I.] Napoleon and Nationalities. 7 despatch of his Minister Drouyn de l'Huys :-"The Emperor recognises the importance of the London Treaty, so far as the latter aims at maintaining the equilibrium and peace of Europe. Fully approving of that object the French Government, however, opines that circumstances call for some alteration of the treaty. The Emperor has always been disposed to accord great consideration to the feelings and efforts of nationalities. It cannot be ignored that the national feelings and efforts of Germany are bent upon a closer union with the Germans of Schleswig-Holstein. Any step that would place him under the obligation to contend in arms against Germany's wishes would be repugnant to the Emperor. Schleswig and England lie far apart. But the territories of Germany and France touch, and a war between these Powers would be the most calamitous and risky enterprise the Emperor could possibly undertake. Besides, the Emperor cannot but bear in mind that he has been made the object of mistrust and suspicion in Europe on account of his alleged projects of aggrandisement upon the Rhine. To commence a war on his Rhenish frontier would lend still greater force to this baseless and unjustifiable accusation. . . . Should the balance of power be seriously menaced later on, the Emperor would be disposed to take fresh measures in the interest of France and Europe; but at present he desires to reserve full freedom of action to his government." Napoleon's forbearance was based, as we shall see, upon the calculation that it would predispose Prussia to come to an understanding with him at some future period respecting certain enterprises, to be undertaken in common for his advantage. On the other hand, Bismarck took care to foster the Emperor's friendly feeling in every way compatible with the interests of Germany. Speaking on this 8 Napoleon misjudged Bismarck. [СНАР. subject (February 21, 1879) in the Reichstag, he observed: "I had every reason for keeping up this good understanding, by means of which I succeeded—not only whilst I was Envoy in Paris, but throughout the difficulties of the Polish 1863 crisis, when France was opposed to us-in maintaining such a favourable disposition towards us, that, in the Danish question, France's friendly behaviour cut the ground from under the feet of other powers which had a fancy not to allow us to fight out our quarrel with Denmark singlehanded. Still more, during our heavier struggle with Austria in 1866, France's self-restraint would certainly not have been carried so far as (fortunately for us) it was, had I not bestowed every possible care upon our relations with her, thereby bringing about a 'benevolent' connection with the Emperor Napoleon, who, for his part, liked to have treaties with us better than with others; but who undoubtedly did not foresee that the 1866 war would terminate in our favour. He reckoned upon our being beaten, and upon then according us his protection-benevolently, but not gratuitously. Politically speaking, however, it was lucky for us, in my opinion, that he remained amicably disposed towards us, and particularly towards me, up to the battle of Sadowa." The Emperor's good-will was partly the result of Bismarck's conciliatory behaviour, and partly of the hope that-by exchanging favours with him in time of peace, or by effecting later on an alliance having for its purpose common action in the direction of a common goal, or by playing a double game of temptation and deceit he might attain certain ends steadfastly kept in view by Napoleon throughout all his dealings with Germany. In this latter respect he misjudged the Prussian statesman with whom he had to do. Just as Bismarck (in the sixties) seems to have thought Napoleon more intelligent than, upon further experience, I.] Merimée on Bismarck. he pronounced him to be (in Versailles he spoke of him to us as "lacking information," "stupid and sentimental" and a Tiefenbacher ") so it is manifest that Napoleon did not understand Bismarck's capacity and character, that he mistook his ease of manner for frivolity, his frankness for inconsiderateness, and was deluded enough to imagine him wanting in patriotic feeling. Napoleon regarded Bismarck as a person at once frivolous and simple. "Ce n'est pas un homme sérieux," he said of him, just after one of Bismarck's visits in Paris; and it is not impossible that the latter may have given him some cause to express that opinion. But he did not look deep enough. There was one amongst his entourage gifted with clearer sight and brighter intelligence than he, although not a professional politician. Prospère Merimée, writing to "Une Inconnue" (October, 14, 1863), after having made Bismarck's acquaintance at Biarritz, remarked:" Another personage, M. de Bismarck, pleased me still better. He is a tall German, very polite and not at all naïf. There is no sentiment about him, but plenty of wit. He has quite captivated me." Later on (July 15, 1866) he wrote to his friend Panizzi:-" "As for Bismarck, he is my hero. Although himself a German, he seems to understand the Germans thoroughly, and to take them for the blockheads they are." In a third letter (Dec. 1867), after stigmatising "Ollivier et tutti quanti" as "wordspinners and second-rate actors, who never take anybody in," he adds :-"We are getting more and more crumpled up every day. There is only one great man left; and that is M. de Bismarck." We now come to Napoleon's successive attempts to gain Bismarck over to a compact that should prove profitable to France. Hints and proposals in this direction reached him even before he undertook the direction of the Prussian ΙΟ France and the Gastein Treaty. [CHAP. Foreign Office; for, in his Circular to the diplomatic representatives of the North German Confederation (July 29, 1870), he expressly states:-"The French Government's endeavours to secure the aid of Prussia in carrying out its covetous projects with respect to Belgium and the Rhenish frontier were brought to my knowledge before 1862. . . . These tendencies of the French Government first became manifest (as producing a visible effect upon European politics) in France's friendly behaviour towards us during the German-Danish difficulty. Her subsequent ill-humour with us, anent the Treaty of Gastein, was caused by the apprehension that a lasting consolidation of the AustroPrussian Alliance would deprive the Cabinet of Paris of the fruits of that behaviour." The ill-humour alluded to, expressed itself in Drouyn de l'Huys' Circular Despatch of August 29, 1865, denouncing the Austro-Prussian action in the Elbe Duchies as arbitrary and violent-repugnant to a sense of justice and to the dictates of conscience. Napoleon indignant at violent proceedings! The Man of December a prophet of righteousness and conscientiousness! The truth was that the Gastein Convention crossed his plans and expectations. "France," continued Bismarck (Circular Despatch, July 29, 1870) "had reckoned in 1865 upon war breaking out between us and Austria, and drew nearer to us readily enough as soon as our relations to Vienna became troubled." In a declaration made by the French Government at Berlin (September 23, 1865), it was observed that the views expressed in Drouyn de l'Huys' Circular Despatch (August 29, 1863) need not be regarded as more binding than the Treaty of Gastein itself, and that France noticed with pleasure, according to the Berlin Cabinet's assurance, that the latter agreement was of a purely provisional nature. I.] Russia, Italy, and France. II The Gastein Convention was, in fact, only a time-bargain, postponing the definitive solution of the German question; and as that solution, in all probability, could only be achieved by a war between Austria and Prussia; as, moreover, it might be confidently anticipated that the great majority of the German States would side with the former; it became necessary for Bismarck to make sure of French non-intervention on the one hand, and, on the other, to secure an ally whose strength might counterbalance the support given to Austria by the German States. Such an ally was Italy, with whom Prussia had hitherto not stood upon the most friendly footing, but towards whom her Austrian difficulty compelled her to turn for assistance. Italy, however, was under obligations to Napoleon, and dependent upon his good will to boot. Therefore Bismarck had to come to an understanding with the Emperor of the French in this direction as well as others. The then Prussian Envoy in Paris not proving equal to conducting the needful negotiations, Bismarck himself (November 1863) went to see Napoleon at Biarritz, and talked the matter over with him tête-à-tête. Nothing positively authentic has transpired respecting the interviews that then took place; but it may be concluded from Napoleon's' subsequent behaviour that the Prussian Minister-whilst avoiding any binding obligations on the part of Prussia-succeeded in inducing the Emperor to promise him benevolent neutrality in the case of an Austro-Prussian war, and furtherance of his projects with regard to Italy. We shall soon see that Napoleon entertained an arrière-pensée-that he hoped Prussia would be defeated, so that he might have an opportunity of offering her his assistance, to be paid for by a cession of German territory. But of all this nothing was said at Biarritz. Later on Napoleon repeatedly essayed, by offering his aid |