means of knowing the fact, and whose character places him far above the suspicion of having in vented and proclaimed a falsehood for the sake of exciting an odium and abhorrence of the ruler of France. Indeed nothing, however atrocious, will appear incredible of Buonaparte, when we reflect how he treated his prisoners on his retreat from Acre.*

The next operation in the progress of the French army of Portugal was the siege of Almeida. But a considerable time was spent in repairing and strengthening the defences of Ciudad Rodrigo, in waiting for the return of the troops that escorted the Spanish prisoners to Bayonne, and the arrival of some other reinforcements. Parties were sent out to reconnoitre the positions of the Anglo-Portugueze army; whose advanced posts fell back as the French approach ed. Towards the middle of August, the army under the command of Marshal Massena was posted as follows. Fifteen thousand men of Marshal Ney's corps, under the orders of General Loison, invested Almeida; the remainder of that corps, about 10,000, were at Fort de la Conception; 25,000 men under Junot were at St. Felizes, about three miles N. W. from Ciudad Rodrigo. A third corps, of 25,000 men, was at Ciudad Rodrigo and the neighbourhood. These three corps were within two days march of the allies, and some of their divisions not further off than seven or eight miles. Marsha! Massena, the commander

in chief, was at Valdemula, a village near Ciudad Rodrigo, which about three weeks before had been occupied by the English.

On the north side of Portugal General Kellerman, with 12,000 men, menaced Oporto; and, on the south, General Regnier, with about 15 or 18,000, menanced Alentejo. Marshal Massena, August 14, published a proclamation, addressed to the inhabitants of Portugal, announcing that he was at the head of 110,000 men,† destined to take possession of Portugal, and drive away the English. But he protested to the Portugueze, that his master the Emperor, so far from entertaining any sentiment of hostility towards their nation, was their true friend, and a friend who possessed the means of making them the happiest people on earth. The king of England, he said, was actuated solely by narrow and selfish views, while the Emperor of the French was directed in his conduct by the principles of true philanthropy. He concluded by saying, that the time of clemency and generosity was not yet past. But now was the moment to shew by their submission that they were proper objects of protection and kindness. The greatest calamities were denounced in case of resistance. It appears that Massena was not quite so confident in his 110,000 men as he pretended to be: whether it was that he deemed even this great force insufficient for the conquest of Portugal, or that the different corps were found by Massena, as

has

has been stated in the Spanish papers, to have fallen through death, disease, or desertion, greatly short of their complements, or the numbers at which they were computed in the dispatches, at the end of May, from Paris. An intercepted letter from Buonaparte to Massena, published in the Spanish and Portugueze Journals, contains an answer to one from the General demanding a reinforcement of not less than 40,000 men. "As to the reinforcement you require," says Napoleon, "it is impossible to send you so many troops at the present moment. As soon as it can be done, you shall receive every assistance possible. Meanwhile you must compel the English to come to a general engagement: if you are victorious, the peninsula is ours; if you are beaten, which is not improbable, you will at least have so weakened the enemy, as to find means of making a good retreat." The testimony of letters, said to have been intercepted, and published by the opposite power at war, is very equivocal; and the clause, which is not improbable, in the present letter, looks a little suspicious; nevertheless it may have a place here. If authentic, it is important if fictitious, it is a proof and instance of that miserable policy of publishing lies, to which most belligerent powers of the present times resort, oftener, and more impudently, than those of any former period.

The fortress of Almeida, deemed by General Dumourier, the strongest in Portugal, stands on the top of a high mountain, or rather a lofty mountainous plain, at the distance of 113 miles N. E. from Lisbon. This elevat

ed plain is divided by a very deep. valley, or rather an immense glen, containing in its sinuosities, the rapid river Coa, which, rushing down amidst rifted rocks of granite, after being joined by three small rivers, falls into the Ebro, The Coa runs at the distance of a mile from the town of Almeida. It had six royal bastions of stone, and as many ravelius. There was a good ditch and covered way. Nearly in the centre of the town, on a lofty mound stood the castle and magazines, which were bombproof. Within its walls were wells, and at a small distance a fine spring of water. The population of Almeida did not exceed 2500. The fortress garrisoned by 5000 men, partly English, partly Portugueze, but the whole commanded by British officers. The Governor was Brigadier General Cox.

was

The trenches were opened before Almeida in the night between the 15th and 16th of August. The attention of the besieged was occupied by false attack directed against the north side of the town: by the favour of which circumstance, 2000 labourers dug the first parallel, 3 feet in depth and 500 fathoms in length, through a rocky stratum, under the necessity of covering themselves every instant by gabions. The trench was afterwards enlarged by blowing up the rocks. In the night between the 24th and 25th the second parallel was opened, in the rock, within less than 150 fathoms of the place. A terrible fire from the castle obliged the men to quit the trench in the day-time, but they returned and enlarged it by the means

of

of the petard the following night On the 26th, at five A. M. eleven batteries, mounted with 65 pieces of cannon, opened a fire on the fortress, which was returned by the garrison with great vigour. Towards 8 o'clock P. M. a bomb fell within the walls of the castle on a caisson which they were filling with gunpowder at the door of the principal magazine; the flame was communicated to one hundred and fifty thousand weight of powder: the explosion was like the eruption of a volcano. It was supposed by the besiegers that the whole of the place had been blown up. A great quantity of the wrecks fell into the French trenches. By this accident 900 persons were killed, and 400 wounded. Of about 400 artillery men not one escaped. The conflagration spread, and was continued for the whole night.

Next

day, Aug. 27th, Marshal Massena went himself to the trenches, and viewed the ravages of the terrible explosion. The castle, the cathedral, and all the neighbouring houses had disappeared. Even before this explosion the fire of the fortress had been silenced, and was heard no more; and the bombarders had been posted particularly against the town. The Marshal immediately ordered this firing of shells to cease; and sent a flag of truce, offering capitulation, and also a note to the Governor, in which he observed to him that Almeida was in flames, that the whole of his heavy artillery was now mounted on batteries, and that it was impossible that the English army should come to his relief; "surrender then to the

generosity of the armies of His Imperial and Royal Majesty. 1 offer you honourable terms. Think of what has passed at Ciudad Rodrigo, and of the evils in reserve for Almeida, if you should prolong a useless defence." British officers were instantly sent to have a conference with the French commander, who stated his terms of capitulation.

After several hours employed in negociation, the Governor, whose object it had been, as Massena thought, to gain time, refused to accede to them. The French therefore re-commenced their fire at 8 o'clock in the evening. It was not till three hours thereafter that Governor Cox signed the capitulation proposed by Massena, dated the 27th of August, 1810. The garrison were to have the honours of war, that is, to march out with their arms, and lay them down on the glacis of the place. The militia to return to their homes, and not to serve during the present war, either against France or her allies. The property of the inhabitants was to be protected, and their religious opinions respected. The plans and memoirs of the place to be given up to the chief engineer of the French army, and the magazines, &c. to the commissaries. The sick and wounded were to be taken care of, at the expense of the French army, and on their recovery to follow the garrison as prisoners to France. Ninety-eight pieces of heavy artillery and seven field pieces fell into the hands of the French, with 300,000 rations of biscuit, 100,000 rations of salt fish, and a great quantity of other provisions.

instead

Of the Portugueze militia, 1200 instead of returning home, entered voluntarily into the service of France, and were employed as pioneers. Part of the 24th Por. tuguese regiment of the line too, instead of being sent with the rest of the garrison to France, were kept for the service of the French army, as that regiment, Massena says, had manifested a good disposition they were placed under the command of Portuguese officers who were warmly attached to the French, and hated the English: 112 Portuguese cannoniers, and 40 horsemen, also offered

themselves, and were admitted into the French service. "But," says Massena," I shall always have an eye on these troops, and take care to place them only in the least important stations.*

It was the division of Ney's corps, under the orders of General Loison, that pushed the sieges of both Almeida and Ciudad Rodrigo. The other troops bad not in those enterprises discharged a firelock. They were however employed in covering the sieges, as well as in other movements, preliminary to Massena's intended march to Lisbon.

СНАР.