102 The French Press. [CHAP. them its assistance. It would be difficult to exhibit a greater lack of tact. Is it, then, a matter of course that France should ask Germany's advice before deciding what she shall do at home-that her political parties should enquire how far they may go without drawing down the German Chancellor's remarks upon their heads? The Norddeutsche is quite right in saying that France does not exhibit any desire to break the peace; but it is gravely in error if it believes that all parties in France are not at one in the resolve to be masters in their own country, and to maintain the independence of the French nation." Paul de Cassagnac, the clerical Bonapartist, bitterly lamented in the Pays that "It is the foreigner who watches over and supports the Republic in France. What a disgrace for the Republic! If we required any further proof how fatal the Republic is to us, we should find it in this German article, which so correctly explains the motives of the Triple Alliance formed against our unfortunate country!" The Gambettist organ, La République Française, was quite beside itself, to the extent of becoming irefully sarcastic and regrettably personal, e.g. : "M. de Bismarck has rallied from the painful throes of his neuralgia or gout to dictate an article for the Norddeutsche Zeitung. He condescends to acquaint us with a fact which was never unknown to us, namely, that Germany, Austria and Italy have concluded an offensive alliance against us. He is so good as to admit that none of these Powers considers its tranquillity menaced by us. Is it possible to be more gracious? It is therefore certain that the Fraeuleins of Berlin and Vienna and the Roman signorine need not fear that General Gallifet will forthwith sound to boot and saddle on the Meuse or Var. The Spring of 1883 will not have to wrinkle its brows I.] The "Peaceful Republic." over war-rumours. 103 All renown to Prince Bismarck and his prophet the editor of the Norddeutsche, for having proclaimed this message to the universe! Our constitutional laws are quoted as the chief guarantee of European peace, and it is observed that nothing short of a cataclysm could revive our warlike dispositions, by bringing a man or principle to power, whose position would have to be strengthened by turning Frenchmen's attention to foreign matters. We are happy to inform M. de Bismarck that no man in the world is capable of dragging our nation into a war of conquest. (!) If he imagines that our existing institutions would cause us to hesitate if called upon to defend our rights and honour, he is most abominably misinformed. The Republic will attack nobody, but will know how to make itself respected by everybody. To recommend our form of government to European benevolence as the only preventative against the warlike proclivities of the nation, is to insult France as well as the Republic. There is no Frenchman, be he Republican or Monarchist, who does not feel this insult. We are not accustomed (!) to blame or praise the institutions of our neighbours. We do not side with either Herr von Bismarck or Herr Richter; we let the Germans, Austrians and Italians govern themselves as best pleases them. Watch us, if you like; conclude defensive alliances against us, if doing so strengthens your feeling of security. It is all one to us, for we shall require no allies when summoned to defend ourselves. But for Heaven's sake spare us your advice concerning the constitution best suited to us." Did this "peaceful Republic" promise to be durable, it would be scarcely necessary to take any precautions against it. But we have reason to doubt its durability, firstly, on account of the French character, which loves change, and secondly, by reason of the very nature of a democratic 104 Three to One. [CHAP. I. Republic, or Parliamentary Despotism, which hithertoat least amongst peoples of Latin origin—has always sooner or later led to exaggerations of principle, thence to reaction, to a military régime and finally to an absolutist Monarchy. Provision has therefore been made for putting a stop to these extravagances, should the case in question accrue, bringing with it the necessity of war. France would then find herself faced to the south and east by a formidable Triple Alliance. It may perhaps be doubted that a written Treaty to this effect exists; but it is beyond a doubt that a clear understanding has been arrived at by the three Powers, in the sense that France shall not be able to attack any one of them without finding the two others arrayed in arms to resist her. This is the exact converse of the state of Europe during the reign of Napoleon III. He (unwisely enough in the interests of England, not of France) attacked Russia in the Crimea whilst Prussia remained inactive, and Austria was only able to lend him a half-hearted assistance. He made war upon Austria whilst Prussia and Russia "stood at ease." He fell upon Germany in 1870, who fought him unsupported. If the Republic be wise, it will not play the old game over again; nor, in all probability, will any Emperor or King of the French who may reveal himself as the outcome of the Republic. If France wants, as matters now stand, to pick a quarrel with one of her neighbours, she will have to fight three at once—an undertaking to which she will never be equal. She will scarcely be so insensate as to dash her head against the wall of a new Coalition which, unlike its predecessors, is and will most likely remain a purely defensive one. ( 105 ) CHAPTER II. THE CHANCELLOR AND RUSSIA. JUST before and immediately after the last Russo-Turkish war it was a standing allegation in the columns of the Muscovite Press that Prussia (and even all Germany), owed a debt of gratitude to Russia and was not inclined to pay it. A retrospective glance at the history of the last eighty years-that is, up to the date of Bismarck's accession to Ministerial office-will enable us to judge what is the exact state of our debt and credit account with that country, as far as thankfulness is concerned. Stein, at the Vienna Congress, wished to ensure lasting peace and tranquillity to this quarter of the globe by arrangements calculated to augment Germany's strength and permanently consolidate it. A neighbour, however, who should be able to dispense with the patronage of Russia and to decline foreign interference in its affairs did not suit Czar Alexander's plans, and so he quashed Stein's projects by his veto. Prussia's indemnity-claims were at first supported by Russia; but when the latter had ascertained to a certainty that no one intended to interfere with her designs upon Poland, that the efforts of Austria and the Western Powers were exclusively directed against Prussia, and that peace could be preserved without any further sacrifice on Russia's part, the Czar and his advisers 106 The July Declaration. [CHAP. cooled towards this country, and eventually required Frederick William III. in plain terms to forego certain claims which would have procured for Prussia far larger compensation than that with which she was compelled to content herself. During the Russo-Turkish war of 1829 Prussia did good service to Russia, chiefly by General von Mueffling's mission, which materially contributed to bring about the peace that extricated the Russians from grave embarrassment. In the Spring of 1830 Russia contracted an antiGerman alliance with France, by which the latter was to acquire the left bank of the Rhine; nothing but the revolution of July prevented our two loyal neighbours' plan from being carried out. The notorious "July Declaration" of 1848 reckoned amongst Russia's proofs of friendship for Germany, her readiness to stand by the latter against the projects Rhinewards disclosed by our Western neighbours in 1840. But Russia never even thought of arming at that time; and if she withstood Thiers' demonstrations by diplomatic action, it was only because she had reason to anticipate a national rising throughout Germany which would have endangered Russian influence in that country, whilst a rapprochement to France was in many respects desirable for the Muscovite Empire in 1840. Through the death of the Duke of Nassau an important point in Western Germany was left forlorn of relations to the Court of Petersburg, whose former connection with the Royal House of Wuertemberg had ceased to exist, whilst its relations with Baden were considerably slackened. A visit to London paid by Czar Nicholas had not produced the desired effect. In Russia itself there was trouble with the peasants and discontent in the highest circles; fresh conspiracies had been detected |