Opinion of the Court. structive notice of the rights of the mortgagee; occupies the same position as his grantor; and is subject to the same equities. Either may be treated as tenant or trespasser, upon forfeiture of the condition of the mortgage, at the pleasure of the mortgagee. Dunn v. Rogers, 43 Ill. 260; 1 Hill. on Mort. 123; 4 Kent Com. 157; Hughes v. Edwards, 9 Wheaton, 489; Doe v. Maisey, 8 B. & Cress. 767. The grantees of the mortgagor were never treated as trespassers, and their possession was not hostile to, or inconsistent with, the right of the mortgagee. Partridge v. Bere, supra; Hitchman v. Walton, 4 M. & W. 409; Doe v. Barton, 11 Ald. & Ell. 307. There can be no doubt, that before protection can be afforded, under the limitation law of 1839, the possession must be adverse. It must be hostile in its inception, and so continue. It must be actual, continued, visible, notorious, distinct, and hostile possession. Hawk v. Senseman, 6 Ser. & Rawle, 21; McClellan v. Kellogg, 17 Ill. 503; Cook v. Norton, 48 Ill. 20. The relation of mortgagor and mortgagee; the fact that the purchaser only succeeded to the rights of the former, and with notice of the incumbrance, and the consequent privity between the parties, forbid the conclusion of an adverse possession. The possession must be regarded as in subordination to the mortgage; and it can not cease to be of that character until there is an open disclaimer of holding under it, and the assertion of a distinct title, with the knowledge of the mortgagee. Brown v. Devine, 61 Ill. 260; Geller's Lessee v. Eckert, 4 How. U. S. 289. The case of Manning v. Warren, 17 Ill. 267, differs from the present in an important particular. The entry, in that case, was under a deed executed by the mortgagor prior to the execution of the mortgage, and, hence, the possession could not be said, with any propriety, to be subservient to the mortgage. As to the payment of taxes, it was the duty of the mortga gor, as well as his grantees, while in possession, to pay the Opinion of the Court. taxes, and no right could be acquired thereby. The mortgagee might well regard such payment as a protection of his interest. Wright v. Langley, 36 Ill. 381. We are of opinion that the record shows a release of all the mortgaged premises, except the land conveyed to appellants, and that the mortgage lien rested upon it. The releases were executed prior to the conveyance to appellants. The heirs of the mortgagor were not necessary parties, as all the premises mortgaged had been sold and conveyed, and, therefore, they had no subsisting interest in the land. We think that the decree should be affirmed. Decree affirmed. INDEX. ABANDONMENT. ABANDONMENT OF HOMESTEAD. See HOMESTEAD, 3, 4. ABATEMENT. NON-JOINDER OF SECRET PARTNER. 1. In an action of assumpsit to recover the value of services rendered, the defendant pleaded in abatement the non-joinder of his alleged partner: Held, that proof showing there was such a partner, but that he was a secret partner, and of whom the plaintiff had no knowledge at the time he was employed by the defendant, would not support the plea. Goggin v. O'Donnell, 66. ASSESSMENT OF DAMAGES. 2. When issue is found against the defendant, whether jury should assess them. Where a plaintiff takes issue on a plea in abatement, and the jury find against the defendant, they should assess the plaintiff's damages so that final judgment may be given. It is not necessary to swear the jury specifically to assess the damages, but swearing them to well and truly try the issue joined between the parties, and a true verdict render according to the evidence, includes the assessing of the damages. Ibid. 66. DEATH OF A SOLE PLAINTIFF IN EJECTMENT. 3. Revivor in the names of a part of the heirs. See EJECTMENT, 1, 2. ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEEDS. IMPEACHMENT BY PAROL. 1. Where the certificate of acknowledgment of a mortgage in due form shows that the wife relinquished her dower and homestead right, in the t absence of fraud or imposition upon the wife, or combination between the mortgagee and the officer taking the acknowledgment, she will not be allowed to show in defense of a bill to foreclose that she did not in fact relinquish her dower and homestead right. Monroe v. Poorman et al. 523. 2. Where the certificate of the acknowledgment of a deed is in conformity to law, it can only be impeached for fraud or imposition. The certificate must be judged of by what appears upon its face. There (537) ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEEDS. IMPEACHMENT BY PAROL. Con- tinued. fore, proof negativing the necessary facts shown therein, will not alone 3. An objection that a deed admitted in evidence was defectively ACTIONS. BEFORE EXPIRATION OF CONDITIONAL CREDIT. 1. When the plaintiff performs work for a defendant under a con- EXCAVATION IN STREET BY AN INDIVIDUAL. 2. Payment of damages therefor by the town, and action by the town against ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES. GRANTING LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION. 1. Presumption as to jurisdiction-questioning the proceedings collaterally. 2. The county court being invested with complete jurisdiction of SALE OF LAND TO PAY DEBTS. 3. Notice of application. The following notice was given of the pre- ADMINISTRATION OF ESTATES. SALE OF LAND TO PAY DEBTS. notice, that I intend to present a petition to the circuit court at its next 4. Under the statute in force in 1853, the administrator had the 5. An administrator's sale of real estate, under an order of court, 6. So, also, when such notice was directed "to all persons inter- 7. Finding as to notice. When the circuit court, on the petition of an 8. Of the petition. Although the statute required the administrator |