South Asia crisis, 1971"The scope of this volume is limited to the political crisis that began in Pakistan in March 1971 with the government's efforts to suppress Bengali demands for virtual autonomy in East Pakistan and concluded with the establishment of the state of Bangladesh at the end of the year. The limited time frame covered by the volume enabled the editor to compile the record of the Nixon administration's response to the crisis in considerable detail. The crisis was managed largely out of the White House by President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, with the support of the National Security Council staff. The focus of the volume is on the management of the crisis by Nixon and Kissinger. The editor selected documentation to trace the evolution of the United States response to the crisis from Nixon's initial reluctance to become involved to his "tilt" toward Pakistan which was highlighted by the despatch of the aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal to act as a restraint on India in the war that had developed between India and Pakistan as a result of the crisis. Nixon's response to the crisis in Pakistan was conditioned in part by the concern that he and Kissinger had to protect the emerging opening to China, which had been facilitated by Pakistani President Yahya Khan. The volume documents that concern, as well as the assurance offered to China that the United States would protect China from the Soviet Union if China took military action against India in support of Pakistan. The record of the Nixon administration's management of the crisis in South Asia thus also bears importantly on United States relations at the time with China and the Soviet Union. In that respect, the volume should be read in conjunction with Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XVII, China, 1969-1972; volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970- October 1971; and volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1971"--Overview. |
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Page 18
... thing very close to independence , i.e. , " emancipation , " is his goal and that his movement will not be deflected until that is achieved . Note- worthy also is the fact that Rahman quite openly took issue with Yahya , accusing him of ...
... thing very close to independence , i.e. , " emancipation , " is his goal and that his movement will not be deflected until that is achieved . Note- worthy also is the fact that Rahman quite openly took issue with Yahya , accusing him of ...
Page 26
... thing . He doesn't want to be in the position where he can be accused of having encouraged the split - up of Pakistan . He does not favor a very active policy . This probably means that we would not 26 Foreign Relations , 1969-1976 ...
... thing . He doesn't want to be in the position where he can be accused of having encouraged the split - up of Pakistan . He does not favor a very active policy . This probably means that we would not 26 Foreign Relations , 1969-1976 ...
Page 27
... things more difficult . We should certainly not be the first to recognize . Mr. Johnson : Our principal concern is the Americans who are there . Thus far , the disturbances have not taken any anti - American tone . The best thing for ...
... things more difficult . We should certainly not be the first to recognize . Mr. Johnson : Our principal concern is the Americans who are there . Thus far , the disturbances have not taken any anti - American tone . The best thing for ...
Page 37
... thing to do is to keep cool and not do anything . There's nothing in it for us either way . K : It would infuriate the West Pakistanis ; it wouldn't gain any- thing with the East Pakistanis , who wouldn't know about it anyway and the ...
... thing to do is to keep cool and not do anything . There's nothing in it for us either way . K : It would infuriate the West Pakistanis ; it wouldn't gain any- thing with the East Pakistanis , who wouldn't know about it anyway and the ...
Page 64
... thing , he noted , for the U.S. to close its eyes to reports of clandestine Indian support for the East Pakistani resistance movement but quite another thing for the U.S. to collude with the Indians in this supply . Dr. Kissinger stated ...
... thing , he noted , for the U.S. to close its eyes to reports of clandestine Indian support for the East Pakistani resistance movement but quite another thing for the U.S. to collude with the Indians in this supply . Dr. Kissinger stated ...
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Common terms and phrases
action agreed Ambassador Farland army asked Assistant for National attack Awami League Bangla Desh Bengali Bhutto border ceasefire Central Files China Chinese conversation crisis Dacca December December 12 Delhi discussion Document draft East Bengal East Pakistan effort Embassy forces Foreign Minister Foreign Secretary Gandhi Government guerrillas Haig Helms Hilaly Hollen Ibid India India and Pakistan Irwin Islamabad issue Johnson Kissinger Papers Kissinger's meeting memorandum military supply million Moorer move Mujib Mujibur Mukti Bahini National Archives National Security Affairs Nixon Presidential Materials noted NSC Files Packard Pakistan Army political accommodation political settlement President Nixon President Yahya President's Assistant Prime Minister problem refugees relief resolution Saunders Security Council Singh Sisco situation source text South Asia Soviet Union talk Telegram text not declassified tion United Vorontsov Washington West White House Williams WSAG Yahya Khan