South Asia crisis, 1971"The scope of this volume is limited to the political crisis that began in Pakistan in March 1971 with the government's efforts to suppress Bengali demands for virtual autonomy in East Pakistan and concluded with the establishment of the state of Bangladesh at the end of the year. The limited time frame covered by the volume enabled the editor to compile the record of the Nixon administration's response to the crisis in considerable detail. The crisis was managed largely out of the White House by President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, with the support of the National Security Council staff. The focus of the volume is on the management of the crisis by Nixon and Kissinger. The editor selected documentation to trace the evolution of the United States response to the crisis from Nixon's initial reluctance to become involved to his "tilt" toward Pakistan which was highlighted by the despatch of the aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal to act as a restraint on India in the war that had developed between India and Pakistan as a result of the crisis. Nixon's response to the crisis in Pakistan was conditioned in part by the concern that he and Kissinger had to protect the emerging opening to China, which had been facilitated by Pakistani President Yahya Khan. The volume documents that concern, as well as the assurance offered to China that the United States would protect China from the Soviet Union if China took military action against India in support of Pakistan. The record of the Nixon administration's management of the crisis in South Asia thus also bears importantly on United States relations at the time with China and the Soviet Union. In that respect, the volume should be read in conjunction with Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XVII, China, 1969-1972; volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970- October 1971; and volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1971"--Overview. |
From inside the book
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Page 2
... West Pakistan can settle their differences . Yahya char- acterized the situation as Pakistan's " gravest political crisis . " The future course of events now depends largely on the decision of Mujibur Rahman and the other leaders of the ...
... West Pakistan can settle their differences . Yahya char- acterized the situation as Pakistan's " gravest political crisis . " The future course of events now depends largely on the decision of Mujibur Rahman and the other leaders of the ...
Page 3
United States. Department of State, Louis J. Smith. adamantly opposed by West Pakistani leader Z.A. Bhutto , important elements of the military and many politically aware West Pakistanis . Rahman's six points are : -The constitution ...
United States. Department of State, Louis J. Smith. adamantly opposed by West Pakistani leader Z.A. Bhutto , important elements of the military and many politically aware West Pakistanis . Rahman's six points are : -The constitution ...
Page 4
... West Pakistan from intervening militarily against a succession [ secession ] movement . President Yahya is well aware that he is risking a strong East Pa- kistani reaction , but presumably decided that the alternative to post- ponement ...
... West Pakistan from intervening militarily against a succession [ secession ] movement . President Yahya is well aware that he is risking a strong East Pa- kistani reaction , but presumably decided that the alternative to post- ponement ...
Page 7
... West accommodation by categorically rejecting President Yahya's plan to hold a conference of the major political lead- ers on March 10 . -Mujib has admitted to several foreign correspondents " off the record " that he will announce the ...
... West accommodation by categorically rejecting President Yahya's plan to hold a conference of the major political lead- ers on March 10 . -Mujib has admitted to several foreign correspondents " off the record " that he will announce the ...
Page 12
... West Pakistan reaction . It would probably buy us time . Something short of a unilateral decla- ration of independence might be accepted by West Pakistan . In that event , they would not use force . Mr. Kissinger : How would two ...
... West Pakistan reaction . It would probably buy us time . Something short of a unilateral decla- ration of independence might be accepted by West Pakistan . In that event , they would not use force . Mr. Kissinger : How would two ...
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Common terms and phrases
action agreed Ambassador Farland army asked Assistant for National attack Awami League Bangla Desh Bengali Bhutto border ceasefire Central Files China Chinese conversation crisis Dacca December December 12 Delhi discussion Document draft East Bengal East Pakistan effort Embassy forces Foreign Minister Foreign Secretary Gandhi Government guerrillas Haig Helms Hilaly Hollen Ibid India India and Pakistan Irwin Islamabad issue Johnson Kissinger Papers Kissinger's meeting memorandum military supply million Moorer move Mujib Mujibur Mukti Bahini National Archives National Security Affairs Nixon Presidential Materials noted NSC Files Packard Pakistan Army political accommodation political settlement President Nixon President Yahya President's Assistant Prime Minister problem refugees relief resolution Saunders Security Council Singh Sisco situation source text South Asia Soviet Union talk Telegram text not declassified tion United Vorontsov Washington West White House Williams WSAG Yahya Khan