Riot as regards the mutual liability of those engaged in it.-A riot is when three or more persons assemble together of their own authority with an intent mutually to assist each other, and to resist all those who should oppose them, and with a further intent to break the peace; and this likewise for a private purpose.1 Three persons are the smallest number who must be engaged in this offence, for much of the criminality consists in the likelihood of danger arising out of mere numbers so acting. And for that reason it is that women as well as children above the age of fourteen, if mixing in the crowd, will incur the same liabilities as adult males, unless their presence can be otherwise explained.2 It is a species of offence in which persons may become involved almost without knowledge. or premeditation. Hence whenever a person joins a crowd, which is acting riotously, he must take care to get out of it with the least delay, as his presence is presumably an encouragement, and at least goes to swell the number and inspire terror in third parties; and so the burden of proof is thrown on him, who is found in the crowd, to prove that he was an involuntary associate.

One of the rules of law, therefore, is, that all who are members of a riotous crowd are principals, and the wearing of a badge or the making of signs is good prima facie evidence of being animated by the common design, and what each does, though perhaps on the spur of the moment, is deemed impliedly authorised by all the rest. An ambulatory partnership for the time being binds all together in one common liability, and makes each answerable for the wrongful acts and mischiefs done by all the others. The general characteristic of guilty participation in a riot thus being, that many act in furtherance of the common object, if there are riotous speeches made, the speakers are guilty of what follows, though they may have retired before the actual disturbance begins. And for the like reason, he, who joins at the latest stage, cannot escape liability by saying that he was no sharer in the original design.5

2 2 Salk. 594; 1 L. Raym. 484;

1 Per Heath, J., 26 St. Tr. 523. 1 Hawk. c. 65, § 14; 1 Hale, P. C. 20. 3 Clifford v Brandon, 2 Camp. 367; R. v Royce, 4 Burr. 2073; R. v Billingham, 2 C. & P. 234; R. v Perkins, 4 C. & P. 537. 4 R. v Sharpe, 3 Cox, C. C 288. 5 R. v Grampound, 2 L. Raym. 965; Anon. 6 Mod. 43.

Riot as to its origin and common purpose.-The unlawfulness of a riot may be manifested in different ways. The avowed object may be unlawful in the first instance, or an object, in itself lawful, may be sought to be carried out by unlawful means; or an object may be in the first instance lawful, but in the course of the proceedings this object may change into something unlawful. Numbers of people often meet, under a common sense of injustice, to redress an outrage on what they suppose to be their rights, and in the heat of the moment are carried much further than they intended. Hence the origin, nature, and development of the motives and actions require to be scrutinised, before the respective criminality of parties can be rightly ascertained. While an essential ingredient in the offence of unlawful assault and riot is the apprehension or terror caused to third parties, it is not necessary that the persons engaged in it should actually commit a breach of the peace; it is enough if they cause, not the nervous and weakminded, but one or more persons possessed of reasonable firmness, to apprehend that a breach of the peace is likely to be committed and is imminent.1 And if even one person is reasonably alarmed, this is all that is needed to complete this ingredient of the offence.2 Where the persons assemble with the view not of doing an unlawful overt act, but merely to display their numbers and power, the offence, if anything, is rather that of an unlawful assembly than of a riot, as, for example, where numbers of people ride about with weapons in an unusual manner. On the other hand, if the degree of intimidation is not sufficient to constitute a riot, the meeting may be unlawful from the mere fact of the object being to do a lawful act with unlawful and unnecessary violence, in which case the offence may be an unlawful assembly. And where numbers of persons meet for a lawful purpose, and their purpose changes into an unlawful one, those who take part in the latter purpose are in the same position of guilt, as if they had originally entertained such purpose. But that kind of common purpose which distinguishes a riot is not to be confounded with a mere

3

1 Per Mansfield, C. J., Clifford v Brandon, 2 Camp. 367. Phillips, 2 Mood. C. C. 252. 3 R. v Pugh, Holt cas. 635. Stroude, 2 Show. 150; R. v Cox, 4 C. & P. 538.

2 R. v 4 R. v

quarrel or fight between the parties themselves, in which case there may be an affray, though no riot.1

The more frequent origin of a riot is the general sentiment, that a public right has been invaded and requires to be vindicated by the force of numbers and a species of physical intimidation. Thus it is where many people have been excluded from the exercise of a right of common and pull down fences to a greater extent than is necessary to exercise their right,2 or where they join in some diversion which may be carried on in a tumultuous and violent manner, and in a public place, as playing at foot-ball in the public street. And to encourage a premeditated prizefight, is also an origin of riot. On one occasion, where many persons, offended at a rise of prices in a theatre, went purposely to the pit and hissed and hooted, rung bells and blew horns, so as to drown the voices of the actors and make the performance inaudible, it was held they were all guilty of a riot, though no personal violence was actually done to any one individual, and no injury done to the house. And when a lion-fight took place at Warwick in 1826, the Attorney-General (Copley) told the House of Commons, that it was a riotous and illegal assembly, and might have been dispersed by the magistracy.

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How far one may assemble friends for self-defence.—But though the carrying out even of a legal object with the aid of numbers in a tumultuous manner makes the offence of riot, it does not follow that in no case whatever is it legal for one person to be assisted by several persons. On the contrary, there may be situations in which a person may be aided by his friends or neighbours in doing something even in public, which makes their conduct punishable neither as a riotous nor as an unlawful assembly. And here arises a distinction between one's house and one's fields. Though it would be unlawful to assemble numbers to defend the possession of a close or field claimed by one of them, still, if it is to defend the peaceable possession of a house, this will be deemed justifiable, owing to the greater

1 R. v Ellis, 2 Salk. 595; 1 Hawk. c. 65; R. v Corp. of Grampound, 2 L. Raym. 965. 2 R. v Wyvill, 7 Mod. 286. 31 Hawk. c. 65, § 5. 4 R. v Billingham, 4 D. & R. 127; 2 C. & P. 234; R. v Perkins, 4 C. & P. 537. 5 Clifford v Brandon, 2 Camp. 358. 6 14 Parl. Deb. (2nd ser.) 651.

degree of protection thrown round the house or castle,— which is deemed a sanctuary, than round the lands and fields where no one dwells.1 In other cases it depends chiefly on the peaceable manner in which the people assemble and act, whether the crowd is riotous or not, for if by their conduct they neither break the peace nor cause any reasonable apprehension of so doing, then their conduct is not illegal, even though the purpose in view is wrongful. As when a man claiming a log of wood in another's field, goes with his friends to remove it ;2 or where a wear across a river is said to injure the local public in their rights, they may join and with crows of iron and spades remove it.3 In such cases, however, it is an important ingredient, that no more people should assemble than are reasonably necessary to do the contemplated act. And in all such cases it will be for a jury to decide, whether the circumstances of the assembling transgressed the line of peaceable behaviour, and reasonably inspired terror and apprehension in the minds of the public in the neighbourhood; and to ascertain this result the place and time of meeting and the nature of the speeches must all be considered.*

Riots to demolish buildings, machinery, &c.—Though the offence of riot or unlawful assembly is at common law only a misdemeanour, the legislature has singled out from the ordinary cases some attended with peculiar mischief as well as recklessness or malignity in the participators, namely, where the common object is to demolish buildings or machinery. This class of riots is made felony, and punished with penal servitude for life, or two years imprisonment. And if the rioters injure and damage without demolishing, the offence is misdemeanour, punishable with seven years penal servitude.

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1 Per Heath, J., R. v Bangor, 26 St. Tr. 526. 6 Mod. 141. 3 Dalton, c. 137.

R. v Neale, ib. 431.

2 R. v Pugh,

4 R. v Vincent, 9 C. & P. 91;

5 24 & 25 Vic. c. 97, § 11; 27 & 28 Vic. c. 47, § 2. The punishment is penal servitude for life, or for not less than five years, or imprisonment for not less than two years, with or without hard labour, and with or without solitary confinement.

6 24 & 25 Vic. c. 97, § 12; 27 & 2 Vic. c. 47, § 2. This punishment is penal servitude not exceeding seven, and not less than five, years, or imprisonment not exceeding two years, with or without hard labour. A variety of buildings are enumerated in the statute, as

In applying these enactments, it has been held that a person present and aiding at part of the mischief, such as the burning of a house, though not at the firing of it, is equally guilty.1 And where the mob attack and injure a house, chiefly as a means of getting at and seizing some obnoxious person inside, they may be guilty nevertheless of this statutory offence, especially if the evidence leaves it doubtful whether their object was not twofold.2

Individuals stepping a riot.—The duty of individuals to put a stop to a riot was thus expounded by Lord Mansfield. Every individual in his private capacity may lawfully interfere to suppress a riot: much more to prevent acts of felony, treason, and rebellion. Not only is he authorised to interfere for such a purpose, but it is his duty to do so; and if called upon by a magistrate, he is punishable in case of refusal. What any single individual may lawfully do, for the prevention of crime and preservation of the public peace, may be done by any number assembled to perform their duty as good citizens. It is the peculiar business of all constables to apprehend rioters, to endeavour to disperse all unlawful assemblies, and in case of resistance to attack, wound, nay kill those who continue to resist, taking care not to commit unnecessary violence or to abuse the power legally vested in them."3 And another learned judge near our own times thus gave his version of the same rights and duties. By the common law every private person may lawfully endeavour of his own authority and without any warrant or sanction of the magistrate to suppress a riot by every means in his power. He may disperse or assist in dispersing those who are assembled; he may stay those who are engaged in it from executing their purpose; he may stop and prevent others whom he shall see coming up from joining the rest; and not only has he the authority, but he is bound under pain of fine and imprisonment, when called upon by the magistrate, to do his utmost in assisting him to suppress any tumultuous assembly. If the riot be general and dangerous, he may arm himself against the evildoers to keep the peace. It is undoubtedly more prudent, included in this special protection, such as churches, chapels, houses, shops, mills, granaries, county buildings, machinery, mines, &c. 1 R. v Simpson, Car. & M. 669. 2 R. v Price, 5 C. & P. 510; R. v Batt, 6 C. & P. 329. 3 21 Parl. Hist. 688.