2

A Franco-Russian League.

[CHAP.

Germany I have never counselled any other course, than in case of war, to rely exclusively upon the national force of Germany."

Even later on libels of the above description obtained currency, and were credited, not only by Progressists and Ultramontanists, but by exalted personages at Court. They owed their origin either to mendacious party-spirit or to the misapprehensions of persons who heard the bell but not the knocker. What follows will enable the reader to get at the exact truth, if he will take the trouble to read it by the light of the fifth chapter (Bismarck and Austria) of the preceding volume, in reference to Austrian policy during the Crimean war and to the attitude of the German Central States towards France. The contents of that chapter demonstrate that for some considerable time Bismarck had been compelled to take a French alliance into his calculations, but had never even dreamt of purchasing France's friendship by a cession of German territory.

When he was Envoy to the Bund he wrote to Manteuffel (April 26, 1856) about the position Prussia would be placed in by a Franco-Russian League, which then appeared probable; and, after pointing out the comparative worthlessness of an alliance with England, the untrustworthiness of the German Central States, and the faithless selfishness of the Vienna Cabinet, concluded as follows: "If a Russo-French alliance with warlike purposes should really come about, it is my conviction that we could not afford to be reckoned amongst its opponents. . . In order to keep every chance open to ourselves, we can do little for the moment but display a little inexpensive friendliness towards Louis Napoleon and repel any attempt on the part of Russia to take us in tow gratuitously and prematurely. When the Paris peace shall be ratified, no doubt the

I.]

Prussia and France.

3

respective Monarchs will exchange decorations, and it would certainly do us no good to exclude ourselves from this amiable demonstration at Paris, or even to participate in it sensibly later than others. You may be sure that Louis Napoleon, with his brand-new Court and personal vanity, will think more of the performance or omission of this act of amity than would the wearers of more ancient crowns." A little later (May 10) he recommends his chief to cultivate friendly relations to France, in view of a possible alliance with her, to what immediate end appears in the following remarks. "We cannot arrange the mutual relations of other Great Powers as we could wish them to be, but we can take the liberty of utilising, in conformity with our own security and interests, arrangements made without our co-operation, and possibly in contrariety to our wishes. Our relations to Russia, England and Austria are such as to offer no hindrance to a rapprochement towards any one of those Powers, if circumstances should render that step advisable. I do not say that the contrary is the case in respect to France; but there are so many germs of mutual estrangement in our respective historical and dynastic circumstances that nothing short of the most careful nursing of our relations with that country can possibly enable us to join her as easily as we could join any one of the three Powers above alluded to. I am not recommending a FrancoPrussian alliance à priori; but I deem it beyond dispute that our position would lose weight, and that other Cabinets would begin to treat us with less consideration, as soon as the contingency of an alliance with France should be effaced from the category of Prussia's potential resolves; and we may be unavoidably forced into choosing the least of two evils. Admitting this, it follows that our relations to France, for the time being, must be such as will allow us at any moment to

4

The Emperor Napoleon.

[CHAP. drew nearer to her without injury or humiliation to ourselves; and that the other Courts may remain under the impression that such a course is open to us. Travellers returning from Paris relate that the Emperor Napoleon has expressed to Prussian officers the wish and hope to be present at a review of Prussian troops. As he seldom says anything unadvisedly or without an object, it may be inferred that he would like to be invited to Berlin. How this may be Hatzfeldt will know better than I; if it be correct I should regard his visit to our capital as a triumphant conclusion to Prussian policy in the Oriental question, and a shining illustration of its correctness. The Autocrat of the French just now exercises so decisive an influence upon European policy, and his friendship—or even the mere credit of its outward seeming-is so eagerly sought for by the mightiest Monarchs, that it would not only be a formal proof of recognition on his part, but a fact of political moment, were he to aspire to the honour of visiting our most gracious Sovereign before calling upon any other reigning personage. We may regret that such is the case; but we cannot alter facts, though we can utilise them; and, as matters stand, in my opinion a visit of the French Emperor to Berlin would be a diplomatic victory for usour omission to invite him, if he really has a fancy to come, a political mistake."

It would really seem that the Emperor of the French at that time was earnestly disposed to make friends with Prussia. On November 4 Bismarck reported to his Minister a conversation he had had with Prince Napoleon during an evening party at the French Ambassador's. "The Prince devoted himself to me with an exclusiveness that was rather distressing to the rest of the company, and told me inter alia that the Neuenburg affair would turn out a lucky

I.]

Bismarck and Napoleon.

5

incident if it should bring about a rapprochement between King Frederick William and the Emperor Napoleon. An alliance between Prussia and France, 'the two most civilised peoples in the world,' would be the most natural of all Leagues, and equally advantageous to both. France only demanded territorial increment if other Powers sought to enlarge their possessions." When the question of the Neuenburg Royalists (1857) threatened to lead to a Prussian campaign in Switzerland, and—at the conference assembled in Paris to settle the dispute-England and Austria opposed Prussia's claims, Count Walewski, the representative of France, "endeavoured to baffle England's objections upon each successive point;" and the Emperor (with whom Bismarck had several conversations on the subject by the order of his Government) was "very nice and pleasant," as the Chancellor himself told us during the Franco-Prussian war. Napoleon however would not comply with the King's wish that the Prussian troops told off to attack the Swiss should march through Elsass and Lothringen, on the ground that their doing so would arouse too much excitement in France. In other respects he approved of the undertaking, observing that "he should like nothing better than to see that nest of democrats swept away." He also shewed himself very friendly and willing to oblige in another question, at that time discussed between Bismarck and himself, namely, the Schleswig-Holstein business; and when Bismarck explained to the Emperor what, in his opinion, Denmark should do and leave undone in this matter to content Germany, and mentioned how desirable he thought it that the foreign Envoys at Copenhagen (in particular the representative of France) should privily support German claims as put forward by a Federal Commissioner there, Napoleon promised him the required

6

Napoleon III.

[CHAP. assistance, provided the existence of the Danish Monarchy should not be called in question by Germany's claims. In the following year, too, Bismarck had no reason to anticipate that the Emperor would take part against Germany in the question of the Duchies. In a report dated June 30, 1858, he observed:"As far as I can see there is no reason to fear that France will seek a quarrel with Germany over this question. It is just possible that (should England lend herself to such a step) she may, later on, take up a demonstrative attitude in favour of Denmark together with Great Britain. But if France be on the look out for a continental war, in which England would not stand by her, I do not think the Emperor Napoleon is so unwise as to pick out the Holstein affair to fight about; for, if there is a question which just now would stir up national feeling throughout Germany and unite German Governments against France, even despite themselves, it is this one. Hence it is far from probable that Napoleon-if he deems himself compelled to get up a war-will choose German territory for his attack. Whosoever asserts that he will select (as the pretext for that attack) a question which has been for years past flaunted on high as a symbol of German national honour, regarded by every Teuton as the soundest test of patriotism and the surest means of achieving popular favour, has special reasons of his own, either for creating a panic, or for impugning the sound common-sense of the French Emperor."

This appreciation of Napoleon was proved to be absolutely correct in January 1864. When Lord Russell proposed to France an "eventual co-operation with England, by which material support should be afforded to Denmark in her resistance to ambition," Napoleon declined the suggestion, and his refusal was thus explained in a