Mr. Packard: It might be better to start at the lower level. Dr. Kissinger: OK, but let's get the telegrams out within the hour. Mr. Van Hollen: We have the same problem, with cutting off the pipeline, of the impact on U.S. effectiveness with the Indians. Dr. Kissinger: I'm only talking about the military pipeline. 197. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Pakistan (Farland)1 Washington, November 24, 1971. Appreciate your personal assessments of the situation2 and share your concern for its gravity. Because there may be some differences in approach within the bureaucracy, I wanted you to be aware of actions we have taken over the past twenty-four hours, and am providing information via this channel with the confidence that it will be kept exclusively to you although you may draw on it in discussions with Yahya. I also provided this information to Pakistani Ambassador Raza today on an exclusive basis. Details include: 1. Meeting with the British Ambassador today during which I informed him that U.S. is prepared to support the UN Resolution along the lines contained in State 212583.3 I emphasized, however, that we would leave up to the Government of Pakistan decision as to whether the issue should be referred to the Security Council. I asked him to request that his Government support Pakistan in UN and if this proved impossible for them, to at least refrain from supporting India. 2. Decision to send stronger démarche to Prime Minister Gandhi on situation. Specific inquiries would be included concerning India's failure to respond to our proposal already agreed to by Yahya calling for pullback of forces from border between West Pakistan and India. 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 426, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, 1971, Amb. Farland, Pakistan. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Dated November 24, but an attached memorandum from Haig to Kissinger indicates that it was sent on November 25 at 1233Z. (Ibid.) Haig signed for Kissinger, but a copy in another file indicates that Kissinger revised and cleared the telegram. (Ibid., Box 643, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan, July 1971) 2 See Document 192. 3 See footnote 8, Document 196. 3. My discussion with Chancellor Brandt on November 23 during which I informed him of our position with respect to Security Council Resolution and suggested that we would welcome démarche from FRG to Indians registering FRG concern for the situation. 4. Instruction to Ambassador Beam to register again our concerns to Moscow. 5. Daily meetings of Washington Special Actions Group from which several additional actions are pending. These meetings have resulted in issuance of strictest Presidential instructions to tilt toward Pakistan in our public stance. In addition to informing Ambassador Raza of the foregoing, I recommended that he check promptly with the PRC UN delegation in New York to ascertain their views on the desirability of introducing the issue into the UN as well as their views on the draft resolution. I informed him that we believe PRC views should be considered by Pakistan as they decide whether or not to proceed in UN forum. We will continue to follow the situation very closely and you can assure Yahya that President is personally involved in all aspects of the problem. Please keep me informed via this channel of any additional steps that you believe should be considered here. Warm regards. 198. Minutes of Washington Special Actions Group Meeting1 Washington, November 24, 1971, 9:29-10:05 a.m. SUBJECT South Asia PARTICIPANTS Chairman-Henry A. Kissinger 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-115, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Codeword. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. A briefer record of the meeting, prepared by James Noyes (OASD/ISA), is in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files, FRC 330 76 0197, Box 74, Pakistan 381 (Jan-Nov) 1971. Mr. Kissinger: (to Cushman) What is the situation? Gen. Cushman: We still have conflicting Pakistan and Indian versions of the action, but there is little doubt that regular Indian troops have entered Pakistan. Mr. Kissinger: Is there any doubt? How long can they maintain this charade? Gen. Cushman: There's no doubt in my mind. Mr. Packard: They call it "protective reaction." Mr. Kissinger: There's no doubt in my mind what is meant by "protective reaction." Mr. Sisco: Mrs. Gandhi's statement yesterday2 didn't deny that Indian troops had crossed the border. There's no doubt in my mind that they have. Gen. Cushman: There is no doubt for our purposes, but it is questionable whether we could prove it in the UN. Mr. Irwin: The question, also, is how the troops are being used. Mr. Kissinger: Why can't we find out more? Gen. Cushman: We are getting all the information available in the capitals, but we don't have anyone on the ground where the fighting is. Mr. Kissinger: Are we getting from the Pakistanis everything they have? They must have captured some prisoners by now. Ask them. 2 Prime Minister Gandhi's statement in the Lok Sabha on November 24 was summarized in a November 24 memorandum from Kissinger to Nixon. Gandhi told the Indian parliament that Pakistani allegations of Indian aggression were wholly untrue, and that Indian troops were under orders not to cross borders, except in self-defense. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Indo-Pak Crisis, Withdrawn Files, Boxes 570-573) The speech was also reported in The Washington Post on November 25. Gen. Cushman: We will. Mr. Sisco: [1 line of source text not declassified] Mr. Irwin: Do we have contacts in East Pakistan? Gen. Cushman: Yes. Mr. Kissinger: Tell them that it is essential we have objective information on the situation. Gen. Cushman: We have. Mr. Waller: [3 lines of source text not declassified] Gen. Cushman: [3 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Irwin: [1 line of source text not declassified] Gen. Cushman: Yes. Mr. Kissinger: Is there any doubt in the mind of anyone in this room that the Indians have attacked with regular units across the Pakistan border? And if there is, does it make any difference? Can we possibly believe that these are guerrillas attacking across hundreds of miles, with tanks and aircraft-that this is an indigenous movement? Mr. DePalma: There is no question that these forces are armed and supplied from the outside, but we can't make an airtight case in the UN. Mr. Kissinger: The question is what hard data we have to support whatever action we want to take. We have no doubt that India is involved and that they are probably across the border. But we need something to nail down the exact nature of their activity and we need it in a day or two. Adm. Moorer: They may be making a distinction between their regular forces and their border security forces. [21⁄2 lines of source text not declassified] Mr. Irwin: (to Moorer) What do you think their purpose is? Are they trying to cut off supplies? Are they primarily supporting the Bangla Desh guerrillas, or are they planning to go further? Are they putting forces in to take and hold territory or to protect the Bangla Desh? Adm. Moorer: Initially to support the Bangla Desh, and then to whip hell out of the Pakistanis. The Bangla Desh are moving to the border where the Indians can assist in attriting the Paks. Mr. Kissinger: So our situation is that we don't know enough now to do anything, and by the time they are in Dacca, it will be too late to do anything. In these circumstances, we should move early rather than later, since if we are late, any move we make will be ineffectual. That is our dilemma. Mr. Packard: We should also think about the steps we could take. We have sent the messages to the Ambassadors for the approaches to the Foreign Ministers.3 Mr. Kissinger: Have we any answers? Mr. Sisco: Farland couldn't get in to see Sultan Khan. Mr. Kissinger: How about India? Mr. Sisco: No reply, yet. Mr. Packard: The first thing we can do is escalate to a higher level. We will also get the reaction from our telegram on possible UN activity. Adm. Moorer: I personally am confident that Indian forces are inside the East Pakistan border, but I don't think they have the drive to penetrate deeply. Mr. Irwin: They can cut two vital supply routes with only a short penetration. They haven't done it yet, though. Adm. Moorer: They don't have enough forces for a deep penetration. I think they're trying to open up the Paks so the guerrillas can defeat them. The Paks have only a limited reinforcement capability. The Indian Navy could prevent reinforcement. Mr. Kissinger: (to Sisco) What do you think? Mr. Sisco: From the Indian point of view, I think this is a substantial probe in force with both a political and a military objective. The political objective is to increase pressure on Yahya in terms of dealing with Mujib. The military objective is to increase the strength of the insurrection. I don't think the Indians have made any decision in terms of this being a prelude to something more militarily. From Yahya's point of view, he shows every evidence of wanting to wash his hands of the situation. I think his immediate objective is to proceed with the elections and then to turn the situation over to Bhutto. Once Bhutto takes over, whatever slim possibility exists of a reconciliation between West and East Pakistan is reduced considerably. The Bengalis have always been willing to deal with Yahya but not with Bhutto. Indeed, Bhutto was the primary problem in the trouble in March. Bhutto's sole objective is to achieve power-in all of Pakistan if he can, but, at least, in the West. Mr. Kissinger: But he has it. Mr. Sisco: I mean literal power. He will have it if the election schedule goes forward. Yahya is willing to go ahead and dump the problem in Bhutto's lap. If this happens the possibility of reconciliation is reduced. 3 See footnote 5, Document 196. |