off" of military supply for a resumption of economic assistance is tenable. It could well turn out that Sisco has given an empty promise of economic aid in exchange for a cut-off of virtually nothing in the military supply pipeline. If this is true, Yahya's willingness to give up quietly what little military supply remains for vital economic aid could quickly turn to pique if he comes to believe that in fact aid may not be forthcoming in the large and fairly immediate quantities Sisco seemed to indicate.

Bangla Desh-West Pakistani Talks. If Yahya gives the signal to go ahead (Ambassador Farland will see him on Saturday) and the "Bangla Desh" representatives agree, we may soon be on the sidelines of secret exploratory talks between them. The main issue then for us will be at what moment, if ever, and how we should use our influence to help produce a settlement. Sisco's inclination, as in the Middle East, will probably be to jump right into a mediatory role just as soon as there is any opportunity. However, to make our limited influence count most will require careful timing and employment of it with Yahya, if at all.

New Approach to India. As you know, Under-Secretary Irwin would like to make a trip to India before too long to parallel Williams' trip to Pakistan. The main issue here is not so much the principle of a new highlevel approach to India but its substance and who makes the pitch. Irwin seems to have in mind using the same old refrain of restraint and mild threat, but, just as we were with Pakistan, we may well want to consider a new approach to India. There may be some new elements we can add. Williams, for example, seems to have some thoughts worthy of consideration. As for who does the job, State, especially after the Williams trip, will insist that they do it and Irwin would be much better than unleashing Sisco on the Indians.

142. Analytical Summary Prepared by Harold Saunders and Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff1

Washington, September 3, 1971.

CONTINGENCY PLANNING-INDO-PAK HOSTILITIES

The Papers

At the last WSAG meeting on contingency planning for possible Indo-Pak hostilities (August 17) it was agreed that the State Department would prepare scenarios for US approaches to the Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China and the United Nations. Most of this work has now been completed and is incorporated in the several papers that follow this analytical summary.

The papers that State has drafted analyze the problems and suggest diplomatic moves within the separate and artificial categories of "before" and "after" hostilities. This makes it difficult to devise a present strategy toward the Chinese and Soviets with a clear view in mind of where we want to be if there is an extended war. This approach also makes it difficult to calculate the possible inter-play of interests among the great powers at the various stages of a South Asian crisis.

This analytical summary, therefore, is organized so as to raise the issues that the State papers seem to miss. These will be highlighted in your talking points.2 The summary will cut across the several papers State has produced and construct from them the separate but related approaches we might wish to take toward China and the USSR at the major stages of the South Asian crisis and our derivative postures at the UN. In other words, instead of using State's "before hostilities" and "after hostilities" approach, this summary deals first with China, then with the USSR and finally with the UN.

You should not be handicapped by this at the meeting since you will be focusing on issues rather than on papers per se. Our approach makes it a lot easier to get to the ultimate issues which the papers generally miss.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-082, Senior WSAG Meeting, South Asia, 9/8/71. Secret; Exdis. No drafting information appears on the source text. The summary was sent to Kissinger by Saunders and Hoskinson on September 3 under cover of a memorandum that refers to the papers cited in the summary. (Ibid.)

2 Saunders and Hoskinson sent a memorandum to Kissinger on September 3 outlining talking points for the WSAG meeting scheduled for September 8. (Ibid.)

Just so you will know what State has done, here is the list of papers which this summary covers. They follow the summary at sub-tabs under the general tab marked "Contingency Papers":3

-"China." A proposed line to take with the Chinese now before

hostilities.

—“Soviet.” This is a proposed approach to the Soviets now before hostilities, both in New York and Moscow. Also at this tab is the report of the August 25 Rogers-Dobrynin meeting.

-"UN." A posture at the UN before hostilities.4

-"After Hostilities." Approaches to the Soviets and Chinese and actions at the UN after hostilities break out. This concentrates on getting a cease-fire. It does not deal with the tough question of Chicom intervention.

I. Approach Toward China

State's scenario for dealing with the Chinese on South Asia is contained in two papers-"Contacts with the Chinese on the South Asian Crisis" considers what we might wish to say to the Chinese before the outbreak of hostilities and a scenario for approaching the Chinese after the outbreak of an Indo-Pak war is included in the paper entitled "China, the Soviet Union and the UN-Post Outbreak-of-Hostilities Diplomacy" (pp. 7-9). The following summary draws together the main points made in both of these papers and identifies issues that should be considered.

3

The papers cited here are identified and summarized in the text by Saunders and Hoskinson, with the exception of the paper dealing with the approach to take to the South Asian crisis at the United Nations before hostilities developed, and the report on the meeting between Rogers and Dobrynin on August 25. For a memorandum reporting on the meeting between Rogers and Dobrynin, see Document 135. On August 27 Eliot sent to Kissinger the paper entitled "Contact with the Chinese on the South Asian Crisis." On September 1 he sent him the papers entitled "Conversation with the Soviets on South Asia" and "China, the Soviet Union, and the UN-Post Outbreak-ofHostilities Diplomacy." All three are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-082, WSAG Meeting, South Asia, 8/17/71. Eliot sent "South Asia at the United Nations" to Kissinger on September 3. (Ibid., Box H–115, WSAG Minutes Originals, 1971)

4

The paper entitled "South Asia at the United Nations" laid out what was seen in the Department of State as the potential offered by the United Nations to try to contain the crisis short of war. The United Nations provided a channel for famine relief for East Pakistan and refugee relief for India. The United States could use the United Nations to stress the gravity of the situation and the danger of war, to express concern to India about Indian reluctance to accept a UN presence in India, and to emphasize the importance of a political accommodation in Pakistan to defuse the crisis.

A. Contacts with Chinese Prior to Hostilities

The paper on contact with the Chinese prior to hostilities asserts that the principal purpose would be to:

-make sure the Chinese were fully informed of our policies on South Asia;

-stress parallel interests we have in discouraging a war between India and Pakistan.

In

any such contact, State believes that it should be made clear that we are not challenging the Sino-Pakistani relationship nor threatening China but simply trying to insure that there are no misunderstandings of each other's policies.

Specifically, State suggests that the following points be communicated to the Chinese through "appropriate" channels:

1. We are seriously concerned about the dangers of war in South Asia. 2. Hostilities may not only result from military over-reaction to provocations but also from the flow of refugees into India.

3. Our actions are designed to ease the burden of the refugees on India and mitigate the prospect of a major famine in East Pakistan.

4. Our efforts are primarily humanitarian and we will not be a party to any effort to capitalize on relief for political purposes.

5. We have urged the Indians to act with restraint and have pointed out to Pakistan the importance of working for a political accommodation in East Pakistan as the best hope for preserving the unity and integrity of the country.

6. We regard the East Pakistan situation as an internal matter, although we recognize that it has international dimensions with involvement of the US, Soviet Union and China.

7. Indo-Pak hostilities would not be to anyone's benefit. Moreover, if external powers did become involved, it would contribute to rising international tensions that would make it difficult for the US to reduce the level of confrontation in Asia and move toward an era of consultation and détente.

8. For our part we are (a) making sure both India and Pakistan are aware that we would not support an attack by one of them against the other, (b) pursuing an extremely restrained military supply policy and (c) using our influence to prevent border incidents from escalating into general war.

5

9. As the President made clear in his foreign policy report to Congress, we will do nothing to harm legitimate Chinese (or Soviet) interests in South Asia. No outside power, however, has a claim to pre

5 Reference is to the report submitted to the Congress on February 25, 1971. For text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 219–345.

dominant influence in the region, and each can serve its own interest best by acting accordingly.

10. We are making similar points to the Soviets and would be interested in China's overall view of the South Asian situation.

These suggestions appear to be reasonable as far as they go but some very important contingencies and related issues are not addressed. As State suggests the Chinese should probably know what our general approach to the South Asian crisis is but more important to them, and to us, would be our specific reaction should China and India seem to be heading for a military confrontation or even war. It is difficult to sharpen our present approach to the Chinese (or to the Indians, for that matter) unless we have some idea what stance we would take in a SinoIndian confrontation. Some of the more important issues that would arise in such a situation would include:

-Should the Chinese provoke border incidents with India and/or make threatening noises in support of Pakistan, what would be the US private and public positions? Even strong anti-Indian propaganda, ultimatums and border incidents without a Chinese military buildup along the frontiers could conceivably raise serious problems for the China trip. Should this be pointed out to the Chinese now? (Who wants the China trip more-we or they?)

-How would we react to a gradual buildup of Chinese forces along India's borders, especially at strategic points? The Indians might regard such a development as a serious threat, or at least would bill it as such in public. Again the spectre of China threatening India could raise some serious problems for the China trip. Would we want to point this out to the Chinese as soon as we detected the beginning of their military buildup or even before they begin to move?

B. Contacts with Chinese After Hostilities

The State paper is premised on the assumption that:

1. In the immediate aftermath of the outbreak of hostilities, we should attempt to prevent China from intervening directly and militarily on the side of Pakistan by military action against India;

2. In the post-hostilities peace-keeping phase we should move "energetically" to limit the influence the Chinese may have gained in South Asia, and ensure that they accept and will not disrupt whatever political settlement may be achieved between India and Pakistan.

1. Actions in Immediate Aftermath. State believes that there are a "variety of factors" encouraging the Chinese to limit their intervention, like fear of a possible Soviet riposte along the Sino-Soviet border and the damage that bellicose behavior might do to China's foreign policy posture in general and the prospects for the President's trip in particular. Therefore, State believes that should Indo-Pak fighting break out "these constraining factors, reinforced by statements of our concern, are more likely to be effective than direct preemptive moves."