the want of clear and certain knowledge in cases where nnot be had, is judgment; whereby the mind takes its ideas ee or disagree; or, which is the same thing, any proposition rue or false, without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in ofs.

, knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives, and is undoubt
isfied of the agreement or disagreement of any ideas.
ndly, judgment, which is the putting ideas together, or
ing them from one another in the mind, when their agree-
r disagreement is not perceived, but presumed to be so;
s, as the word imports, taken to be so, before it certainly

And if it so unites, or separates them, as in reality
re, it is right judgment."

is limitation in the definition of judgment, some pretence is by the literal signification of the word, when applied to sion of a tribunal; and also, by its metaphorical application cisions of the mind, on those critical questions which fall e province of Taste. But, considered as a technical or term of logic, the practice of our purest and most correct fficiently sanctions the more enlarged sense in which I lained it; and, if I do not much deceive myself, this use be found more favourable to philosophical distinctness than e's language, which leads to an unnecessary multiplication ellectual powers. What good reason can be given for ase name to the faculty which perceives truths that are and another name to the faculty which perceives truths that le? Would it not be equally proper to distinguish, by dif nes, the power by which we perceive one proposition to nd another to be false?

nowledge, I do not think that it can, with propriety, be with judgment; nor do I apprehend that it is at all agreeer to common use or to philosophical accuracy, to speak edge as a faculty. To me it seems rather to denote the of those truths, about which our faculties have been prenployed, than any separate power of the understanding, by ath is perceived.f

n the Human Understanding, Book iv. Chap. 14.

pting thus to fix the logical import of various words in our language which confounded, in popular speech, with reason, and also with reasoning, some may be surprised, that I have said nothing about the word wisdom. The t the notion expressed by this term, as it is employed by our best writers, suppose the influence of some principles, the consideration of which belongs to art of my work. In confirmation of this, it may be remarked, that whereas of our reasoning powers (in their application to the business of life,) is lim hoice of means, wisdom denotes a power of a more comprehensive nature, and rder; a power which implies a judicious selection both of means and of ends. precisely defined by Sir William Temple, to be "that which makes meu ire the best ends, and what the best means to attain them."

wo modifications of wisdom, the one denotes a power of the mind which ob under the view of the logician; the examination of the other as obviously bics.

Before concluding these preliminary remarks, I cannot help expressing my regret, that the subject on which I am about to enter will so frequently lay me under the necessity of criticising the language, and of disputing the opinions of my predecessors. In doing so, I am not conscious of being at all influenced by a wish to indulge myself in the captiousness of controversy; nor am I much afraid of this imputation from any of my readers who shall honour these speculations with an attentive perusal. My real aim is, in the first place, to explain the grounds of my own deviations from the track which has been commonly pursued; and, secondly, to facilitate the progress of such as may follow me in the same path, by directing their attention to those points of divergency in the way, which may suggest matter for doubt or hesitation. I know, at the same time, ty bust that, in the of many, the best mode of mode of ciples of a science is to state them systematically and concisely,

knowledge, where

without any historical retrospects whatever; and I believe the opi-unfolding nion is in those difficulty arises less from vague ideas and indefinite terms, than from 7 vincithe length of the logical chain which the student has to trace. But, ples of a in such disquisitions as we are now engaged in, it is chiefly from the side. gradual correction of verbal ambiguities, and the gradual detection of unsuspected prejudices, that a progressive, though slow approximation to truth, is to be expected. It is indeed a slow approximation, at best, that we can hope to accomplish at present, in the examination of a subject where so many powerful causes (particularly those connected with the imperfections of language) conspire to lead us astray. But the study of the human mind is not, on that account, to be abandoned. Whoever compares its actual state with that in mental which Bacon, Des Cartes, and Locke found must be sensible

amply their efforts for its improvement have been repaid, both by philosophy their own attainments, and by those of others who have since pro-progressing

fited by their example. I am willing to hope, that some useful hints for its farther advancement may be derived even from my own

ELEMENTS OF THE PHILOSOPHY

arches; and, distant as the prospect may be of raising it to a with the physical science of the Newtonian school, by uniting pinions of speculative men about fundamental principles, my ion as an author will be fully gratified, if, by the few who are etent to judge, I shall be allowed to have contributed my share, er small, towards the attainment of so great an object. he discussions which immediately follow, no argument will, I ccur beyond the reach of those who shall read them with ention which every inquiry into the human mind indispensauires. I have certainly endeavoured, to the utmost of my , to render every sentence which I have written, not only ble but perspicuous; and, where I have failed in the athe obscurity will, I hope, be imputed, not to an affectation ry, but to some errour of judgment. I can, without much ay, that, with less expense of thought, I could have rivalled urity of Kant; and that the invention of a new technical , such as that which he has introduced, would have been task, than the communication of clear and precise notions been so fortunate as to succeed in this communication,) eparting from the established modes of expression. following observations of D'Alembert (with some trifling ceptions) I give my most cordial assent; and, mortifying ay appear to the pretensions of bolder theorists, I should to see them generally recognised as canons of philosophi m: "Truth in metaphysics resembles truth in matters of the seeds of it exist in every mind; though n both cases, k of attending to this latent treasure, till it be pointed out by more curious inquirers. It should seem that every learn from a good metaphysical book is only a sort of rece of what the mind previously knew. The obscurity, of e are apt to complain in this science, may be always justly to the author; because the information, which he profess municate, requires no technical language appropriated to Accordingly, we may apply to good metaphysical authors been said of those who excel in the art of writing, that, g them, every body is apt to imagine, that he himself ve written in the same manner.

this sort of speculation, if all are qualified to understand, ot fitted to teach. The merit of accommodating easily to ehension of others, notions, which are at once simple and ears, from its extreme rarity, to be much greater than is y imagined. Sound metaphysical principles are truths ery one is ready to seize, but which few men have the talent ing; so difficult is it in this, as well as in other instances, to ate to one's self what seems to be the common inheritance man race."*

en métaphysique ressemble au vrai en matière de goût; c'est un vrai dont ont le germe en eux-mêmes, auquel la plupart ne font point d'attention, nnoissent dès qu'on le leur montre. Il semble que tout ce qu'on apprend

I am, at the same time, aware, that whoever, in of the human mind, aims to be understood, must lay his account with Perspicuit forfeiting, in the opinion of a very large proportion of readers, all pretensions to depth, to subtlety, or to invention. The acquisition' nor studied of a new nomenclature is, in itself, no inconsiderable reward to the from motiv industry of those, who study only from motives of literary vanity;" and, if D'Alembert's idea of this branch of science be just, the wider f an author deviates from truth, the more likely are his conclusions to assume the appearance of discoveries. I may add, that it is chiefly in those discussions which possess the best claims to originality, where he may expect to be told by the multitude, that they have learned from him nothing but what they knew before.

ambitio

sees not

The latitude with which the word metaphysics is frequently used, The term. makes it necessary for me to remark, with respect to the foregoing passage from D'Alembert, that he limits the term entirely to an ac-metaphy. count of the origin of our ideas. "The generation of our ideas (he "tells us) belongs to metaphysics. It forms one of the principal "objects, and perhaps ought to form the sole object of that sci-ttled. "ence."*If the meaning of the word be extended, as it too often is in our language, so as to comprehend all those inquiries which relate to the theory and to the improvement of our mental powers, some of his observations must be understood with very important restrictions. What he has stated, however, on the inseparable connexion between perspicuity of style and soundness of investigation in metaphysical disquisitions, will be found to hold equally in every research to which that epithet can, with any colour of propriety, be applied.

CHAPTER FIRST.

FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF HUMAN BELIEF; OR THE PRIMARY ELEMENTS OF HUMAN REASON.

ropriety of the title prefixed to this Chapter will, I trust, be sufficiently by the speculations which are to follow. As ffer, in some essential points, from the conclusions of former I found myself under the necessity of abandoning, in various 3, their phraseology;-but my reasons for the particular which I have made, cannot possibly be judged of, or even od, till the inquiries by which I was led to adopt them be y examined.

in with a review of some of those primary truths, a convicwhich is necessarily implied in all our thoughts and in all our and which seem, on that account, rather to form constituent ntial elements of reason, than objects with which reason is nt. The import of this last remark will appear more clearly Is.

rimary truths to which I mean to confine my attention at re, 1. Mathematical Axioms: 2. Truths (or more properly Laws of Belief,) inseparably connected with the exercise ousness, Perception, Memory, and Reasoning-Of some laws of Belief, the truth of which is tacitly recognised in asonings concerning contingent events, I shall have occae notice under a different article.

SECTION I.

OF MATHEMATICAL AXIOMS.

placed this class of truths at the head of the enumeration, cause they seem likely, from the place which they hold nents of geometry, to present to my readers a more innd at the same time an easier subject of discussion, than e more abstract and latent elements of our knowledge, to be considered. In other respects, a different arrange at perhaps have possessed some advantages, in point of cal method.

I.

evidence of mathematical axioms it is unnecessary to enhe controversies to which they have given occasion are

entirely of a speculative, or rather scholastic description; and have no tendency to affect the certainty of that branch of science to which they are supposed to be subservient.

It must at the same time be confessed, with respect to this class of propositions (and the same remark may be extended to axioms in that some of the connected with them continue still to be involved in much obscurity. In proportion to Axioms their extreme simplicity is the difficulty of illustrating or of describing their nature in unexceptionable language; or even of ascertain

difficult

ing a precise criterion by which they may be distinguished from to be exother truths which approach to them nearly. It is chiefly owing to plained this, that, in geometry, there are no theorems of which it is so diffiон амо cult to give a rigorous demonstration, as those, of which persons unacquainted with the nature of mathematical evidence are apt to say, of their that they require no proof whatever. But the inconveniences arising from these circumstances are of trifling moment; occasioning, at the worst, some embarrassment to those mathematical writers, who are studious of the most finished elegance in their exposition of elementary principles; or to metaphysicians, anxious to display their subtilty upon points which cannot possibly lead to any practical conclusion.

simplicity

It was long ago remarked by Locke, of the axioms of geometry, as stated by Euclid, that although the proposition be at first enunciated in general terms, and afterwards appealed to, in its particular applications, as a principle previously examined and admitted, yet Axioms that the truth is not less evident in the latter case than in the former. He observes farther, that it is in some of its particular applications, that the truth of every axiom is originally perceived by the mind; Generaliza and, therefore, that the general proposition, so far from being the ground of our assent to the truths which it comprehends, is only a verbal generalization of what, in particular instances, has been already acknowledged as true.

formed by

tion

The same author remarks, that some of these axioms "are no more than bare verbal propositions, and teach us nothing but the

66

66

respect and import of names one to another. The whole is equal

46

to all its parts: what real truth, I beseech you, does it teach us? "What more is contained in that maxim, than what the signification "of the word totum, or the whole does of itself import? And he that "knows that the word whole stands for what is made up of all its

66

parts, knows very little less, than that the whole is equal to all "its parts.' And upon the same ground, I think, that this proposi

66

tion, A hill is higher than a valley, and several the like, may also pass for maxims."

66

Axion

Notwithstanding these considerations, Mr. Locke does not object to the form which Euclid has given to his axioms, or to the place which he has assigned to them in his Elements. On the contrary, he is of opinion, that a collection of such maxims is not without rea- not withous son prefixed to a mathematical system; in order that learners, "having in the beginning perfectly acquainted their thoughts with

use