the tribunal at Geneva in respect to the claims for the so-called indirect damages.

In the case of William Adam, (No. 72,) the claimant, a British subject domiciled in England, alleged that he was, in 1862, the owner of certain bonds of a railroad company within the United States, amounting to $5,000 principal, with interest, payable half yearly, at six per cent. per annum, the interest upon which had been regularly paid in specie up to the 31st December, 1861. That in the year 1862, the Congress of the United States passed a law making paper money a legal tender without any protection to pre-existing contracts; and that immediately after that law the paper money of the United States became depreciated in value, and the claimant was thenceforward compelled to receive payment of his interest in such depreciated currency, and that the bonds themselves and the prospective interest to become due thereon, had likewise become depreciated in consequence of the same legislation. That the Supreme Court of the United States had, in 1871, adjudged the act of 1862 valid in its application to pre-existing debts. He submitted with his memorial a computation of his losses in the premises, and claimed damages $3,309, besides interest. A demurrer was interposed to the memorial on behalf of the United States, on the ground that it stated no case within the jurisdiction of the commission, and no facts showing any liability for compensation to the claimant.

The commission unanimously made an award as follows:

The commissioners are of opinion that the matters alleged in the memorial do not constitute the basis of any valid claim against the United States. The claim is therefore disallowed.

In the case of Joseph W. Roach, No. 154, the claim was for the value of the brigantine Madeira and her cargo, which was alleged to have been, on the 3d October, 1863, run into by the Clyde, a steamer transport owned by the United States, and the vessel and her cargo thereby sunk and totally lost. That the collision took place in the course of a lawful voyage of the Madeira from the port of Saint John's, Porto Rico, to the port of New York; and that the Clyde was then upon a voyage for the Government of the United States, and under the charge of officers of that Government. That the collision happened entirely through the neglect and default of the officers of the Clyde. The memorial claimed damages $14,969.50, besides interest. The proofs filed sustained the allegations in the memorial as to the loss of the vessel and cargo by the default of the officers of the Clyde, and showed that the matter had been investigated by the claims commission of the War Department, and a report was made by that commission in January, 1867, assessing the damages of the claimant at $11,373.98, besides interest. The only question raised in the case was as to the amount of damages to be allowed. The commission unanimously awarded the claimant $14,081.

Claim of William Scott Millar, No. 157. The memorial in this case alleged that the claimant, a British subject domiciled at New Orleans, was, on the 25th September, 1864, the owner of 330 bales of cotton, then worth $223,253. That on that day the cotton was unlawfully seized and taken from his possession by a supervising special agent of the United States Treasury Department, and was proceeded against for forfeiture to the United States, by libel of information filed in the United States district court for the district of Louisiana. That the claimant appeared in that suit, and claimed restitution of the cotton, but that it was detained till December, 1864, when it was surrendered to him upon the execution of a bond by him with sureties to the United States, conditioned to abide the decree of the court upon the libel. That between the date of the seizure and the date of the release the cotton largely depreciated in value, and the claimant was also compelled to pay large sums by way of costs. Damages were claimed by reason of the depreciation in value and the costs paid, $90,145, besides interest.

The proofs showed that the cotton in question was purchased at points within the confederate military lines in the State of Mississippi, under alleged permits issued by a special agent of the United States Treasury Department, and was seized on its way through those military lines and into the territory held by the United States forces. The district court dismissed the libel for confiscation with costs. No claim for damages by reason of the seizure appeared to have been interposed by the claimant in that court, and no damages were there awarded him.

On the part of the claimant it was contended that the decree of acquittal by the district court without certificate of probable cause conclusively established the seizure as wrongful. That the United States were responsible for the seizure as made by an authorized agent of the Treasury Department in the line of his duty and under color of acts of Congress. And that the act of the agent in making the seizure had been expressly adopted by the Government by instituting proceedings for the forfeiture of the property. The counsel for the claimant cited Gelston vs. White, (3 Wheat., 246, and cases there cited;) The Appollon, (9 Wheat., 362;) Hall vs. Warning, (2 McLean, 332, and cases there cited ;) The Caledonian, (4 Wheat., 100 ;) Taylor vs. United States, (3 How., 197.) On the part of the United States it was maintained that the proofs conclusively showed the purchase of the property by the claimant within the enemy's lines, and his attempted transportation of the same through those lines into the Federal jurisdiction, to have been illegal and not warranted by his permits; that the cotton should have been condemned by the district court; that the decree of that court was not conclusive against the United States upon the claim now preferred for damages, and that the commission were entitled to look into the proofs and adjudicate upon the question of the liability of the United States for damages as an original question; that the claimaut might have presented and prosecuted his claim for damages against the United

States in the district court in the action brought against him for forfeiture, and might there have recovered his damages if lawfully entitled to the same; and that until he had exhausted his remedy before the tribunals of the United States, he had no standing to make reclamation before the commission. The commission unanimously disallowed the claim.

Amos Bigland's claim, No. 199, was for damages for the detention of the British steamship Tubal Cain, in the port of New York, from the 8th April to the 16th July, 1863, one hundred days; and damages were claimed, $38,378, besides interest. The claimant was a British merchant domiciled in the city of New York. He chartered the Tubal Cain to one Mora for a voyage to Matamoras via Havana and back to New York. She was loaded by the charterer, and on the 8th April, being ready to sail, clearance was refused by the custom-house authorities, and she was seized by the United States authorities, the collector of the port and the military commander of the department concurring in the seizure, on the charge that she was undertaking to carry on an illicit voyage between New York and the blockaded ports of Texas, and was carrying out contraband of war destined for the confederacy, and was also carrying passengers engaged in contraband trade with the enemy, one of them being an agent of the Confederate States government engaged in the purchase of munitions of war. Mr. Edwards Pierrepont, of New York, was commissioned by the War Department to examine and report upon the case. On the 26th May he made his report, sustaining in substance the charges named as to two passengers, Blum and Sutton, whom he found having contraband goods on board intended for the Texas trade, and engaged in the service of the enemy; but reported that neither the owner or charterer of the vessel had knowledge that any of the goods shipped were contraband of war or were intended for illegal trade. He further reported that there was reasonable cause for detaining the vessel, but recommended that the vessel be discharged from custody, and the goods be delivered up to the owners on their application and receipt for the same. The report was approved by the Solicitor of the War Department, and the vessel was surrendered on the 16th July and her cargo returned to the shippers, with the exception of the goods of Blum and Sutton.

On the part of the United States it was contended that the refusal to clear the vessel, her detention for examination, and the unlading of her cargo for that purpose, were lawful acts; that they were done under the authority of the regular custom-house officials of New York, and that the fact that those officials were aided by the military authorities in no respect affected the character of the transaction; that the facts of the case were such as in a prize court would have certainly justified the capture as one by "probable cause" if the vessel had been captured on the high seas and brought into port and libelled as prize; that the same

principles were to be applied in the consideration of this case of deten tion, and that no liability existed against the United States on account of it.

The commission unanimously made an award in favor of the claimant for $4,800. I am advised that this award was made in respect only of the detention of the vessel, between the date of Mr. Pierrepont's report and her final discharge, the commission holding that detention unreasonable.

In the case of Thomas Grant, No. 211, the claimant, in addition to his claim for tobacco, captured in running the blockade from Wilmington, before reported, claimed $7,000 damages for the alleged breaking up of his lawful business as a manufacturer of tobacco by the "terrific shelling of the city of Petersburg," by the United States forces in 1864 and 1865, "which was so violent at times, during the period of ten months, that no business could be regularly and successfully conducted within the city limits." He also claimed the further sum of $1,440 for his interest in a quantity of tobacco, which he alleged was lost in South Carolina while in the course of transportation to remove it out of the reach of the Federal Army under General Sherman. It was not alleged that the loss was caused by the United States forces except as the remote cause of the removal. On demurrer the commission unanimously disallowed the claim.

In the case of William Cleary, No. 220, the claimant, among other claims set up in his memorial, claimed $5,000 damages for an alleged violent assault, wounding, and ill treatment committed upon him by a private soldier of the United States Army, at Savannah, in March, 1865, by which he alleged that his life was endangered and himself disabled for some months. No allegation or proof was made connecting any officer of the United States, or any other person except the assailant, with the alleged assault. The commission made an award in favor of the claimant in respect of property taken for the use of the United States, but gave nothing on account of the alleged assault.

In the case of Sheldon Lewis, No. 287, the claimant alleged that, in March, 1863, he was the owner of the bark Matilda A. Lewis, on which vessel was laden in that month a quantity of fowls destined for Havana. That the officers of the United States refused to permit the vessel to leave with the fowls, and took possession of them. That subsequently the consignee of the fowls in Havana brought suit against the vessel in the United States district court for the southern district of New York for the value of the fowls, and recovered judgment for $1,100, for which amount, with the additional sum of $600 costs expended by him, the claimant claimed an award.

It appeared from the evidence that, by order of the Secretary of the Treasury of 19th May, 1863, officers of the custom-houses of the United States were directed to refuse clearances for the exportation of "horses,

mules, and live-stock," and to cause the detention of all animals attempted to be so exported. That the fowls in question had been shipped by one Glas upon the vessel for Havana; that the customs officers in New York construed the order of the Secretary of the Treasury as covering fowls, refused to grant clearance for them, and ordered them to be relanded. The fowls were relanded and delivered to the shipper, and the charterer of the vessel having produced to Glas one of the triplicate bills of lading, Glas signed a memorandum on same, annulling the bill of lading. Meantime Glas had procured from the agent of the consignees at New York an advance of $700, on one of the triplicate bills of lading for the fowls. This fact was not disclosed to the charterer when the bill of lading was cancelled by Glas. The consignee subsequently brought suit against the vessel and recovered on the ground of his advance made to Glas upon the bill of lading, and that the surrender of the fowls by the charterer to Glas, and the cancelling of the bill of lading by Glas did not prejudice his rights, and that the order prohibiting the exportation of live-stock was unlawful, and that if lawful it was not intended to include fowls. (See report of the case Desvernine v. The Bark Matilda A. Lewis, 5 Blatchford's C. C. R., 520 to 523.) In a like case, subsequently brought to the notice of the Secretary of the Treasury, and involving the construction of the order of 19th May, 1863, the Secretary held that the order did not cover poultry.

On the part of the United States it was contended that the construction placed by the custom-house officers upon the order of the Secre tary of the Treasury was evidently an unjust and forced construction; that if application had been made at once to the Secretary of the Treasury, the decision of the customs-officers at New York would have been overruled, and that the United States were not responsible for the error of judgment of such subordinate officers till proper resort was had to some responsible and chief officer of the Government, whose decision upon the question might bind the Government. Also, that if the United States were liable for the wrongful acts of the customsofficers, the claimant was in no position to maintain this claim; that the charterer of his vessel had wrongfully allowed the fowls to be returned to Glas, the shipper, on his cancellation of one of the bills of lading, without calling in the others, upon one of which the advance of the consignees had already been made; that the owner of the vessel had therefore been made liable solely by the default of his charterer, by whose acts certainly the United States could not be prejudiced.

The commission made an award in favor of the claimant for $1,819; Mr. Commissioner Frazer dissenting.

Messrs. A. E. Campbell & Co., claimants in No. 290, claimed from the United States $25,881, besides interest, the alleged value of a cargo of sugar on board the brig John Welch, which brig was alleged to have been captured by the privateer Jeff. Davis, and carried into Charleston, S. C., where her cargo was sold, but the proceeds of the claimant's por