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virtually nothing in military supply for vital US economic aid and leadership in the consortium.

2. Resumption of economic aid to Pakistan and US pressure on the consortium governments to resume aid raises bureaucratic, Congressional and policy problems. As Sisco indicates, we might save the possibility of resuming aid by cutting off military supply but we will be right back in the soup again with Congress if we do this without first having some sort of national development plan such as the Congress expects. Taking the lead in the consortium raises the same problem and it is doubtful we could achieve much anyway in the consortium without such a plan. Finally, AID is no more aware of this approach than we. Sisco has promised much more than we may be able to deliver soon.

-A cut-off of military supply to Pakistan might gain us some points in India but we have already been so damaged there on this issue that a cut-off when the pipeline is almost dry will not recoup much. Moreover, there is some question whether we really want to send the Indians this kind of a signal now.

In short, Sisco is talking about a trade-off that might make sense when the Senate reconvenes. But he has raised it with the Paks without authority, without much sense of what it would take to resume aid and over-arousing Pak expectations about resumption.

139. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 2, 1971.


Military Supply Pipeline for Pakistan


The Secretary
Christopher Van Hollen, Deputy Assistant Secretary, NEA
Peter D. Constable, Senior Political Officer, Pakistan-Afghanistan Affairs
Maj. Gen. Inam-ul Haq, Director General, Defense Procurement; Pakistan

Ministry of Defense
Mr. Z.M. Farooqi, Deputy Chief of Mission, Embassy of Pakistan


Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 626, Country Files, Middle East, Pakistan, Vol. VII, Sep Oct 1971. Secret; Nodis. Drafted on September 8 by Constable (NEA/PAF).

The Secretary welcomed General Haq to Washington and expressed his deep appreciation for President Yahya's prompt response to Mr. Sisco's suggestion that our two governments look at ways to deal with the remaining military supply pipeline. He also expressed appreciation of President Yahya's understanding of the problems that military supply pipeline presents. The Secretary stated, however, that he wanted to make clear Mr. Sisco's suggestion was just that. We are not pressing the Government of Pakistan. We want to take a look at the problem together. We do not want to change our policy toward Pakistan or to do anything that will hurt Pakistan. If it does work out, it would be to our mutual advantage, since it would give us an opportunity to try to play a constructive role in economic assistance. Comparing the military supply pipeline of $2.6 million with the economic assistance pipeline of $80 million, it is apparent which is the more important. While the military supply question is not an important issue in domestic politics, Congressional opposition to military supply has created a potential political problem in U.S.-Pakistan relations. The pipeline question may impair our ability to be helpful with economic assistance. It is in this context that Mr. Sisco asked Ambassador Hilaly if shipments from the remaining small pipeline might be speeded up or items ordered elsewhere. If that were done, then we could make a low-key statement to the effect that shipments from the pipeline had been completed.

Major General Haq replied by expressing President Yahya's deep appreciation for being taken into confidence. He does not want to cause any difficulties for President Nixon and he is aware of the political pressures. President Yahya had instructed him to cooperate fully with us. There is tremendous good will in Pakistan for the United States and there might be some bafflement when the public learns the United States is no longer shipping military items to Pakistan. However, he hoped the announcement can be worded in such a way as to avoid any impression that we have joined hands with India. The General noted that the recent Indo-Soviet treaty had caused an imbalance in the Subcontinent and he alleged that the Indians would be receiving 400 T-60 series tanks from the Soviets as a result of the treaty, while the Soviets had now cut off spares for the inferior tanks they had previously supplied to Pakistan. It was obvious, according to the General, that the new Soviet tanks were for Indian use on the plains of the Punjab. The imbalance of power could be increased by Pakistan's difficulties in maintaining U.S. equipment, particularly aircraft. He added, however, that they would try for the time being to find alternate sources for the spares. He concluded by saying they would try to ship out as much as possible in as short a time as possible. He also raised a question as to the feasibility of air cargo shipments out by MATS flights, but also recognized possible problems with this method.


The Secretary then emphasized our interest in a low-key announcement, perhaps by the State Department spokesman, noting simply that Pakistan had completed its shipments of military supply items, or some similar formulation that we could mutually agree on. The General and Mr. Farooqi expressed their agreement with and appreciation for this kind of formulation.

Mr. Farooqi asked whether the resolution of the military supply question would enable the United States to take the lead with the Consortium countries in economic assistance questions. The Secretary replied that it would make it easier. In response to Farooqi's observation that President Yahya also hoped there could be a resumption of arms shipments when conditions settled down, the Secretary noted that while we need not go into that question now, relations between the United States and Pakistan and their leaders were very close and cordial.

(Note: In an earlier conversation with the General, Mr. Van Hollen sketched out briefly the mechanics of the “drying out” exercise as we saw it, pointing out the need for rapid movement, if there were to be advantage in an announcement before the Senate considered the foreign assistance legislation. Subsequently in the technical discussions with General Haq, Mr. Constable pointed out that we were thinking in terms of completion of shipments by the end of September.)

140. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the

Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Kissinger)?

Washington, September 3, 1971.


Cut-Off of Aid to India

The Washington Special Action Group meeting on August 17, 1971 agreed on the need to prepare a study of a possible cut-off in economic assistance to India setting out the specific steps which might be taken


Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-082, WSAG Meeting, South Asia, 8/17/71. Secret; Exdis.

in gradually implementing a cut-off and evaluating the anticipated consequences.

The possible actions set forth in the attached paper? range from a total cut-off, which we would impose automatically if India clearly instigated hostilities, through a series of partial steps that might be used in an attempt to gain influence over Indian policy by using our aid program

This analysis shows that a restrictive use of aid, in the short run at least, would provide us with some marginal influence but would be unlikely to affect significantly policies that India saw to be in its vital interest.

The paper does not consider alternative strategies. One such alternative might be based on supportive political and economic policies, paralleling those we are currently pursuing with respect to Pakistan.

We will be prepared to discuss these issues at the September 8 meeting of the WSAG.

Ted E.3

2 Not printed. Attached was a 15-page paper entitled “Economic Assistance Cutoff for India." The paper is undated and no drafting information is provided.

Deputy Executive Secretary Robert T. Curran signed for Eliot.


141. Paper Prepared by Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson

of the National Security Council Staff

Washington, September 3, 1971.


In addition to the issues arising from the continuing refinement of our contingency planning, there are several other issues that should be considered at this point. These arise either from actions we have already taken or may wish to take in the relatively near future.


Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-082, Senior WSAG Meeting, South Asia, 9/8/71. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. It was sent to Kissinger by Saunders and Hoskinson on September 3 under cover of a memorandum that refers to a paper they were preparing on the Williams report. (Ibid.)

Williams' Trip. As you know, Maury Williams has returned from his trip to Pakistan. His written report? is attached to this memo, and he is prepared to report orally to the WSAG.

On the basis of his experiences, Williams has some specific recommendations for future action. He feels that refugees and relief in both India and Pakistan are integral parts of the same problem. On the relief side, the critical element for the success of our efforts is the acceptance, or tolerance, by all parties—Pakistan, Bengali insurgents and India—that food and humanitarian concern for the Bengalis is "above the battle.” On the refugee question, Williams sees the need for an equivalent “cease and stand fast” situation to break the vicious circle of the refugee influx leading to increased Indian support to the insurgents and the Pak army fighting back with policies encouraging more Hindu refugees to leave and never return. Specifically, Williams suggests that:

1. We urge on Yahya a public declaration of protection for all minorities and that he back up the new Bengali Governor, Dr. A.M. Malik, in measures to reduce the emotions against the remaining Hindus.

2. (We) parallel our approach to Pakistan on relief needs and administration with similar discussions in India at the appropriate level. Among other things, we would (a) encourage the Indians to help exempt the movement of relief supplies within East Pakistan from insurgent attack; (b) seek Indian recognition that intensification of the insurgency only produces more refugees; (c) seek help in obtaining a 60-day “dampening” of insurgent activity to permit a cooling of anti-Hindu passions in East Pakistan and improve the atmosphere for possible negotiations between Pakistani and "Bangla Desh" representatives; and (d) seek acceptance of UN observers statement [stationed] in East Pakistan having the freedom to cross into India on valid refugee business.

Comment: The security of food distribution in East Pakistan is a crucial issue. Our next step should be to devise approaches to persuade the insurgents not to attack it.

Arms Supply to Pakistan. This is an old issue returned with new problems because of Joe Sisco's discussion with Hilaly.” The basic issue at this point is whether Sisco's proposition to the Paks of trading our "cut

? Maurice Williams submitted a report to Secretary Rogers on September 3 on the trip he made to Pakistan August 17–23. Rogers sent a copy of the report to President Nixon on September 13. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 10 PAK) The report is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Document 143.

See Document 131.


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