Opinion of the Court. they must discharge. They can be compelled, by the mandates of the courts, to a full performance of them; and parties seeking redress need not resort to the imperfect action at common law, but may apply for the more effectual remedy by mandamus. Railways are improved public highways; and the courts have uniformly held that they are of such public use as to justify the exercise of the right of eminent domain, in taking all real estate that may be necessary for the construction and maintenance of the road, its depots, side tracks, stations, machine shops, and other necessary appendages, disfiguring and rendering unfit for cultivation farms, and even in destroying dwellings. The necessity and expediency for the exercise of this right, in making public improvements, either for the benefit of all the people of the State, or of a particular municipality, must be determined by the legislature. Mere convenience is not sufficient to justify the exercise of the right. The public use must be necessary and pressing. In referring to the urgency of the public use, Woodbury, J., in the case of West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 6 How. 546, said: "So as to a road, if really demanded in particular forms and places, to accommodate a growing and changing commu nity, and to keep up with the wants and improvements of the age-such as its pressing demands for easier and social intercourse quicker political communication, or better internal trade-and advancing with the public necessities from blazed trees to bridle paths, and thence to wheel-roads, turnpikes, and railroads." Though the distinction between the right of eminent domain and the power of taxation may be manifest, yet, when the public use, necessary for the exercise of the former, has been settled by both the legislative and judicial departments, and a particular enterprize has thus been fixed as of public importance, the position is very much strengthened, that taxation for such an enterprize is for a public purpose. This court has decided that such corporations are created Opinion of the Court. for the public good; to increase the facilities and conveniencies, and promote the great ends of commerce; and that they can not organize monopolies, and make contracts injurious to the public interests. Vincent v. C. & A. R. R. Co., 49 Ill. 33; Chi. & N. W. R. R. Co. v. The People ex rel. Hempstead, 56 id. 365. In view of the past history of railroads, the impossibility of dispensing with them, the necessity of an increase of the number to open new outlets for the products of our fertile and inexhaustible soil-all of which were well known to the legislature and sustained by numerous authorities-we must hold, that, even if the appropriation in this case was not for a public purpose in the broadest sense, the character of the purpose is involved in such doubt that we can not declare void the action of the legislature. Is the law, under consideration, in violation of the fifth section of the ninth article of the constitution of 1848? That section provides that "The corporate authorities of counties, townships, school-districts, cities, towns, and villages, may be vested with power to assess and collect taxes for corporate purposes; such taxes to be uniform in respect to persons and property within the jurisdiction of the body imposing the same." It is contended that the appropriation was not for a "corporate purpose." If it was for a public purpose-for the benefit of the inhabitants of the municipality-then it would be for a corporate purpose. The latter can not be distinguished from the former; and all that we have said in relation to the public purpose of the tax, will apply with equal force to a corporate purpose. We refer to the following cases, in which the questions discussed have been settled by this court. Prettyman v. The Supervisors of Tazewell County, 19 Ill. 406; Johnson v. The County of Stark, supra; Perkins v. Lewis, 24 Ill. 208; Butler v. Dunham, 27 Ill. 474; The President and Trustees v. Frick, 34 Ill. 405. In the case of Nichol v. The Mayor and Aldermen, supra, a subscription by the city of Nashville to a railroad was held Opinion of the Court. to be for a corporate purpose. The constitution of Tennessee provides that "The general assembly shall have power to authorize the several counties and incorporated towns in this State to impose taxes for county and corporation purposes respectively." The language is substantially the same as in our constitution. The city of Nashville having subscribed, a bill was filed to restrain the issue of bonds; and the court decided that the legislature had power to authorize the subscription; that the construction of the road was a corporate purpose; and that the city might either levy the tax or issue bonds to obtain the money. In Taylor v. Thompson, 42 Ill. 9, this court defined a corporate purpose to mean: "A tax to be expended in a manner which shall promote the general prosperity and welfare of the municipality which levies it." We accept this definition, and are of opinion that no person can doubt but that taxes, expended to aid in the construc tion of a railroad, must promote the general prosperity. The remaining question is, whether a distinction exists be tween a donation in aid of the road, and a subscription to the capital stock of the corporation? The distinction is more ap parent than real; indeed, to our view, is entirely shadowy No principle would justify the authority to a municipal corporation to become a stockholder in a railroad company, merely to acquire equitable rights, and to prevent the misapplication of the funds. The power is granted in consideration of the public benefits, and these are as great in the one case as in the other. The decree of the court below is reversed and the cause remanded. Decree reversed. Syllabus. Opinion of the Court. BARRETT CLARK V. WILLIAM LAUGHLIN. 1. CHANCERY—error in master's report. Where a party to a suit in chancery fails to except to the master's report of the sum due him, he will be precluding from objecting in this court that there was a greater sum due him than was allowed. 2. REDEMPTION FROM MORTGAGE -tax title. Where a party made a mortgage of land by a deed absolute on its face, and the mortgagee gave a bond obligating himself to convey back the premises on payment of the debt, free from all incumbrance, by deed with full covenants of warranty, and afterward acquired a tax title to the premises, the court, on bill to redeem, allowed the mortgagee the sum advanced for the tax title, and required him to convey the whole title, which the mortgagee assigned for error: Held, that under the terms of his bond there was no error. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Will County; the Hon. JOSIAH MCROBERTS, Judge, presiding. Mr. R. E. BARBER, for the appellant. Mr. H. B. GODARD, for the appellee. Mr. JUSTICE SHELDON delivered the opinion of the Court: This was a bill in equity brought by Laughlin, the appellee, to redeem from a deed of mortgage. The conveyance was, in form, a warranty deed given by Laughlin and wife to Clark, the appellant, with a bond for reconveyance by the latter, and is recognized by both parties as a mortgage. The court below so found, and ordered a reference to the master to compute the amount due to Clark, and, upon the coming in of the master's report, rendered a decree against Laughlin for the sum reported by the master to be due from him. The first point of error which the appellant urges is, that Opinion of the Court. Syllabus. there was a greater amount due to him than that reported by the master; as to which it will suffice to say that no exceptions were taken to the master's report in the court below, and it can not be questioned for the first time in this court. Reigard v. McNeil, 38 Ill. 401. The land had been sold at a tax sale, for the taxes of 1860, and purchased by one Peaselee, who assigned the certificate of purchase to Clark, who obtained from the sheriff a tax deed; and it is urged as another ground of error that the tax title was disallowed by the court as being a valid paramount one in Clark, and he was allowed a credit for the amount he advanced for its purchase. Without considering the question as to whether a mortgagee can buy in an outstanding title and hold it against the mortgaClark had here given a bond for the recoveyance of the land, free from all incumbrances, with full covenants of warranty. Under the conditions of his bond he was required to transfer this title to Laughlin upon payment of the mortgage debt, and he must be taken to have acquired it for that purpose, or to extinguish it for the benefit of Laughlin. Laughlin, it seems, had made a parol agreement to pay the taxes, which was no more than his duty as mortgagor required him to do; but the only effect of his failure to do so was to give Clark the right to be reimbursed what he paid to obtain the tax title. This the decree allowed. Finding no error in the record, the decree is affirmed. Decree affirmed 62 279 42a 63 62 279 279 BOARD OF PUBLIC WORKS OF CHICAGO-awarding contract on buildings. 62 By the charter of the city of Chicago the board of public works was made a 114a 312 |