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MARCH OF THE BRITISH.

against the French, whom they deemed well-nigh invincible. To oppose him, he had leaders inured to success under the great captain of the age, and troops equally brave and well-disciplined, to whom war and victory had for years been familiar things.

Several days were of necessity spent in providing the means of conveyance for the stores, ammunition, and other requisite appliances of an army. In the interval he had a conference at Montemor Velho with Bernardim Freire de Andrada, the Portuguese commander-in-chief, who wished that the united forces relinquishing all communication with the coast should throw themselves into the heart of Beira. This proposal was instantly and decisively rejected by Sir Arthur. He had resolved to march towards Lisbon by the road on the sea-coast, that he might keep up the communication with his store ships, and with some difficulty he persuaded the Portuguese general to join the British army. But it was necessary that no time should be lost; the season was advanced, and it was obvious, from the news lately received, that the Spanish generals were not in a condition to act offensively against Bessieres, or prevent him from advancing on Portugal. Sir Arthur's march, however, was slow, from the want of cavalry and the utter inexperience of his commissariat staff, and, on his arriving at Leyria, his measures were yet farther impeded by the Portuguese general, who announced his intention of separating himself and advancing to Santarem by way of Thomar, unless his troops were supplied with provisions from the British stores on their march to Lisbon. By this plan his communication with his allies would be cut off, and his army exposed to the attacks of the French, if,

PORTUGUESE INSINCERITY.

85

leaving the defence of Lisbon and the Tagus, they should proceed northward and eastward, or even in the more favourable event of their being defeated by the English general. In reply to so absurd a proposition, Sir Arthur conjured him to co-operate in the deliverance of Portugal, if he had any regard to his own reputation, or the honour of his prince and country, and pointed out the resources of which he might avail himself to support his army. But the Portuguese chiefs had become more alarmed as they advanced; in addition to which, the Junta of Oporto felt that, even after a successful battle, it would be more advantageous to their particular views to be provided with an army untouched and entirely disconnected from a foreign general. Finding, therefore, all entreaties vain, Sir Arthur suggested that, instead of this dangerous movement, the Portuguese general should stay at Leyria with the main body, in which case he would take under his own command, and feed, one thousand Portuguese infantry, with all their light troops and cavalry. To this proposal Freire consented, and remained in disgraceful safety at Leyria, while a stranger marched forward to fight the battles of his country.

Slow as the march of the English had of necessity been, they had yet anticipated the movements of Junot. That general had ordered Loison to march by Portalegre and Abrantes, while Laborde should proceed with another division by Villa Franca and Candeiros, with the ultimate intention of their meeting at Leyria before the arrival of the British. Disappointed in this expectation, Loison was obliged to return to the southward, leaving General Laborde, with six thousand men, exposed to the attacks of his

86

LABORDE'S POSITION.

advancing enemy, and obliged to risk an action with more than twice his own numbers.

The English General was quick to perceive and take advantage of the faults committed by his opponents. Driving their pickets out of Bielos and Obidos, he proceeded to examine the position of their main body at Roliça. This village is situated on an eminence, having a plain in its front at the end of a valley, which commences at Caldas, and is closed to the southward by mountains. On the plain immediately in front of the village Laborde's division was posted, all the favourable points of defence in the valley and on the nearest hills on each side being occupied by small detachments. About a mile in the rear a steep ridge extended from east to west, parallel to the French position, presenting a second line of great strength. Over this ridge, called the Height of Zambugeira, the main road led by a deep defile, and, beyond it, lofty mountains stretched abruptly from the sea-coast to the Tagus like a wall, filling up the whole space between that river and the ocean down to the rock of Lisbon.

At seven in the morning the army broke up from Obidos in three distinct columns; the right under Colonel Trant was destined to turn the enemy's left and penetrate into the mountains in his rear; the left, under General Ferguson, was to ascend the hills at Obidos, turn his posts on the left of the valley, as well as his right at Roliça, and watch the expected advance of Loison from Alcaentre; the centre, where the General himself was present, was appointed to attack Laborde's position in front. This last was composed of Hill's, Nightingale's, Cotton's, Crawford's, and Fane's brigades of British infantry,

BATTLE OF ROLIÇA.

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four hundred cavalry, two hundred and fifty of which were Portuguese, and four hundred light troops of the same nation.

As the English army advanced upon him, Laborde with the utmost order and celerity retired by the passes into the mountains, the only object of his first position having been to defer the final moment of battle and gain time for the approach of Loison. It then became necessary to make a fresh disposition for the attack of this new and formidable post, for which purpose Trant continued his march to turn the enemy's left, while Ferguson and Fane, who were by this time united, were directed to penetrate by the heights, and outflank his right. But without waiting for the result of these flank movements, and perhaps to divert the enemy's attention from them, a simultaneous attack was made by the main body upon several of the passes, which the enemy had lined with light troops, so as to present an almost inaccessible front. Such, however, was the ardour of the 9th and 29th regiments, that they forced the two strongest ravines and reached the plain above long before Ferguson and Trant were advanced far enough to support them. The struggle here was for awhile both fierce and bloody. Laborde, who had shown himself throughout the whole day as a brave and skilful general, flung all his force upon the two isolated regiments; but all was in vain: this gallant band stood their ground firmly, till the gradual advance of the rest of the English troops, and particularly of General Ferguson, who had at first taken an erroneous direction towards the centre, but had now regained the true line, compelled the enemy to retreat. Even now, though defeated, the French army was not broken, principally owing to the English Gene

88

DEFEAT OF LABORDE.

ral's want of cavalry, and to the difficulty of bringing up in time through the mountain passes a sufficient number of troops and cannon to support those who had at first ascended. At the village of Zambugeira Laborde made another desperate stand, and being driven from this ground also, he fell back to the Quinta de Bugagliera, where he halted till his detachments on the side of Segura had joined him. In the night he marched to gain the position of Montechique, having left three guns behind him on the field of battle.

It was the intention of Sir Arthur Wellesley to march the next morning to Torres Vedras, but having learnt before nightfall that the expected reinforcement under General Anstruther and General Acland was in the offing, he was compelled to give up his first design, which in all probability would have led to the surprise and utter defeat of Laborde, who had now effected a junction with Loison. Nothing could with prudence be risked, with so bold and skilful an adversary in the neighbourhood. It was necessary to cover the disembarkation, as from the extreme difficulty of the shore a small force only from Penichè would have been sufficient to prevent a landing. He therefore marched to Lourinha, where he again communicated with General Anstruther, and on the day following he advanced to Vimiero, which appeared on the whole to be the position best calculated to secure the junction of the expected corps; at the same time it was a march in advance upon his route. On account of the calms, the fleet, which was anchored off the Berlings, could not stand in till a late hour of the evening, when Anstruther's division landed at Maceira, upon a sandy beach at the foot of a cliff almost perpendicular. The disembarkation, however,