South Asia crisis, 1971"The scope of this volume is limited to the political crisis that began in Pakistan in March 1971 with the government's efforts to suppress Bengali demands for virtual autonomy in East Pakistan and concluded with the establishment of the state of Bangladesh at the end of the year. The limited time frame covered by the volume enabled the editor to compile the record of the Nixon administration's response to the crisis in considerable detail. The crisis was managed largely out of the White House by President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, with the support of the National Security Council staff. The focus of the volume is on the management of the crisis by Nixon and Kissinger. The editor selected documentation to trace the evolution of the United States response to the crisis from Nixon's initial reluctance to become involved to his "tilt" toward Pakistan which was highlighted by the despatch of the aircraft carrier Enterprise to the Bay of Bengal to act as a restraint on India in the war that had developed between India and Pakistan as a result of the crisis. Nixon's response to the crisis in Pakistan was conditioned in part by the concern that he and Kissinger had to protect the emerging opening to China, which had been facilitated by Pakistani President Yahya Khan. The volume documents that concern, as well as the assurance offered to China that the United States would protect China from the Soviet Union if China took military action against India in support of Pakistan. The record of the Nixon administration's management of the crisis in South Asia thus also bears importantly on United States relations at the time with China and the Soviet Union. In that respect, the volume should be read in conjunction with Foreign Relations, 1969-1976, volume XVII, China, 1969-1972; volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970- October 1971; and volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1971"--Overview. |
From inside the book
Page 22
... present some 850 Americans , including 250 U.S. offi- cials and dependents , in East Pakistan . State's plan is to make no im- mediate move to evacuate these people since they could be in greater danger on the streets and we have no ...
... present some 850 Americans , including 250 U.S. offi- cials and dependents , in East Pakistan . State's plan is to make no im- mediate move to evacuate these people since they could be in greater danger on the streets and we have no ...
Page 28
... present situation I don't think it would put much money in the bank . If we get a public appeal for recognition , we will have a problem . Dr. Kissinger : What should we do in that case ? Mr. Van Hollen : Go slow . This will be a ...
... present situation I don't think it would put much money in the bank . If we get a public appeal for recognition , we will have a problem . Dr. Kissinger : What should we do in that case ? Mr. Van Hollen : Go slow . This will be a ...
Page 30
... present . 2. Foreign Secretary began by handing me copy of Foreign Min- ister's statement made in Lok Sabha earlier in day . ( Text and subse- quent developments in Lok Sabha reported septel . ) 2 Kaul said Foreign Minister had been ...
... present . 2. Foreign Secretary began by handing me copy of Foreign Min- ister's statement made in Lok Sabha earlier in day . ( Text and subse- quent developments in Lok Sabha reported septel . ) 2 Kaul said Foreign Minister had been ...
Page 32
... present con- flict was an internal matter that should be settled internally . 12. Kaul said GOI had recently heard that all units of the Pak army had been permitted to ask for fighter support from the Pak air force and that there had in ...
... present con- flict was an internal matter that should be settled internally . 12. Kaul said GOI had recently heard that all units of the Pak army had been permitted to ask for fighter support from the Pak air force and that there had in ...
Page 52
... present cir- cumstances , we should be somewhat more willing than we have been heretofore to express our thoughts with controlled candor to the main parties concerned . The human and political problems that are likely to ensue from ...
... present cir- cumstances , we should be somewhat more willing than we have been heretofore to express our thoughts with controlled candor to the main parties concerned . The human and political problems that are likely to ensue from ...
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Common terms and phrases
action agreed Ambassador Farland army asked Assistant for National attack Awami League Bangla Desh Bengali Bhutto border ceasefire Central Files China Chinese conversation crisis Dacca December December 12 Delhi discussion Document draft East Bengal East Pakistan effort Embassy forces Foreign Minister Foreign Secretary Gandhi Government guerrillas Haig Helms Hilaly Hollen Ibid India India and Pakistan Irwin Islamabad issue Johnson Kissinger Papers Kissinger's meeting memorandum military supply million Moorer move Mujib Mujibur Mukti Bahini National Archives National Security Affairs Nixon Presidential Materials noted NSC Files Packard Pakistan Army political accommodation political settlement President Nixon President Yahya President's Assistant Prime Minister problem refugees relief resolution Saunders Security Council Singh Sisco situation source text South Asia Soviet Union talk Telegram text not declassified tion United Vorontsov Washington West White House Williams WSAG Yahya Khan