quarry and lime-kiln, together with some 1,500 barrels of lime, tools, furniture, &c., on San Juan Island, in the Territory of Washington, belonging to the United States.

That in his absence from the island in August, 1862, his wife was ejected from the premises by one Roberts, a British subject, who took possession of the real estate and appropriated the personal property. That claimant commenced a suit against Roberts in a justice's court of the Territory of Washington to recover the possession of the premises, and obtained judgment for restitution of the property, which was fol. lowed by a warrant of restitution for its enforcement.

That Roberts thereupon appealed to Captain Bazalgett, commander of the British forces on the island. That Bazalgett thereupon applied to Major Bissell, commanding the American forces on the island, and that Major Bissell thereupon arrested the claimant and the justice of the .peace who had rendered the judgment against Roberts, put them in the guard-house, and shortly after expelled the claimant from the island.

That in April, 1864, the claimant returned to the island, and finding his claim vacant, took possession of the same, providing a new stock of tools and supplies, and commenced to work the quarry; but after ten days spent in it, was again forcibly removed by command of Captain Bazalgett, put in the guard-house, detained two weeks, and then banished from the island and forbidden ever to return.

The memorial alleged the value of the quarry at $50,000, and claimed damages by occasion of the premises $100,000.

Evidence was taken on the part of the claimant tending to sustain his allegations as to his possession of the property and removal therefrom.

At the time of the acts alleged the title of the island of San Juan was in dispute between the United States and Great Britain, and the island was occupied by a joint military force of the two governments under an arrangement made between them for such joint occupancy, by which the citizens and subjects of each government were made amenable to the authorities of their own government only.

Pending the case before this commission, His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, to whom the decision of the question was referred by the treaty of 8th May, 1871, decided the island to be the property of the United States.

The proofs filed on the part of the defence showed that the arrest of Tripp and his expulsion from the island were by order of the commander of the United States forces upon the island, and not through any assumption of authority on the part of the commander of the British forces.

The claimant filed an argument admitting that the arrest and order of banishment on each occasion came from the American commander, but claiming that it was on the complaint of the British commander, who represented his own government and made unfounded charges

against the claimant, which were the cause of his arrest and banishment, and that by reason thereof the British government was liable to his reclamation for damages.

The commission, without hearing any argument for the defense, unanimously disallowed the claim.

Hubbell's case.

William Wheeler Hubbell vs. Great Britain, No. 17.

The memorial of the claimant alleged, in effect, that prior to the 1st of July, 1844, the claimant was the inventor of a certain improvement in breech-loading fire-arms, for which letters patent were issued to him by the United States, dated 1st July, 1844.

That in the year 1844 the British government, through Her Majesty's consul at Philadelphia, ordered of the claimant two specimen guns made under the claimant's invention and patent, which were thereupon procured to be made by the claimant, and furnished through the consul to Her Majesty's government in 1845, and paid for by that government.

The memorial further alleged that "it was understood and agreed that the invention of said mechanical principle" of the claimant "should be paid for by Her Majesty's government whenever it should be determined upon for adoption in Her Majesty's service." That after the receipt of the specimen guns, in 1845, it was determined by Her Majesty's government, in the same year, that it was not expedient to adopt them for use, but that subsequently, on the 14th March, 1865, Her Majesty's government made "a full determination of adoption in Her Majesty's service of breech-loading fire-arms" known as the Snyder Enfield rifle, containing and embodying the mechanical principle covered by the claimant's invention and patent; and that after such official "determination of adoption," in March, 1865, Her Majesty's government issued to Her Majesty's army and navy 500,000 muskets of the pattern named and covered by the invention and patent of the claimant.

The claimant claimed a royalty of $1 each upon these muskets, amounting to $500,000, besides interest.

A demurrer was interposed by Her Majesty's counsel to the memorial, on the ground that the commission had no jurisdiction of the claim stated in the memorial, and that the memorial alleged no sufficient ground of claim against Great Britain, in that—

1. The claim was based upon a contract, express or implied, which was not a claim within the terms or intent of the treaty, not being a claim arising out of acts committed against the persons or property of citizens of the United States."

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2. That if such claim on contract were within the jurisdiction given by the treaty, the claimant could have no standing before the commission as an international tribunal until he had exhausted the remedies in

all the municipal courts of Great Britain, and until justice had been denied him by such tribunals in re minime dubia.

3. That the facts alleged in the memorial established no such contract as claimed by the claimant for the payment of a royalty upon guns subsequently used and covered by his invention.

4. That no act of Her Majesty's government was alleged as happening within treaty time, except the "full determination of adoption " alleged to have been made in March, 1865, and that this was not an act committed against the property of the claimant.

5. That the claimant did not appear to have had any property in his alleged invention in England, and that his property in the invention in the United States had expired prior to March, 1865, and was open to the whole world.

On hearing on the demurrer, the claim was unanimously disallowed by the commission.

V.-CLAIMS OF SUBJECTS OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

1.-Claims for property alleged to have been taken and appropriated to the use of the United States.

The claims embraced under this head were very numerous, and arose under various circumstances. Most of them may be grouped under the following heads:

a. Those for property in the nature of military supplies, taken by authorized officers for military use, and vouchers given for the same. These claims arose sometimes within the loyal States, sometimes within the Federal lines, in territory reclaimed from the enemy within the insurrectionary States, and sometimes within the enemy's lines. Among them may be named the case of Thomas Ward, No. 1, which was for cotton taken from the claimant at Wilmington, N. C., shortly after the capture of that city by the Federal forces, and appropriated for the use of the United States hospital.

On the part of the United States it was contended that the claimant, being a resident of North Carolina, was, by domicile, an enemy of the United States. He was found in a town captured by them, and his property was liable to levies and contributions for their benefit. The voucher given was in the following words:

OFFICE PROVOST-MARSHAL GENERAL,

Wilmington, N. C., March 3, 1865.

Received of Thomas Ward, two bales of cotton.

P. C. HAYES,

Lieut. Col. and Provost-Marshal General, U. S. A.,

and was accompanied by a certificate of an assistant surgeon that the

cotton was used for beds in the hospital.

The award of the commission, in which all the members joined, was as follows:

Without expressing any opinion on the effect to be given to the evidence of Thomas Ward and Sarah Ward, the commissioners are of the opinion that the receipts and vouchers given by acknowledged officers of the Army at the time, show that the cotton was taken from the claimant for the use of the United States. This we think sufficient, in the absence of all countervailing proof, to show the taking by the United States. Nothing appears to indicate that it was taken as enemy's property, and the question of the right so to take is, therefore, not involved. It was taken nine days after the capture of Wilmington, N. C., by the United States, and the possession of the place ever after continued in the United States. We are not, upon the facts before us, prepared to hold that, at the time of the taking of the cotton, the place was enemy's territory. We agree, therefore, that the claimant is entitled to compensation for the property, the amount being the average value of cotton usually produced in that neighborhood, with interest at six per cent. per annum until January 31, 1873.

We therefore award that the sum of $620.44 be paid by the Government of the United States to the government of Her Britannic Majesty in respect of the claim of Thomas Ward.

In the case of John Wilkinson, No. 28, the claim was for beef taken from the claimant on Matagorda Island, Texas, by a commissary of the United States in 1863, and for which vouchers in the usual form were given. The claimant was domiciled and his property situated within the insurrectionary State of Texas, and apparently not within the actual military lines of the United States at the time of the taking. The vouchers were all signed by an authorized officer, and recited, "I have taken for military purposes from John Wilkinson," the property described, and that the same was necessary for the public service, and would be accounted for in the officer's monthly returns.

On the part of the United States it was claimed that the taking was a capture under the right of war, and that no liability for payment arose against the United States.

An award was made in favor of the claimant, in which all the commissioners joined.

The same principle was applied in all other cases of like character.

b. Claims for property taken under the command of authorized officers of the United States for military use, whether in the loyal States or within those portions of the insurrectionary States permanently occupied by the Federal forces, or within those portions of the insurrec. tionary States not so reclaimed by the United States, and for which property no voucher was given.

The claim of Jonathan Braithwaite, No. 31, was for a horse taken for cavalry use in Kentucky, a loyal State, in 1864.

On the part of the United States it was contended that the claimant, being domiciled in Kentucky, had precisely the same remedy for prop. erty taken for public use, as citizens of the United States residing within the loyal States; that the laws of the United States afforded him the

proper means of securing compensation before the proper bureau of the War Department, and that the case was not one for international reclamation.

The commission gave an award in favor of the claimant, in which all the commissioners joined.

In the case of Samuel Brook, No. 99, the claim was for certain tarpaulins taken by an authorized officer for the use of the United States, at Memphis, Tenn., in June, 1862, shortly after the capture of that city by the Federal forces.

An award was made in favor of the claimant, Mr. Commissioner Frazer dissenting upon the question of the sufficiency of proofs, but the commissioners all agreeing as to the principle involved.

It may be stated generally that the commission were unanimous in the allowance of claims for property coming under this head when taken within the loyal States or within those portions of the insurrectionary States permanently occupied by the Federal forces, except when something in the nature of the property or in the conduct of the claimant took him out of the condition of neutrality. Thus, for instance, in the case of Robert Davidson, No. 66, the claim was for gun-carriages and other artillery apparatus, manufactured by the claimant for the use of the confederate government, and remaining in his possession at the surrender of New Orleans, together with material for use in the same manufacture, which was taken and appropriated by the Federal forces, under the orders of General Banks, some months after the capture of New Orleans. The claim was unanimously disallowed.

Where, however, the taking of the property by the Federal forces and the domicile of the claimant were within the enemy's lines, or in those portions of the enemy's country not reclaimed from the enemy, the majority of the commission, on satisfactory evidence that the property was taken by authority, or actually appropriated to military use, made awards in favor of the claimants, Mr. Commissioner Frazer dissenting, on the ground that one domiciled in the country of the enemy was himself an enemy in law, whether an actual enemy or not; and by well-settled principles of public law his sovereign had no right in such cases to intervene in his behalf against the ordinary treatment of him as an enemy. In the principle thus held by Mr. Commissioner Frazer, I am advised that the presiding commissioner agreed; but in view of the fact that the United States had, by the establishment of the Southern claims commission, made provision for the compensation of its own citizens domiciled within the enemy's country "who remained loyal adherents to the cause and the Government of the United States during the war," for property taken in like manner, (16 Stat. at L., 524, § 2,) he was of opinion that neutral aliens in like situation should be entitled to the same degree of compensation, and, if British subjects, to a standing before the commission for that end.