CHANCERY. EXCEPTING TO MASTER'S REPORT. Continued.
cluded from objecting in this court that there was a greater sum due
him than was allowed. Clark v. Laughlin, 278.
ENFORCING AN ATTORNEY'S LIEN. See LIENS, 1.
CHATTEL MORTGAGES. See MORTGAGES, 16, 17.
CLOUD UPON TITLE. See CHANCERY, 5 to 8.
COLOR OF TITLE. See LIMITATIONS, 3 to 6.
DECISIONS OF SUPREME COURT OF U. S.
1. When binding upon State courts. The decisions of the Supreme
Court of the United States upon questions arising under the Federal
Constitution are binding upon this court. McInhill v. Odell et al. 169.
ATTACHMENT OF BOATS AND VESSELS.
2. Of the jurisdiction of State and Federal courts in respect thereto. See
ATTACHMENT OF BOATS AND VESSELS, 2, 3, 4.
3. As to a bequest of personalty, and a devise of realty-by what law go-
erned. See WILLS, 25, 26.
1. If A owe B and give his order on C for a sum that may come
into the hands of C, to his use, and C accept the order, he is liable to
B for so much of that sum as shall come to his possession, his accept-
ance being a promise founded upon a sufficient consideration. Tuttle v.
Ridgeway, 515.
OF AN ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE.
1. Its constitutionality—general rule of construction. The question of
the repugnancy of a law to the constitution is one of great delicacy;
and the judiciary, in justice to the rights of a co-ordinate department
of the State government, ought not, and will not, declare a law to be
void, except, upon the most deliberate and mature consideration, its
repugnance to the constitution is clearly manifest to the understanding.
Chicago, Danville & Vincennes Railroad Co. et al. v. Smith, 268.
2. The judicial department being created under the constitution to
construe and administer the law, has nothing to do with the policy or
expediency of an act of the legislature. The mere fact that an act
may be mischievous in its effects, burdensome upon the people, in con-
flict with our conceptions of natural right, abstract justice, or pure
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. OF AN ACT OF THE LEGISLATURE. Continued.
morality, or of doubtful propriety, will not justify the courts in hold-
ing it to be beyond the scope of legislative authority. Chicago, Danville
& Vincennes Railroad Co. et al. v. Smith, 268.
3. In the enactment of laws the legislature must exercise its judg-
ment and discretion. As to questions of pure policy and expediency,
no express or necessarily implied constitutional provision intervening,
it is the sole judge; and if there be grave doubt as to the nature of the
purpose, that doubt must be solved in favor of the action of the legis-
lature. Ibid. 268.
Majority required in receding from an amendment. See STATUTES, 1.
EMINENT DOMAIN.
Compensation for taking private property for public use—and what manner to
be fixed-Constitution of 1870, and the act of 1852. See RIGHT OF
WAY, 1 to 8.
TAXATION FOR CORPORATE PURPOSES.
EQUALITY AND UNIFORMITY IN TAXATION.
EXEMPTION FROM TAXATION.
To what extent allowable. See same title.
DELINQUENT TAXES AND SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS.
By whom the application for judgment and the sale may be made, under con-
stitution of 1870. See TAXATION, 13, 14, 15.
Prohibition in constitution of 1870-when it went into effect. See SUB-
SCRIPTION, 1.
Whether within the power of the legislature. See SUBSCRIPTION, 4;
RAILROADS, 3, 4.
DISOBEYING A VOID WRIT OF INJUNCTION.
Is not a contempt. See INJUNCTIONS, 1.
CONTRACT AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY.
1. To induce the location of a railroad. A contract made with officers
of a railroad company, acting in their individual capacity, to induce
them to establish the line of the road at a given point, for the purpose
of promoting the private advantage of the contracting parties, is against
public policy, as tending to sacrifice the interests of stockholders and
of the public, and will not be enforced in equity. Linder v. Carpenter,
309.
OF A NEW CONTRACT WITH A THIRD PARTY.
2. Whether it will operate to discharge liability incurred under former co-
tract. The defendant, by a verbal contract, chartered a vessel to plaint-
iffs for the season, guaranteeing that her boiler was in good condition,
and delivered possession. On inspection the boiler was found to be in
an unsound condition, and needing extensive repairs. Defendant's
agent directed plaintiff to make the necessary repairs, telling them that
it would be all right. After the repairs were made, involving a consid-
erable expense and damage for wages paid employees, who were idle
during the repairing, the plaintiffs applied for a written charter-party,
and were informed by defendant that he was not the owner of the ves-
sel. While the repairs were being made, defendant chartered the ves-
sel for the season to a railroad company. The owner refused to charter
her to plaintiffs, unless they would accept the charter which defendant
had made to the railroad company, and perform defendant's part of
that agreement. The plaintiffs then took such charter, agreeing to
perform defendant's contract with the railroad company, the owner
agreeing to allow them one-half of the cost of the repairs: Held, that
the new contract with the owner did not cancel the defendant's verbal
undertaking and release him from liability for damages, except to the
extent of the cost of repairs agreed to be paid by the owner.
Webster v.
Vogel et al. 184.
3. It seems when a party has become liable by the violation or
breach of a contract made by him in respect to the use of property of
which he is not the owner, and the injured party then procures a simi-
lar contract from the rightful owner, and in it assumes some of the un-
dertakings of the wrong-doer to still another party, that this will not,
by implication, have the effect to dissolve the first contract and release
the party making it from his liability for damages. Ibid. 184.
SERVICES IN EFFECTING A SALE OF PROPERTY.
4. And herein of the necessity of notice to the person employed, if his services
are to be dispensed with. Where the plaintiffs are employed by defend-
ants to assist in making a trade in real estate with a promise of a certain
compensation in case the same is effected, and do assist in bringing
about a trade, they will be entitled to recover the sum agreed to be
paid, even though the defendants had changed their proposition, with
a view to dispense with plaintiffs' services, when the plaintiffs received
no notice of such fact. Bash et al. v. Hill et al. 216.
5. When a party engages the services of another, to assist him in
making an exchange of property, if he desires to dispense with such
services, he should give the other party notice. If he does not, and the
service is rendered, he will be required to pay for the same. Ibid. 216.
CONTRACTS IN WRITING.
6. Presumed to contain the whole engagement of the parties. It is a gen-
CONTRACTS. CONTRACTS IN WRITING. Continued.
eral rule of law that when parties have deliberately put their engage-
ments in writing, in such terms as import a legal obligation, without
any uncertainty as to the object or the extent of such engagement, it is
conclusively presumed that the whole engagement of the parties, and
the extent and manner of their undertaking, was reduced to writing.
In such case to add to it by implication would be to vary its terms and
legal effect. Merchants' Ins. Co. of Chicago v. Morrison, 242.
REPRESENTATIONS INDUCING SALE.
7. If incorrect, whether availing. Where a party purchasing hogs for
the market not being aware of the fact that the prices had advanced in
Chicago, but relying upon a newspaper report, represented that hogs
were on the decline in the market at Chicago, and, in fact, communi-
cated all the information within his knowledge on the subject, and
thereby induced the owner of a lot of hogs to agree to sell and deliver
them at a certain price per pound: Held, that the seller could not re-
fuse to deliver on the ground that the price had advanced instead of
declining. Bird et al. v. Forceman et al. 212.
CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS.
8. In construing contracts and written agreements, the whole con-
text should be considered, and the intention of the parties ascertained
from it, and not from extrinsic evidence. Stull et al. v. Hance, 52.
9. Procuring enlistments in the military service to enable a town to avoid a
draft. Where a party was employed to procure enlistments in the mil-
itary service of the United States for the benefit of a town, so as to ex-
empt it from draft in the late civil war, and the party so enlisting was
to receive $400 for each man so enlisted, and credited to the town be-
fore the day of the draft: Held, that the plaintiff, to recover under such
contract, must not only show that he procured an enlistment, but also,
that the same was credited to the town before the day set for the draft,
by competent proof. Harbers et al. v. Tribby, 56.
10. As to party bound. The lessees in the caption of a lease were de-
scribed as trustees of Quincy Lodge, No. 139, I. O. of G. Templars,"
and they executed the same in their individual names, and in the body
of the instrument covenanted to pay the rent, without using any
words to show an intention to bind the Lodge: Held, that they were
personally liable, and that the words "trustees," etc., were merely de-
scriptio persona, and did not change the legal effect of their undertaking.
Stobie et al. v. Dills, 432.
11. As to whether parties to a contract are joint contractors, or a part of them
only sureties. See SURETY, 5, 6.
12. Of a contract of subscription by an individual toward the erection of a
college. See SUBSCRIPTION, 5, 6.
AWARDING CONTRACTS IN CHICAGO.
13. By the Board of Public Works. See BOARD OF PUBLIC
WORKS OF CHICAGO, 1.
SEVERANCE OF UNITY OF SEIZIN.
1. What will pass to the several purchasers—easements. The disposition
and arrangement of the several parts of an entire building consisting
of several parts, for various uses, for ease and convenience, and with
reference to ways, light, and mutual supports, made by the owner in fee
during unity of seizin, which are apparent and continuous, and neces-
sary to the reasonable enjoyment of the several parts of the building,
will be easements upon severance of title as to the different parts of the
building, on the principle that every grant of a thing naturally and
necessarily imports a grant of it as it actually exists, in the absence of
any thing showing a contrary intention. Morrison et al. v. King et al.
2. Such easements, when continuous and apparent during the unity
of seizin, upon severance, will pass to the several holders of the prem-
ises, unless the contrary is provided for; and each portion of the
several premises will pass subject to all the burdens and advantages
imposed or conferred by the former owner. The grantees will each take
their respective portions as they existed in the hands of the former
owner; and the same rule applies to a severance by judicial proceed-
ings for assignment of dower. Ibid. 30.
WHAT PASSES AS INCIDENT TO THE LAND.
3. Without the use of the word "appurtenances."
ments appendant or appurtenant to land, will pass by a conveyance
of the land as an incident thereto. Thus, if a house or store be con-
veyed, every thing passes which belongs to, and is in use for, it, as an
incident or appurtenant, without the use of the word “appurtenances”
by mere operation of law. Ibid. 30.
DELIVERY AND ACCEPTANCE OF DEED.
4. A husband having enlisted in the United States army in February,
1862, executed to his wife, for the expressed consideration of one dollar,
a deed of his real estate, for the purpose of enabling her to dispose of
it for the benefit of herself and family in case he should not return
from the service. He caused the same to be recorded. The wife never
saw the deed until after his death, which took place in October, 1862.
She found it in his papers, which he had left in her possession. She
knew he had said he was going to make the deed. After his death the
wife received the rents of the property, offered it for sale, and finally
sold the same: Held, that the facts showed a delivery by the husband,
and that the wife's assent to the transaction was clearly evidenced by
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