to work out a cease-fire." Nixon commented: "We must not be in a position where the Russians and we settle the son-of-a-bitch and leave the Chinese out."

Turning to the decision made earlier in the morning to confront the Soviet Union with military force if necessary in support of China, Kissinger said: "What you did this morning Mr. President was a heroic act." Nixon responded: "I had to do it." He ruminated that the prevailing instinct in the government was to avoid difficult choices: "It's the whole attitude, the whole government, the whole American establishment would say, well don't borrow trouble. It's all going to work out. Nothing ever works out unless you do something about it. That's the trouble with the world." He harkened back to the appeasement of Hitler before World War II and ascribed the war to the "pusillanimous" conduct of the Western allies when confronted with Hitler's challenge. Kissinger pointed to the contrastingly strong stand Nixon had taken in the present crisis: "When I showed Vorontsov the Kennedy treaty they knew they were looking down the gun barrel." Nixon asked: "Did he react?" Kissinger replied: "Oh yeah."

Kissinger suggested that it was time "to turn the screw another half turn." In his view, if the United States was to ease up on the pressure on India and the Soviet Union "we've had it." "Therefore," he added, "my strong recommendation is that we trigger this UN thing as quickly as we possibly can because it is the only way we can go on record now of condemning India." Nixon concurred: "That's right." Kissinger felt that it was "essential" that the condemnation be leveled initially in a White House statement. Kissinger put forward a draft of such a statement and Nixon approved it.

Kissinger was confident that events were moving in the right direction: "We've got them. But the big problem now is, Mr. President, not to give the—is to-if we play this thing well we'll come out ahead with both the Chinese and the Russians." He went on: "We are doing this Mr. President with no cards whatsoever." Nixon felt he had one card: "The Russians want something from us."

The optimism engendered by the Soviet response was tempered, near the end of the conversation, by the fact that the crisis still could take a dangerous turn. Kissinger said: "The Chinese may come anyway and we'll have to face the Russians down anyway." Nixon responded: "Yeah, but if the Russians and the Chinese come now they will come" [largely unclear, apparently Nixon did not feel that a military confrontation with the Soviet Union was as likely as it seemed earlier]. "The Russians want to settle it with us. If this means anything [the Soviet response] this means something. Now there is one great problem. As I said, I may be wrong, but Communists generally use negotiations for the purpose of screwing, not for the purpose of settling."

Kissinger felt that the Soviets were "too scared" to play a devious game with the negotiations. He referred again to the Kennedy commitment to Pakistan as convincing Vorontsov that the United States "meant business." Kissinger felt that the Soviet Union was not ready for a military confrontation with the United States. "In 73-74 they may have you. They're not ready yet." He added: "We must tell the Chinese what the message is. We must inform them." Nixon asked: "The Russian message?" Kissinger responded: "Yeah." Nixon said: "That the Russians are that as a result of the President's ultimatum, I'd put it that way, the Russians have now" Kissinger interjected: "I showed them the message, to tell you the truth." It remained, Kissinger felt, "to see what they [the Chinese] want." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, December 12, 1971, 10:27-10:37 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 637-6)

At 11:06 a.m., Nixon and Kissinger began the process of drafting a response to the message just received from the Soviet Union. They continued to work in the Oval Office on what was sent subsequently as a hot line response. Kissinger concluded from the Soviet message that "there won't be military action." He was referring to further Indian military action against West Pakistan. He went on: "It's just a question of how to wrap it up now."

Kissinger then read a draft hot line message to Brezhnev. He and Nixon discussed and revised it according to Nixon's instructions. Nixon stressed that the message should emphasize that "time is of the essence to avoid frightening consequences neither of us want."

Nixon reverted to the public statement the White House would issue condemning India and observed that in issuing the statement the United States would be "putting it to the Indians." "The argument against putting it to the Indians," he said, "is, as you know, that well if we put it to the Indians then they will stiffen their backs and say screw you." Kissinger interjected: "They won't." Nixon continued: "But my view is that... they seem to be affected by world opinion. To the extent that they are goddamn it we're going to get it across that world opinion is against them." (Ibid., Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, December 12, 1971, 11:06–11:14 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 637-11) The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recordings printed here specifically for this volume. Transcripts of both conversations are published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume E-7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Documents 178 and 179.

284. Message From the Soviet Leadership to President Nixon1

Moscow, December 12, 1971.

The first contacts with the Government of India and personally with Prime Minister I. Gandhi on the question which was raised by President Nixon in his letter2 testify to the fact that the Government of India has no intention to take any military actions against West Pakistan.

The Soviet leaders believe that this makes the situation easier and hope that the Government of Pakistan will draw from this appropriate conclusions.

As far as other questions raised in the President's letter are concerned the answers will be given in the shortest of time.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 643, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan. No classification marking. The message is handwritten in English, is unsigned, and was apparently prepared in the Soviet Embassy. A note indicates it was conveyed by Vorontsov to Haig at 10:45 a.m. on December 12. The message opens with the request that it be conveyed to President Nixon. The hot line response sent by President Nixon to General Secretary Brezhnev 45 minutes later assumes that the message was from Brezhnev (Document 286).

2 Document 269.

285. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, December 12, 1971, 11:15 a.m.

SOUTH ASIA

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Helms, Director, CIA

John N. Irwin II, Under Secretary of State

U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian
Affairs

1

Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-083, WSAG Meeting, Pakistan, 12/12/71. Secret; Sensitive. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

Maurice Williams, AID

Admiral Moorer, Chairman, JCS

Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Kissinger: Let me give you the President's decisions:

-Bush will go to the Security Council.

-Ziegler will put out the following statement. [He reads the White House statement.]

-We want on record the strongest possible statement calling for an immediate ceasefire and withdrawal.

-If this is vetoed, we must call this aggression.

-Instructions are to go to Bush; the timing is today.

-There will be no backgrounding. There must be a united government for the next 72 hours.

Irwin: Bush is to introduce this resolution?3

Kissinger: Either we do it ourselves or we get some others to do it, for example, Somalia. The resolution should be based on the General Assembly Resolution. Bush should work with Bhutto to get the strategy clear. After this, if it's vetoed, we may be able to fall back if Bhutto wants it. We have no indication of this. In first round we must be very firm.

2 Brackets in the source text. The text of the statement released by the Office of the White House Press Secretary on December 12 reads as follows: “On December 7th the General Assembly by a vote of 104 to 11 with 10 abstentions called on India and Pakistan to institute an immediate cease-fire and to withdraw troops from each other's territory. Pakistan has accepted the resolution. India has refused. In view of India's defiance of world opinion expressed by such an overwhelming majority the United States is now returning the issue to the Security Council. With East Pakistan virtually occupied by Indian troops, a continuation of the war would take on increasingly the character of armed attack on the very existence of a member state of the U.N. All permanent members of the Security Council have an obligation to end this threat to world peace on the most urgent basis. The United States will cooperate fully in this effort.” (Circular telegram 223703 to New Delhi, Islamabad and 15 other posts, December 12; ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 INDIA-PAK)

3 Instructions concerning the draft resolution Ambassador Bush was to introduce in the Security Council were sent to USUN in telegram 223687, December 12. (Ibid., POL 27-14 INDIA-PAK/UN) The Security Council convened at the request of the United States on December 12. (UN doc. S/10444) Bush reviewed the evolution of the crisis to that point, pointed to the resolution adopted by the General Assembly on December 7 which had called for a cease-fire and the withdrawal of forces, and noted that Pakistan had accepted the terms but India had not. Bush charged India with responsibility for broadening the crisis and for obstructing, with Soviet support, United Nations efforts to facilitate a solution. He said the Security Council had a responsibility to demand that India comply with the Assembly's resolution. (UN doc. S/PV.1611) Bush introduced a resolution which, in its operative paragraphs, called for an immediate cease-fire, the withdrawal by India and Pakistan of their armed forces from each other's territory, and the creation of conditions necessary to safeguard the lives of civilians and to facilitate the safe return of the refugees to their homes. (UN doc. S/10446 and Rev. 1) The Security Council voted 11–2 in favor of the resolution, with 2 abstentions. The resolution was not adopted because of the negative vote of the Soviet Union.

Sisco: Tell him to put a resolution together and consult with Bhutto. Kissinger: The President wants all our officers to emphasize how important and serious this is, and edge toward calling it aggression.

The Fleet is to go.

Moorer: The plan is to move through the Straits* and then into the Indian Ocean. In 45 hours they can move where we want them. It's a carrier, 4 destroyers, an oiler and amphibious force (the Tripoli) with three destroyers-all set to go at daylight Monday, their time.

Kissinger: Send it where there are Americans—say, Karachi. Defense can comment that they're sent to help in a possible evacuation. Irwin: Will we announce it?

Kissinger: Wait for a question. Are there any Americans in West or East Pakistan?

Irwin: Yes, in both.5

4 Reference is to the Malacca Straits separating Malaysia and Indonesia which the carrier force that had been stationed off Vietnam was expected to traverse the evening of December 12, Washington time. The force was anticipated to arrive off East Pakistan by the morning of December 16. (Note on information concerning U.S. Naval forces; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 642, Country Files, Middle East, India/Pakistan)

5 This is the extent of the record that has been found for this meeting.

286. Message From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev1

Mr. General Secretary:

Washington, December 12, 1971, 11:30 a.m.

I have just received your interim message2 concerning the grave

situation in the Indian Subcontinent.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8. No classification marking. A handwritten note on the message indicates it was sent via the hot line. According to Kissinger's memoirs, the message was drafted by Kissinger and Haig and represented the first use by the Nixon administration of the hot line communication channel between Washington and Moscow. (White House Years, p. 909)

2 Document 284.