Opinion of the Court.

ing supposed debts with which the administrator had not the remotest concern. Hobson et al. v. Payne, Adm'r. 45 Ill. 158.

The amount of which is, simply, that the court erred in ordering a sale to pay such debts, but having jurisdiction of the subject, its judgment was not void, but erroneous only. The case of Stow v. Kimball, 28 Ill. 110, is decisive on this point.

The objection that no account or inventory was filed by the administrator, is answered by the fact that the petition alleges there was no personal estate; of course no account could be made of that which was not; nor could any inventory be made. But these matters are not jurisdictional. Most of the cases cited by appellants are in direct proceedings to reverse for error.

The point that the decree was erroneous and has been reversed, leaving Duhme, the purchaser, not in a condition to hold the title, nor the persons claiming under him, is not tenable. In Goudy v. Hall, 36 Ill. 313, this court said, if the court has jurisdiction to render the judgment or to pronounce the decree, that is, if it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject-matter, then, upon principles of universal law, acts performed and rights acquired by third persons under the authority of the judgment or decree, and while it remains in force, must be sustained, notwithstanding a subsequent reversal. The necessity of this rule, as founded upon important considerations of public policy, is too apparent to admit of dispute. When the validity of acts done under a judicial proceeding is collaterally called in question, we have to look only to the jurisdiction, and if that is found to have existed, then it matters not how erroneous the proceedings of the court may have been, the rights of third persons, acquired while such proceedings were unreversed, and, by virtue of them, must be protected. A great number of cases are there referred to, and we desire to add nothing to what is said in them. The point is made that the parties here were not shown to be bona fide purchasers, and that the reversal of the judgment takes away their rights. The question of the good faith of the transaction is not in the case, and we

Opinion of the Court.

know of no rule of law requiring it to be shown in a case of this kind. Good faith is presumed until the contrary is shown. A purchaser under an execution issued upon a judgment in his own favor, is, equitably, bound to make restoration to the judgment debtor on a reversal of the judgment, because he is a privy and a party to the error, and equity will not allow him to profit by his own error. The present defendants in the ejectment, are, so far as we know, innocent purchasers without notice of any infirmity in the title. Whatever irregularities may have occurred between the administrator and the purchaser, they are not jurisdictional, and, on well established principles, can not affect them. The purchaser at the administrator's sale satisfied the administrator as to the payment of his bid, and if the administrator in his acts, in this regard, did not conform in all respects to the law, he may be responsible to the creditors and to others having an interest therein. These defendants have been in possession of these lands many years, making valuable improvements thereon, and have strong equities in their favor, which courts must respect.

As to the objection that the sale by the administrator has not been confirmed by the court, and that the court refused to confirm it, on a motion for that purpose, it is sufficient to say the statute, authorizing the sale, does not require the subsequent confirmation of the court. It is not necessary to the validity of the sale. Stow v. Kimball, supra. Reynolds v. Wilson, 15 Ill. 394, cited by appellants, was a direct proceeding by writ of error from the original decree overruling a motion for confirmation of the sale, and has no bearing on the question before us.

The remaining objections are: 1. That the deed of the administrator to Love was not acknowledged according to law. This is obviated by the testimony of the grantor of the actual execution of the deed. 2. The deed was not executed to Duhme, the purchaser, but to his assignee, Love. In Dickerman v. Burgess, 20 Ill. 275, we said the sheriff could not execute a deed to a stranger, and reference was

Opinion of the Court. Syllabus.

made to Davis v. Mc Vickers, 11 id. 329, where it was held such deed must be made to the purchaser or to the assignee of the certificate of purchase, or in case of the death of the purchaser to his legal representatives.

Love was the assignee of the certificate of purchase, and it was wholly immaterial to appellants to whom the deed was made, their title having been divested by the sale. They have no interest in the question. If there can be a question raised on this point it must be between the purchaser and the assignee.

We have examined and disposed of all the points raised on this record, and, as we said at the outset, they have been decided adversely to appellants, by numerous decisions of this court, in which we express our full concurrence.

There being no error in this record the judgment must be affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

WALKER, J., took no part in the decision of this case, as he tried the case in which the decree for the sale of the land was rendered.

RUDOLPH E. SCHULTZ, impleaded, etc.,

v.

JOHN HAY.

MECHANICS' LIEN--by sub-contractor. In a suit by a sub-contractor against the owner of a building to recover for labor performed on defendant's house, which he did under the contractor, it appeared that the contractor had abandoned the work and that defendant had fully paid him all he was entitled to before receiving any notice of the plaintiff's claim: Held, that the plaintiff was not entitled to recover.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook County; the HON. JOHN G. ROGERS, Judge, presiding.

Mr. A. T. EWING, for the appellant.

Opinion of the Court. Syllabus.

Per CURIAM: Appellee sought to recover for work and labor performed and materials furnished in the building of a house.

Appellant had contracted with one Hayman to build his house, for a certain sum; Hayman progressed with the work for some time and then abandoned it, and was fully paid for all that he had done.

This payment was made before any notice was given by appellee, under the act amendatory of the Mechanics' Lien Law, approved April 5, 1869 (Sess. Laws, 1869, 255), that he would hold the building liable for his labor and materials.

The fair construction of this statute is, that the sub-contractor, mechanic, or workman shall not have a lien until the required notice is given to the owner or lessee.

When the notice was given in this case the contractor had failed to complete his contract; and there was no money due to him from the owner.

The remedy of appellee, if any, is under Section 7 of the act referred to.

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

Judgment reversed.

MATTHEW MOORE et al.

บ.

THOMAS J. PICKETT et al.

1. TRUST agent. Where the owner of land which had been sold under execution, made an arrangement with his tenant to redeem the same, and the tenant took an assignment of the certificate of purchase in his own name, while acting as the agent of the owner, his landlord, and afterward procured the sheriff to make a deed to himself instead of to his principal, it seems that this in equity will constitute such agent the trustee of the principal.

2. STATUTE OF FRAUDS-writing to take out of. Where a party acquires title to land in trust for another and writes to such other party a letter showing

Syllabus. Statement of the case.

clearly that he holds the same in trust, this will be sufficient to manifest the trust as required by the statute of frauds; and where the letter fails to describe the lands, it may be shown by the facts and circumstances surrounding the case that it referred to land in dispute.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Tazewell County; the Hon. CHARLES TURNER, Judge, presiding.

Thomas J. Pickett was the owner of the land in controversy, which was sold in two parcels by the sheriff on execution against Pickett. The land was occupied by Matthew Moore, as the tenant of Pickett. The time for redeeming from this sale through judgment creditors expired Feb. 21, 1863. The bill alleged that, long before this Moore entered into an agreement with Pickett to redeem the land, for which the latter was to pay him the amount of the redemption money, with interest, less the amount of rent due from Moore to Pickett. Moore, as such agent, purchased the certificates of purchase, taking an assignment to himself; on Oct. 26, 1863, the sheriff executed deeds to Moore for the lands; on March 30, 1863, Moore wrote a letter to Pickett, stating that he had borrowed the money and paid it in time to save the land; that the parties wanted the money, which saved the expense of getting a judgment on Pickett under which to redeem; that the taxes would have to be paid soon; and stated at length what he had done on the place, and asked for instructions and directions, etc. The bill was filed for an account to be taken, and prayed that upon payment to Moore of the redemption money, less the rents, he be decreed to convey by deed the land, and surrender possession.

The answers set up the statute of frauds, and denied the facts stated in the bill.

The circuit court found the amount due, and directed the master in chancery to execute deed upon its payment.

Mr. B. S. PRETTYMAN and Mr. J. B. RICE, for the appellants.