South Asia crisis, 1971"The scope of this volume is limited to the political crisis that began in Pakistan in March 1971 with the government's efforts to suppress Bengali demands for virtual autonomy in East Pakistan and concluded with the establishment of the state of Bangladesh at the end of the year. The limited time frame covered by the volume enabled the editor to compile the record of the Nixon administration's response to the crisis in considerable detail. The crisis was managed largely out of the White House by President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, with the support of the National Security Council staff. The focus of the volume is on the management of the crisis by Nixon and Kissinger. The editor selected documentation to trace the evolution of the United States response to the crisis from Nixon's initial reluctance to become involved to his "tilt" toward Pakistan which was highlighted by the despatch of the aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal to act as a restraint on India in the war that had developed between India and Pakistan as a result of the crisis. Nixon's response to the crisis in Pakistan was conditioned in part by the concern that he and Kissinger had to protect the emerging opening to China, which had been facilitated by Pakistani President Yahya Khan. The volume documents that concern, as well as the assurance offered to China that the United States would protect China from the Soviet Union if China took military action against India in support of Pakistan. The record of the Nixon administration's management of the crisis in South Asia thus also bears importantly on United States relations at the time with China and the Soviet Union. In that respect, the volume should be read in conjunction with Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XVII, China, 1969-1972; volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970- October 1971; and volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1971"--Overview. |
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Page iv
The volume documents that concern , as well as the assurance offered to China that the United States would protect China from the Soviet Union if China took military action against India in support of Pakistan .
The volume documents that concern , as well as the assurance offered to China that the United States would protect China from the Soviet Union if China took military action against India in support of Pakistan .
Page xxiv
... Agency for International Development NI , Nizam - E - Islam ( Pakistani political party ) Niact , night action , telegram indicator requiring immediate action NIC , National Intelligence Council NIE , National Intelligence Estimate ...
... Agency for International Development NI , Nizam - E - Islam ( Pakistani political party ) Niact , night action , telegram indicator requiring immediate action NIC , National Intelligence Council NIE , National Intelligence Estimate ...
Page 21
Pakistani independence and has based his action on the " democratic " voice of the people as expressed in the December election . The Yahya regime must react quickly to this critical move , and Yahya himself has flown to Dacca to talk ...
Pakistani independence and has based his action on the " democratic " voice of the people as expressed in the December election . The Yahya regime must react quickly to this critical move , and Yahya himself has flown to Dacca to talk ...
Page 50
I think Yahya's action against Awami League is a self - defeating step which in time will land Pak army into a hopeless morass . I share ConGen Dacca's view that Yahya's shortterm action has probably made inevitable the thing he is ...
I think Yahya's action against Awami League is a self - defeating step which in time will land Pak army into a hopeless morass . I share ConGen Dacca's view that Yahya's shortterm action has probably made inevitable the thing he is ...
Page 64
He continued that , if the U.S. had been presented with a choice on March 25 , it would certainly have urged President Yahya not to take a military course of action . But he recalled that everyone had been taken by surprise when the ...
He continued that , if the U.S. had been presented with a choice on March 25 , it would certainly have urged President Yahya not to take a military course of action . But he recalled that everyone had been taken by surprise when the ...
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action Affairs agreed Ambassador arms army asked assistance attack Bangla Desh border called Central Files China Chinese clear concern continue conversation Dacca December Delhi Department discussion Document draft East Pakistan economic effect effort Farland forces Foreign Gandhi give Government Hollen hope important India indicated interest involved Irwin Islamabad issue Kissinger letter major March meeting memorandum military million move Mukti Bahini National Archives Nixon Presidential Materials noted NSC Files Office political position possible prepared present President Nixon President Yahya problem proposal question record refugees relations relief resolution response Secret Secretary Security Council sent side Sisco situation Source South Asia Soviet statement steps SUBJECT suggested supply talk Telegram tell thing tion told United Washington West