contracting parties, that in case any of the islands mentioned in any of the preceding articles, which were in the possession of one of the parties prior to the commencement of the present war between the two countries, should, by the decision of any of the Boards of Commissioners aforesaid, or of the sovereign or State so referred to as in the four next preceding articles contained, fall within the dominions of the other party, all grants of land made previous to the commencement of the war, by the party having had such possession, shall be as valid as if such island or islands had, by such decision or decisions, been adjudged to be within the dominions of the party having had such possession.

ARTICLE IX.

The United States of America engage to put an end, immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom they may be at war at the time of such ratification; and forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations, respectively, all the possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities: Provided always that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against the United States of America, their citizens and subjects, upon the ratification of the present treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly. And His Britannic Majesty engages, on his part, to put an end immediately after the ratification of the present treaty, to hostilities with all the tribes or nations of Indians with whom he may be at war at the time of such ratification, and forthwith to restore to such tribes or nations respectively all the possessions, rights and privileges which they may have enjoyed or been entitled to in one thousand eight hundred and eleven, previous to such hostilities: Provided always that such tribes or nations shall agree to desist from all hostilities against His Britannic Majesty, and his subjects, upon the ratification of the present treaty being notified to such tribes or nations, and shall so desist accordingly.

ARTICLE X.

Whereas the traffic in slaves is irreconcilable with the principles of humanity and justice, and whereas both His Majesty and the

United States are desirous of continuing their efforts to promote its entire abolition, it is hereby agreed that both the contracting parties shall use their best endeavors to accomplish so desirable an object.

ARTICLE XI.

This treaty, when the same shall have been ratified on both sides without alteration by either of the contracting parties, and the ratifications mutually exchanged, shall be binding on both parties, and the ratifications shall be exchanged at Washington, in the space of four months from this day, or sooner if practicable.

In faith whereof, we, the respective Plenipotentiaries, have signed this treaty, and have thereunto affixed our seals.

Done, in triplicate, at Ghent, the twenty-fourth day of December, one thousand eight hundred and fourteen.

[SEAL.] GAMBIER.

[SEAL.] HENRY GOULBURN.

[SEAL.] WILLiam Adams.

[SEAL.] JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

[SEAL.] J. A. BAYARD.

[SEAL.] H. CLAY.

[SEAL.] JONA. RUSSELL.

[SEAL.] Albert Gallatin.

DISCUSSION IN PARLIAMENT.

EXHIBIT 161.

Discussion of the Treaty.'

HOUSE OF LORDS, Thursday, March 16. [1815].

TREATY WITH AMERICA.] The Earl of Liverpool laid on the table the Treaty of Peace with the United States of America, and gave notice of his intention to move the consideration of it on Wednesday.

'T. C. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, First Series, Vol. XXX, (March to May, 1815), p. 205.

Earl Grey wished to know whether it was the intention of ministers to lay before the House any information as to the previous negociations?

The Earl of Liverpool answered in the negative.

Earl Grey observed that it had been the practice to communicate information respecting negociations which had terminated to the House; and that it would be impossible to come to the proper consideration of the Treaty without knowing what had been the previous demands, and in what manner those demands had been persisted in or retracted.

The Earl of Liverpool denied that it had been the practice to communicate information respecting negociations that had terminated happily. On the contrary, he believed there was no precedent whatever of that nature. With respect to those negociations that had broken off, it undoubtedly had been the practice to communicate information to Parliament. In the present instance, however, there was no necessity for any such communication, and therefore none was intended to be made; nor was it intended at all to recur to the negociation, but to ground an Address to the Prince Regent, on the terms of the Treaty being satisfactory and advantageous to the country.

Earl Grey again urged the impossibility of properly considering the Treaty without having information of the previous negociation, particularly if it should turn out, as he believed was the case, that we had rejected moderate overtures in the hour of elation and success, to which we had afterwards acceded when the time came of reverse and defeat. He did not know at the moment whether any precedent of such a communication existed, but he thought the information he sought for of so much importance to the proper discussion of the question, that he should take an opportunity of moving for its production.

Speech of Marquis Wellesley.1

He [Marquis Wellesley] would now call the attention of the House to the state of Europe at that time. A series of glorious successes had attended the arms of his Majesty and of the Allies.

'T. C. Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, First Series, Vol. XXX (March to May, 1815), p. 590.

We had concluded peace at Paris; and long before that event it appeared not to be doubted that the result must be favourable to the objects for which we were contending. This country might then have met America with a great artillery of character, and then was the time to have come forward with powerful strength and moderate demands. But instead of taking any advantage of the situation in which we stood, we sent a paltry force of nine thousand men from Bordeaux, and by an expedient the most preposterous, endeavoured to supply the want of military strength by the force and magnitude of our diplomatic demands. He would contend that the instructions sent by the American government to its commissioners were such as to admit of peace. On one branch, it was true, they had no instructions. They were not authorized to cede territory or to negociate Indian pacification. They thought it could never have entered the heads of the negociators at Ghent to have made the first demand, or to have introduced the second, in the way in which it was introduced, under an idea of altering the relations of the Indians towards the American States. This was the undoubted reason why they had no instructions upon these points. There was an extraordinary fact connected with this subject, that was amusing, if one could be amused in contemplating those transactions that while our negociations for the peace and independence of the Indian nations. were going on, a peace was actually concluded by Mr. Madison with many of them, one of the terms of which was that they should enter again under the protection of the United States. The noble earl opposite (Liverpool) appeared by his gestures to contradict what he had said, but he spoke on the authority of the existing documents. In this manner the negociation commenced. Our first proposition was one that never was before suggested, with a view to peace or war, or even as a matter of speculation and argument. We demanded a cession of territory, on the ground that it formed the natural limit of Canada. This territory included the whole of the Lakes, and a large strip of ground on the other side. It was accompanied with a further condition that they should build no fortresses on the banks of the lakes, nor adopt those measures which were necessary to protect their commerce against the Indians. On the subject of natural limits, he could not help amusing himself with inquiring from whence the doctrine had issued. He remembered it was once introduced by

the famous Mr. Anacharsis Clootz, the orator of the human race, who, in a book called 'Revolutionary Diplomatics,' had described the Alps, the Pyrenees, the Ocean, and the Rhine, as the natural limits of France. He was surprised to find that, after we had conquered the French Revolution, and carried our arms into Paris, this doctrine should be revived by a Secretary of State and applied to America. But was this done in the time of our strength? Was the demand insisted on in a commanding attitude? No such thing; we approached in forma pauperis; we laid the British crown at the foot of the American President, and besought that to us, the weaker party, he would afford that security which we knew to be necessary to defend us against his pretensions. And what was the security we asked? that he should abandon all means of defence. Again, when we were asked by the Americans, why did we bring forward this demand at a moment when we professed to be negociating in the spirit of peace? our answer was, because your ambition is so unbounded. What could be expected after this? We set up monstrous, egregious, and unreasonable demands, and justified them by the ambition of that party upon whom we made them. When the question was asked, "Is this a sine qua non?" the answer that followed was perhaps the most extraordinary that was ever given by a set of diplomatists— "We will not tell you whether it is or not-we have already given you one sine qua non—and, until that is decided, we will not give you any information as to another." But this point, in whatever way considered, whether as a sine qua non or not, was completely rejected no attempt was ultimately made to insist on it-it formed no part of the present Treaty. Now, he would ask, was it necessary to insist on this point? If it was, what security could be found in a Treaty which did not contain a word on the subject. The ground on which you called for it was, not your strength but your weakness. You stated that a mutual possession of the lakes produced additional danger in war, and formed a perpetual source of disagreement in peace, and you insisted on additional securitywhether as a sine qua non or not, the noble marquis did not pretend to say, since it was a matter very difficult to be unravelled. He had, however, been informed, that it never was intended to insist on this proposition, as a sine qua non-but that it was thought to be a grand display of diplomatic address, to demand more at first than would ultimately be insisted on. In conformity