192. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Pakistan (Farland) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Islamabad, November 19, 1971.

Foll for Dr. Henry Kissinger from Ambassador Farland:

1. Have reported results of my conversation Nov. 18 to State through Islamabad 11484.2 It reflects that Yahya is determined to proceed on his own political plan of action for a 'political solution' between East and West Pakistan. He considers he has a viable plan of operation going for him. Will convene Assembly Dec. 27 and expects to turn power over to civilian government within about two weeks thereafter. He gave me the impression he was zealously anxious to extricate himself from a deteriorating situation by stepping down, thus accomplishing his prime objective, i.e., the transfer of power. From our conversation I seriously question if he will deviate from what he has as his blueprint.

2. As reported reftel, Yahya is not interested in discussing political settlement with Mujib's designee, but continues to be interested in talks as reported paragraph 6 Islamabad 10927.3

3. I have definite impression that Yahya is beginning to feel cornered. For the first time he was somewhat testy during our conversation. He reaffirmed fact that he would not institute war with India, but we are dealing with a military man whose reactions have been preconditioned. Therefore I sincerely hope that Mrs. Gandhi be cautioned to the fullest by all interested governments, and that as a result of these admonishments she will prevent her generals from instituting any further incursions into Pak territory. Otherwise this thing could blow.

1 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 643, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan, July 1971. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The text of this message was conveyed to Haig in a November 19 memorandum. (Ibid.)

2 Telegram 11484 from Islamabad, November 19. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 15–1 PAK) The telegram is summarized in Document 193.

3 In telegram 10927 from Islamabad, November 2, Farland reported on a conversation he had with President Yahya that day. Paragraph 6 outlined Yahya's conditions for meeting with a leader of the Bangladesh rebels. Yahya said he would grant "white flag" passage to and from West Pakistan, but he would not meet with a Bangladesh representative who had been judged guilty of a major crime. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 32-1 PAK)

193. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

Washington, November 20, 1971.

SUBJECT

Information Items

[Omitted here are summary reports on foreign policy issues unrelated to South Asia.]

Yahya's Views: Ambassador Farland has met with Yahya to brief him on the results of Mrs. Gandhi's visit here. Yahya made the following major points:

-He

expressed appreciation for the U.S. efforts to lessen the tensions that were daily becoming greater.

-Mujib was not the key to negotiations but rather Indira Gandhi held "both the key and the lock."

-He expressed disinclination to permit Mujib to designate a Bangla Desh representative who could speak on his own behalf and negotiate for the Bangla Desh movement with the Paks. On the other hand, his government would be happy to meet with Bangla Desh representatives under other conditions as he had said before.

-He sketched his scenario for a political settlement through promulgation of a constitution in mid-December, convening the National Assembly on December 27 and transfer of power "several weeks" thereafter. Then the new civilian government could, if it wished, deal with Mujib and Bangla Desh.

-He reaffirmed his decision to avoid war if at all possible and said that he would not start war.

-He is thinking of a plan which would turn over completely to the UN the administration of camps for returning refugees.

Farland had the impression that Yahya believes he is being boxed in by numerous pressures that are being exerted on him at home and abroad. For the first time he sensed "agitation" in Yahya. He thinks that Yahya had decided that his political plan is his only means of extricating himself from an untenable military and economic situation inflamed and fueled by India.

Situation in India: Ambassador Keating reports that since Mrs. Gandhi has returned to New Delhi most observers feel that she is attempting to lower the political temperature there for the time being at

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 37, President's Daily Briefs. Top Secret; Sensitive; Codeword. A stamp on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

least. She seems to be telling the Indian people and the world that, while she has no intention of reducing the pressure on Pakistan by withdrawing Indian troops from the frontiers or reducing support to the guerrillas, she is prepared to wait for some unspecified period to see whether the international community's efforts to get Yahya into a dialogue with the Awami League are successful before initiating more decisive action. A frequent comment from Indian and foreign observers is that Mrs. Gandhi remains, as before her trip, less hawkish than the country as a whole, and that she apparently continues to work to avoid a major war.

The above is the positive side of the picture. Our intelligence indicates that complementing this public posture is continuing planning for possible military intervention in East Pakistan and serious incidents, reflecting an aggressive Indian posture, in support of the guerrillas, continues to flare up along the East Pakistan border. It is also worth noting that some official U.S. observers believe that the Indian and guerrilla pressures on the Pak forces could be gradually building up to a point at which the Paks could be goaded into counteractions which could precipitate a full-scale war.

[Omitted here is a summary report on a foreign policy issue unrelated to South Asia.]

194. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1

Washington, November 22, 1971, 2:39–3:14 p.m.

SUBJECT

South Asia

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman-Henry A. Kissinger

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-115, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. No drafting information appears on the minutes. A briefer record of this meeting, prepared by James Noyes (OASD/ISA), is in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330 76 0197, Box 74, Pakistan 381 (Jan-Nov) 1971.

1) State would prepare a scenario for an approach to the UN including a draft resolution;

2) State would prepare telegrams for approaches to Mrs. Gandhi and to Yahya;

3) the WSAG would meet at 9:00 a.m. tomorrow, Tuesday, No

vember 23.

Mr. Kissinger: (to General Cushman) Bob, can you give us a rundown?

(General Cushman briefed from the attached text.)2

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Irwin) What do you think?

Mr. Irwin: We think the Pakistanis are probably overplaying the situation and the Indians are underplaying it. We think increased participation by Indian regulars is designed either to put enough pressure on Yahya to get a more favorable political situation, or to try to provoke a Pakistani attack on India and thereby put Pakistan further in the wrong in the eyes of the world. We believe the first reason is more likely than the second. We think we can do two things: (1) go back to Yahya on the basis of his latest conversation with (Ambassador) Farland,3 which

2 Based on the briefing notes prepared for the meeting, General Cushman reported that press reports from Pakistan indicated that India had launched an offensive on the border of East Pakistan in the Jessore area with two infantry divisions supported by armor. The CIA assessment was that, even if the reports were exaggerated, the size of Indian incursions into East Pakistan were apparently increasing. President Yahya did not want to fight a war he knew Pakistan would probably lose, but Cushman concluded that he might soon decide that he had no choice but to do so. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-082, Senior WSAG Meeting, South Asia, 11/22/71)

3 See footnote 2, Document 192.

we found somewhat disappointing with regard to Mujib; and (2) go to

the UN.

Mr. Kissinger: Because Yahya has been attacked, you would bring pressure on Yahya?

Mr. Irwin: No, the move into the UN would put pressure on India. I just think we should go back to Yahya to talk further about Mujib.

Mr. Kissinger: But if we do that, and Yahya doesn't agree to talk to Mujib, we would be contributing to putting Yahya in the wrong. All this has to go to the President, of course.

Mr. Irwin: I was merely following up the discussion at the last meeting.

Mr. Kissinger: What do you think, Dave (Packard)?

Mr. Packard: It's damned hard to know what is going on. We've got to get the facts, first.

Mr. Irwin: One way to avoid war, though, would be through some political accommodation.

Mr. Kissinger: That's all right if we assume we want to do India's job for them.

Mr. Irwin: I don't think that's doing India's job for them. It's one way to avoid a war.

Mr. Kissinger: But India is saying they will go to war unless Pakistan meets their political demands.

Mr. Irwin: I'm only saying that this would be one way to avoid war. Also, it is a step in a process that is already started.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, we have been moving step by step along a line the President has indicated he doesn't want to go. You can't use the last step, which the President accepted only reluctantly, as the basis for the next step. Also, the assumption on which we made our last move was wrong. We had assumed that Yahya had asked us for suggestions as to what he might do politically, and this turned out to be wrong, if I read the cables correctly. (to Moorer) What do you think, Tom?

Adm. Moorer: We've all sent out flash messages to try to find out what is happening. There's no question that the Indians have superiority in all areas-157 aircraft to 18, for example, along the East Pakistan border. Also, they have deployed forces along the West border and have reorganized them into three sectors so as to manage them more effectively. There's no question that a conflict is going on. I personally think the Indians are trying to provoke the Pakistanis to move in the West. I have some information on the POL and logistic positions that may be interesting. The Indians have a 30-day war reserve of POL, small arms and artillery, plus some local production