will India slow down its cross-border operations if the political process could be speeded up to October? India says Yahya has to deal with the Awami League.

Mr. Van Hollen: The extent to which India desists from its cross-border operations would be linked to progress on the political


Mr. Hannah: Why not approach it the other way around. Tell Yahya that the best way to thwart the Indians is to get better food and better conditions in East Pakistan than in the refugee camps in India. We must convince Yahya that certain things have to be done while the military is occupied in dealing with the guerrillas. If Yahya assumes responsibility for the distribution of food, he can use it as a political weapon.

Mr. Kissinger: We can tell him what is needed to distribute the food as long as our programs are moving ahead.

Mr. Irwin: We're not really disagreeing with you.

Mr. Kissinger: But you're saying the next turn of the wheel is conditional-that nothing will move until there is a start on political accommodation.

Mr. Irwin: No we're not.

Mr. Williams: No.

Mr. Zumwalt: Even if all the food gets through, the famine will still probably occur. Both the Indians and the Soviets would prefer famine rather than see Yahya win. The Chinese would probably prefer famine to seeing East Pakistan split off from West Pakistan.

Mr. Kissinger: I agree with John Hannah. If we can be forthcoming with Yahya on something, we have a better chance of getting some political accommodation than if we hector him and try to put the squeeze on him.

Mr. Hannah: We should continue to do everything we have been doing. We should get Yahya to accept UN direction. We should recognize, though, that even when the UN people are there, it won't work unless the US gets involved in an operation to marshal all existing resources, similar to the recent flood relief operation. We can give him the backstopping of the UN, but we'll still have to furnish the food and get it there, and provide some management once it's there.

Mr. Williams: The food that is moving to Pakistan now is adequate to deal with the crisis. The food is moving to the ports and we have obtained $3 million worth of charter transport to move it from the ports. We want a UN presence involved in the internal distribution. We have an agreement in principle from Pakistan, but they have still not authorized the entrance of the 28 people. We're not holding anything back.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Williams) Maybe you should go there and tell Yahya what is needed to break the bureaucratic log-jam.


Mr. Hannah: It would be more effective if we could get a representative Pakistani to carry the message to Yahya. We can reinforce it. How about Shoaib?5

Mr. Williams: He's traveling for the World Bank.

Mr. Irwin: We would like to move ahead as you are suggesting. In addition, we think it would be better to start some move toward political accommodation.

Mr. Kissinger: My personal judgement of Yahya is that if we do something for him, then ask him to move in a direction of political accommodation, he would be more likely to do it. We're really debating timing. Can we get a comprehensive program of relief and get it to Yahya together with our judgement as to where the bottlenecks are. We can then get someone to talk to him.

Mr. Williams: This is all in train-he's not in real trouble at the moment. When the harvest fails, then there will be trouble.

Mr. Kissinger: The situation isn't going to get any easier in the next two months. If there is another great outflow of refugees, the domestic problem in India may become unmanageable.

Mr. Williams: It's a matter of internal transport.

Mr. Kissinger: I understand that, but let's keep that a technical problem.

Mr. Williams: We'll put together a comprehensive relief package. Mr. Kissinger: Let's put it all together-what has moved and where the bottlenecks are.

(to Irwin) With regard to your scenario, I doubt that Yahya can withdraw his army to their barracks under present circumstances.

Mr. Irwin: We took that out of the paper and substituted a restoration of the civil administration, leaving the maintenance of law and order to the police and the provincial para-military forces.

Mr. Kissinger: Your idea would be to go to Yahya with the whole program. If you do, he'll say "I'll do everything but the political steps."

Mr. Van Hollen: We can tell him that to the degree he can do these things, it would help clamp down on the Indian cross-border operations and establish a UN presence on the Indian side of the border. If he makes some political moves, India may be more amenable to stopping its activities that are adding to the tension.

Mr. Kissinger: How would we get India to do that?

5 Mohammed Shoaib, Vice President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

Mr. Van Hollen: We could tell India that what is happening in East Pakistan is in the right direction.

Mr. Kissinger: The right direction to them is the Indian direction. What is the right direction?

Mr. Irwin: For Yahya to begin to deal with the elected representatives in East Pakistan-maybe not the Awami League. This needn't be conditioned to doing other things.

Mr. Kissinger: We're holding up military shipments to Pakistan and not giving them economic assistance. What would we do if we were opposed to Yahya? How does our policy differ from a hostile policy?

Mr. Van Hollen: In many ways. In general we have been very forthcoming with Pakistan. We came forward rapidly on relief. We haven't cut off economic assistance-indeed we have been more flexible than the other members of the economic consortium. In Yahya's eyes, our stance has been favorable.

Mr. Kissinger: We should tell him he should do these things on refugees but tie it to political accommodation?

Mr. Irwin: It wouldn't be tied to political accommodation.

Mr. Kissinger: Would we tell him that our efforts with India are contingent on these steps, or that our resumption of economic assistance is contingent on political steps?

Mr. Van Hollen: They are not contingent on political steps. We have been doing these things all along. We can tell him that our success with India depends on his success on the refugee flow and on political accommodation.

Mr. Nutter: We have the very practical problem that 90% of his transport is of US origin. If we cut off his spare parts he won't have a transportation system.

Mr. Zumwalt: Or he won't be able to maintain sufficient order to prevent the insurgents from cutting the system. If we don't give him some spares that are classified as lethal, the Pakistan Army will be relatively limited. They could do a better job than if we bring their military machine to a halt by withholding spare parts. We can use the military capability to keep the lines open and use the vehicles to deliver food.

Mr. Williams: I think your first point is valid but I question the second. The UNICEF vehicles have been commandeered by the Army and they aren't using them to move supplies.


Mr. Kissinger: (to Irwin) Your proposed scenario says (reading) ... our hold on military shipments... should not be lifted until there is an end of military activity against the civilian population and until the army is returned to its barracks and effective civilian adminis


tration is in operation." In other words, until after East Pakistan is independent.

Mr. Hannah: What about the spare parts for the trucks now under order? Are they being shipped?

Mr. Zumwalt: The licenses will run out in a few weeks.

Mr. Williams: Shipments will cease on August 13.

Mr. Zumwalt: At just about the time the famine is hitting, we will likely see a breakdown of transport and of the ability to maintain sufficient order to get food supplies through.

Mr. Irwin: If by giving the military some trucks they would use them to move supplies, no one would object. By giving trucks and spare parts to the military, even though we did our best to see that they were used for food distribution, you would be certain to arouse political opposition here.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we see a cable on what you would tell Yahya. I will schedule fifteen minutes at the beginning of the next NSC meeting so that all of the principals can hear the President's views again on this subject. Let's see a cable of what we want to tell Yahya. We're very receptive here to anything we should say on what he should do on refugees.

Mr. Irwin: To sum up, anything in any area that we can do without getting into the question of political accommodation, we should do. Political accommodation will be treated separately.

Mr. Kissinger: In general, of course, I'm in favor of representative government and we should urge Yahya to restore an increasing degree of participation by the people of East Pakistan. But the clock is running in India faster than the clock on political accommodation. We are determined to avoid war. If it is necessary to squeeze India, we will. There will be no war if we have any pressure available. The inevitable eventual outcome of all this is an autonomous East Pakistan. Over any two or three year period, 75,000 Punjabi cannot govern 75 million Bengalis. West Pakistan needs more time for the sort of accommodation that will be required than they do to meet the urgent problem of the refugees.

Mr. Irwin: We don't disagree. In addition, we are saying it might be helpful if Yahya could make a start in the direction of political accommodation.

Mr. Kissinger: If it can be done in a non-conditional way.

Mr. Irwin: There are no conditions.

Mr. Kissinger: Let's draft a telegram and I will show it to the President.

Mr. Irwin: Warren (Nutter) and Admiral Zumwalt have raised a good question on military supply.

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