in the premises; he verified the memorial filed by the claimant; and he alone appeared to have procured the attendance of witnesses, and to have prosecuted the case before the commission.

A considerable portion of the cargo of the M. S. Perry, upon her capture, consisted of arms and ammunition, of the ownership of which no proof was made, and for which no claim was prosecuted before the commission.

On the part of the United States it was maintained that these facts clearly indicated the pretended sale by McKay to McLennan to be colorable merely, and that upon them the claimant had shown no title to recover; that the direction to the vessel to land young McKay and the negro slaves on the coast of Florida was an attempt to violate the blockade, and justified the capture; that the omission of the claimant to produce the testimony before the prize court left the judgment of that court to be presumed fully sustained by the evidence, and that in the absence of that evidence the commission could not declare the judg.

ment erroneous.

The commission unanimously disallowed the claim.

The steamship Granite City; Edward Pembroke, claimant, No. 377. This vessel was captured on the 22d March, 1863, on a voyage from Nassau, at which port she had cleared nominally for Saint John's, New Brunswick. She had shortly before taken a cargo of merchandise from Nassau, through the blockade, to Wilmington, N. C., and succeeded in getting through safely, though fired at by the blockaders, and had also succeeded in running out a cargo of cotton through the blockade. In his deposition in preparatorio, her master, after repeated refusals to state to what port the vessel was actually bound at the time of her capture, finally voluntarily stated, at the end of his deposition, "that he was bound to run the blockade into some confederate port wherever he could get in; and if he could not get in, to go elsewhere." The proof was unquestioned that she was captured in the prosecution of a voyage de signed to violate the blockade. During the pursuit by the captors, and immediately before the capture, a package of papers, of whose contents the captain professed himself ignorant, was burned by his orders.

She was libelled in the United States district court for the southern district of New York, and a decree of condemnation was rendered by that court. (See report of the case, Blatchford's Prize Cases, 355-357.) Pending the proceedings in the district court, and before the decree of condemnation, the vessel was taken for the use of the United States at an appraised value, under the United States statute of March 3, 1863. (12 Stat. at L., 759.) The cargo was sold under the decree. The claimant alleged himself the owner of the vessel and cargo, and claimed damages, $462,000, besides interest. No appeal was taken from the decree of the district court. The claimant filed, under the order of the commission, a statement of the reasons for his failure to appeal, alleging in effect

that the decree of condemnation was by default, the claimant not having appeared in the prize court, and that, the vessel having been taken by the United States, he had no funds, or means of securing funds, where

with to appeal.

The case was decided without a specific decision upon the sufficiency of these reasons.

On the part of the claimant it was contended that the capture was illegal, in that the vessel had received no warning, and that she was captured on the high seas, and not in the act of violating the blockade by crossing that part of the sea which had been conquered by the blockading power. That the declarations of the master, as to the object and intent of the voyage, did not constitute the offence of violating the blockade, nor authorize the capture. That the fact of the former running of the blockade was not to be taken as proof of the illicit character of the voyage in the course of which she was captured. That the spoliation of papers shown did not constitute sufficient ground of condemnation, and generally that the grounds of condemnation assigned by the court were insufficient under well-settled principles of international law, and without precedent in maritime jurisprudence. That the prosecution of an appeal from the decision of the prize court was not necessary to lay the foundation for reclamation before the commission. That the appropriation of the vessel to the use of the United States before condemnation was an unlawful act, and of itself gave sufficient ground for reclamation. That that act deprived the prize court of jurisdiction, the proceeding being in rem, and the subject of the litigation, therefore, must necessarily be before the court, in order to sustain their jurisdiction.

The counsel for the claimants cited the case of the bark Jones, before the commission under the convention of 1853, between the United States and Great Britain; also Kane's notes of decisions by the board of commissioners under the convention with France, of July 4, 1831; The Euphrates, 1 Gall., 451; The Diana, 2 id., 93; Smart vs. Wolfe, 3 T. R., 329; The Eole, 6 Rob., 223; Jennings vs. Carson, 4 Cranch, 23; Halleck's Int. Law, pp. 763, 764, §§ 16, 17; The Pizarro, 2 Wheat., 227; Bernardi vs. Motteaux, Doug., 581; The Wren, 6 Wall; Fitzsimmons vs. The Newport Ins. Co., 4 Cranch, 185; Calhoun vs. The Ins. Co. of Pa., 1 Binney, 293; The Betsey, 1 Rob., 280; The Vrow Judith, id., 128; The Columbia, id., 130; The Vrow Joanna, 2 id., 91; The Neptunus, id., 92; The Spiece and Irene, 5 id., 76; The Shepherdess, id., 235; The Apollo, id., 256; Vattel, book 3, § 117.

The commission unanimously, and without hearing any argument for the United States, disallowed the claim.

The bark Empress; John Loft, mortgagee, claimant, No. 387. This vessel was captured off the mouth of the Mississippi River, in November, 1861, sent into the port of New York, and there libelled for

adjudication as prize in the district court. The district court adjudged condemnation of vessel and cargo, (Blatchford's Prize Cases, 175.) An appeal was taken to the circuit court of the United States for the same district, under the practice then existing, which court reversed the judgment of the district court and awarded restitution, (id., 659,) but without costs or damages to the claimants. Pending the proceedings in the prize court the vessel was sold and the proceeds, less the costs taxed against the same, were paid into the hands of the proctors of the claimants in the prize court, Pearson and others, the owners of the vessel.

The memorial alleged that this money was attached in the hands of the proctors by creditors of Pearson, and that Pearson's interest in the same was appropriated to the payment of the debts due from him to the attaching creditors. The claimant, Loft, alleged himself the holder of a mortgage given by the owner, Pearson, to him to secure the sum of £1,000 and interest, which mortgage was wholly due and unpaid. It alleged that the claimant had never received any notice of the capture of the bark, except as he learned the fact from the owners some time after the capture, and that he was then informed by the owners that they were taking the necessary and proper steps in the law courts for the purpose of protecting their interests.

The memorial also alleged that the bark, at the time of her capture, was worth the sum of £4,000, and that it became largely depreciated in value by being suffered to remain without repairs, and without proper care being taken of it during the time it was detained prior to the sale. The claimant claimed the amount of his mortgage, £1,000 and interest. His counsel contended that the decree of the circuit court having ordered the restitution of the vessel to the claimants free of all costs and charges, it was plain that that decree had not been executed, over $2,000 having been retained from the proceeds as costs and charges, and the proofs failing to show that the remainder of the proceeds even were ever paid over in any manner under the decree of the court.

On the part of the United States, it was contended that from the memorial itself it appeared that the proceeds of the vessel were regularly paid over to the proctors of the owners, the only claimants appearing in the prize court, excepting only costs allowed by the court as claimants' costs out of the fund. That it further appeared from the memorial that these funds thus paid over to the proctors were appropriated by regular judicial process to the payment of claims of attaching creditors of the owners. That, if the claimant, Loft, as mortgagee, had a valid lien upon the vessel, that lien could have been followed against the proceeds due, had he seen fit to take the necessary steps for that purpose; and that he having failed to do so, his lien had been lost by his own negligence. That, as to the sum withheld for costs, nothing appeared to show that that sum was excessive in amount, or was improperly with. held; and that if such had been the case, the remedy of the claimant

or of his mortgagor, who represented his interests before the prize court, was ample before the courts themselves. That the whole case showed no ground of international reclamation on behalf of this claimant. The commission unanimously disallowed the claim.

The steamships Sunbeam, Eagle, Greyhound, Lilian, Lucy, Emma Henry; also, the steamers Banshee, Tristram Shandy; Henry Lafone and John T. Lawrence, No. 389, claimants for the six first named, and John T. Lawrence, No. 431, claimant for the two latter.

These vessels were captured at different times in 1862, 1863, and 1864, by war vessels of the United States, and duly condemned in the prize courts of original jurisdiction. No question was made but that they were all at the time of capture engaged in voyages intended for violation of the blockade. No appeals were taken from the prize courts of original jurisdiction before which they were respectively condemned. The claimants filed their reasons for failure to appeal, in which they alleged poverty and destitution of means to defray the expense of appeal, ignorance of the circumstances of the capture, imprisonment of the masters and crews, and previous adverse decisions by the Supreme Court in like cases, as the excuses for non-appeal.

No specific ruling was made by the commission on the sufficiency of these reasons, but the cases were submitted on their merits, the only claim on the part of the claimants being that they were respectively entitled to formal notice and warning by a blockading vessel before they could be subjected to capture. This question was not argued, and the commission unanimously disallowed the claims.

The brig Geziena Heligonda; Walter Easton, trustee, claimant, No. 390.

This was a Dutch vessel, sailing under charter-party to the firm of Galbraith, Redgate & Co., of Glasgow and Matamoras, for a voyage from Liverpool to Matamoras and back. She was captured on the 4th December, 1864, on the outward voyage, within the blockaded waters of the coast of Texas, and off the port of Brazos Santiago, situated some ten to fifteen miles north of the mouth of the Rio Grande; was taken into the port of New Orleans and there libelled, and in that court a decree of condemnation was rendered on the 2d February, 1865. The claimant applied for a rehearing in the district court, which was granted, and further proof allowed. Jansen, the Dutch master of the brig, was then re-examined in his own language, with the aid of an interpreter; and on the 25th March, 1865, the judgment of condemnation before rendered was annulled, and judgment of restitution awarded, certifying reasonable cause of seizure, and refusing costs and damages to claimant. From this decree both parties appealed, Captain Jansen representing the owners of both vessel and cargo. The Supreme Court, on the hearing, and without any written opinion, unanimously affirmed the decree in all respects.

The claim here was brought by Easton as trustee under a trust deed for the benefit of creditors executed by the firm of Galbraith, Redgate & Co., the alleged owners of the cargo. Samuel J. Redgate, one of the members of this firm, and who was also the claimant in case No. 420, herein before reported, and one of the beneficiaries in No. 439, hereafter reported under the head of the Peterhoff, appeared to be a citizen of the United States. The vessel, when first seen, was not only within the blockaded waters of Texas, but was apparently seeking to effect an entrance into the inlet of Brazos Santiago. From the proofs taken in the prize court, however, it was evident that there was no intention to violate the blockade, and that Captain Jansen was seeking to effect this entrance under the mistaken impression that it was the mouth of the Rio Grande. The cargo of the vessel, though containing nothing strictly contraband of war, was in large part fitted and apparently designed for the confederate markets.

On the part of the United States it was contended that the circumstances under which the vessel was captured sufficiently justified the capture as one of " probable cause," and that no ground existed for overruling or questioning the judgment of the United States courts upon the case.

On the part of the claimant it was insisted that a proper and reasonable examination of the books and papers of the vessel, together with the explanation of her position given by her officers, ought to have fully satisfied the captors of her innocent intent, and to have prevented her detention and taking into port for libel.

The commission unanimously disallowed the claim.

The steamship Adela; Arthur Bower Forwood and James Dorrington, No. 392, claimants for the vessel; Arthur Bower Forwood and William Bower Forwood, No. 393, claimants for cargo.

This vessel was captured on the 7th July, 1862, near the island of Abaco, one of the Bahama Islands, and a possession of Her Britannic Majesty, in a voyage from Liverpool ostensibly to Nassau. She was taken into the port of Key West, and there libelled in the district court, and a decree of condemnation of both vessel and cargo was there ren. dered. The claimants appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States, where the judgment of the district court was affirmed. (See report of the case, 6 Wall., 266.)

The Adela was a small side-wheel steamer of light draught, fleet, well adapted for service as a blockade-runner and for short trips like those between Nassau and Charleston or Savannah, but unfit for carrying on trade in voyages of the length of that from Liverpool to Nassau. Her cargo on the outward voyage was light, consisting only of twenty cases of Enfield rifles and twenty-five boxes of cartridges, which had been discharged at Bermuda before her capture, and of some