Gross Nr. 5378. de consacrer des règles universellement admises". || It, however, soon appeared, britannien. When the more important Articles of the Project came to be examined and 20. Jan. 1875. discussed, that the attitude of reserve which Her Majesty's Government had held towards it, and the caution of the British Delegate were fully justified. Instead of mere rules for the guidance of military Commanders based upon usage, upon which a general understanding could be shown to be desirable. in the interests of humanity, the Articles of the Project were seen to contain, or to imply, numerous innovations, for which no practical necessity was proved to exist, and the result of which, if adopted, would have been greatly to the advantage of the Powers having large armies constantly prepared for war and systems of universal compulsory military service. Her Majesty's Government might, in accordance with their previously announced determination, have instructed the British Delegate to protest formally against any attempt on the part of the Conference to lay down new rules of international law between belligerents; but they preferred to leave the discussions to take their course, being unwilling to throw impediments in the way of a thorough inquiry into the Project, and thus prevent the Emperor of Russia's wishes in regard to the Conference from being adequately carried out. || The rule that only unanimity of opinions should be recorded, was, nevertheless, soon broken through by the protests and reservations of other Delegates, and, at the meeting on the 14th of August, Baron Jomini was forced to abandon it. Her Majesty's Government do not feel themselves called upon to enter into a minute review of the proceedings of the Conference, and they will accordingly confine themselves to touching on some of the more striking differences of opinion, to which the discussions gave expression. The first section of the first chapter occasioned an argument as to the meaning of "occupation", in the 1st Article of the Project, which provided that: "§ 1. The occupation by the enemy of a part of the territory of a State with which he is at war, suspends, ipso facto, the authority of the legal power of the latter and substitutes in its place. the military authority of the occupying State." | The German view, as described by Sir A. Horsford, was, that occupation is not altogether of the same character as a blockade, which is effective only when it is practically carried out. It does not always manifest itself by visible signs. If occupation is said to exist only where the military power is visible, insurrections are provoked, and the inhabitants suffer in consequence. A town left without troops must still be considered occupied, and any rising would be severely punished. Generally speaking, the occupying Power is established as soon as the population is disarmed, or even when the country is traversed by flying columns. Baron Jomini said, that the discussion turned upon the word "territory". This was a general expression, which must be interpreted liberally ("interpréter largement"); a province could not be occupied at every point: that was impossible. The other view was: "That greater power must not be accorded to the invader than he actually possesses. Occupation is strictly analogous to Gross blockade, and can only be exercised where it is effective. The occupier must Nr. 5378. always be in sufficient strength to repress an outbreak. He proves his occu- britannien. pation by this act. An army establishes its occupation when its positions 20. Jan, 1875. and lines of communication are secured by other corps. If a territory frees itself from the exercise of this authority, it ceases to be occupied. Occupation cannot be presumptive". (Sir A. Horsford's Summary of Protocol 10 of Committee.) The discussion terminated in the adoption of modified Articles, in which an effort was made to reconcile the conflicting views by the use of carefully balanced expressions. Her Majesty's Government fear, that the inhabitants of the invaded territory would find in such colourless phrases very inadequate protection from the liberal interpretation of the necessities and possibilities of warfare by a victorious enemy; while the existence of rules, the meaning of which is not distinct and indisputable, could not fail, should they ever be actually promulgated, to give rise to angry controversies which would intensify, rather than mitigate, the horrors of war. The second Chapter, relating to Combatants and Non-Combatants, showed an equal difference of opinion, eventually smoothed over in a similar manner. The Swiss Delegate, in his observations on the Article requiring the use of a distinctive badge recognizable at a distance, remarked, that a country might rise en masse, as Switzerland had formerly done, to defend itself, without organization and under no command. The patriotic feeling which led to such a rising could not be kept down; and although these patriots, if defeated, might not be treated as peaceful citizens, it could not be admitted in advance that they were not belligerents. | Sir A. Horsford also reported that, during the general discussion on the subject of this Chapter, the Netherlands Delegate remarked that, if the plan laid down by the German Delegate was to be sanctioned by the adoption of those Articles which related to belligerents, as drawn up in the Project, it would either have the effect of diminishing the defensive power of the Netherlands, or would render universal and obligatory service necessary, a system to which public opinion in the Netherlands was still opposed. He therefore reserved more than ever the opinion of his Government. The Belgian Delegate also made a declaration of reservation. Upon the consideration of Section II, Chapter I, "of the Rights of Belligerents with reference to Private Individuals", and "of the Military Power with respect to Private Individuals", the discussion was resumed, and the rights of national defence again warmly urged by the Netherlands, Belgian and Swiss Delegates. In Baron Lansberge's opinion no country could possibly admit that, if a population of a de facto occupied district should rise in arms against the established authority of the invader, they should be subject to the laws of war in force in the occupying army. He admitted, that in time. of war the occupier might occasionally be forced to treat with severity a population who might rise, and that, from its weakness, the population might be forced to submit; but he repudiated the idea of any Government contem Gross Nr. 5378. plating the delivering over in advance to the justice of the enemy those men britannien. Who, from patriotic motives and at their own risk, might expose themselves 20. Jan. 1875. to all the dangers consequent upon a rising. || Baron Lambermont added, that, if citizens were to be sacrificed for having attempted to defend their country at the peril of their lives, they need not find inscribed on the post at the foot of which they are about to be shot, the Article of a Treaty signed by their own Government, which had in advance condemned them to death. Colonel Hammer, the Swiss Delegate, who had previously pointed out that Articles 45 and 9 (respecting conditions to be fulfilled by armed forces) were the cardinal points of the whole Project, openly declared that two questions diametrically opposed to each other were before the Committee: the maxims and interests, on the one hand, of great armies in an enemy's country, which imperatively demand security for their communications, and for their rayon of occupation; and, on the other hand, the principles of war and the interests of the invaded, which cannot admit that a population should be handed over as criminals to justice, for having taken up arms against the enemy. A reconciliation of these conflicting interests was, in his opinion, impossible, in the case of a levée en masse in an occupied country. In the face of the opposite opinions expressed on the Articles under discussion, only a provisional modification of them was accepted by the meeting, omitting those upon which the greatest disagreement had been shown. || The Conference was unable to arrive even at a provisional modification of Chapter II "Of Requisitions and Contributions", and, after a variety of views had been expressed, of the most opposite character, the course was adopted of accepting a certain reading in the Project and entering the dissentient opinions in the Protocol. The Articles in Section 4, "on Reprisals", did not attain to this stage. Sir A. Horsford reported, that the general feeling seemed to be that occasions on which reprisals of a severe character had been executed were of far too recent a date to allow the practice to be discussed calmly, and the Articles were withdrawn. || Her Majesty's Government understand, that this was the only subject brought before the Conference which appeared likely to give rise to warmth of feeling from its relation with recent events, and they have been glad to find that their apprehensions in this respect have proved unfounded, owing to the tact and moderation of the President and of the several Delegates, and, in some measure, as they are willing to believe, from the presence of an impartial and friendly counsellor in Sir A. Horsford. At the same time Her Majesty's Government cannot conceal from themselves that, in passing over these Articles in silence, the Delegates really evaded one of the principal difficulties inherent in any scheme for the preparation of the Rules of War to be observed by belligerents, namely, the question how those rules are to be enforced. | Rules of international law in which the interests of neutrals and belligerents are concerned can be enforced in the last resort by recourse to war. In the case, however, of countries already engaged in Gross hostilities, there will be no means, except by reprisals, for either belligerent Nr. 5378. to enforce upon the other the observance of any set rules. It is true, that, britannien. on the outbreak of war, it would be almost certain that one or other bel- 20. Jan. 1875. ligerent would appeal to neutral nations against some real, or supposed, infraction of these rules by his opponent. It can, however, scarcely be seriously contemplated, that neutral countries should intervene to enforce their observance; and, unless their interference were attended by the exercise of compulsion, in which case the circle of hostilities would soon be indefinitely enlarged, it cannot be supposed that the contending nations would respect it. The remaining Articles of the Project, in the words of Baron Jomini, "ont été l'objet de rédactions transactionnelles, destinées à concilier toutes les nuances. d'opinion". They relate to the "Means of injuring the Enemy", "Sieges and Bombardments", "Spies", "Prisoners of War", "Bearers of Flags of Truce", "Capitulations", "Sick and Wounded", "Armistices", "Belligerents interned, and Wounded treated in Neutral Territory". Of these, the Articles on Sick and Wounded, originally seven in number, have been reduced to one, relegating the whole matter to the operation of the Geneva Convention. The Articles relating to Capitulations and Armistices are also merely formal. Those concerning Spies and Flags of Truce only profess to record existing military practice, as do the Articles respecting Sieges and Bombardments; though Her Majesty's Government are not confident of the correctness of this description. The twelve Articles with regard to Prisoners of War appear to Her Majesty's Government to be important only in so far as they show the manner, in which the original objects of the Project and the humane intentions of the Emperor of Russia have become obscured in the attempt to devise general rules of warfare. The Articles themselves may possibly serve some useful purpose in recording the view taken by the Delegates at Brussels of some details of the usual treatment of prisoners of war. It was not, however, proved that any real necessity existed for regulating these details, still less that an international agreement on the subject was required. From the spirit of compromise adopted in framing the Articles to which I have referred, as mentioned by Baron Jomini, it is more than probable, that a close scrutiny would show that many of the Articles admit, or invite, differences of interpretation, and Her Majesty's Government need hardly point out how serious would be the consequences should this be found to be the case in respect to the Articles on "belligerents interned and of wounded treated in neutral territory". It will have been seen from the foregoing observations, that Her Majesty's Government regard the result of the Brussels Conference to have been to demonstrate that there is no possibility of an agreement upon the really important Articles of the Russian Project; that the interests of the invader and the invaded are irreconcilable; and that, even if certain rules of warfare could be framed in terms which would meet with acquiescence, they would prove to exercise little more than that fictitious restraint deprecated by the Gross Nr. 5378. Russian Government at the opening of the Conference. | Under these circumbritannien. stances, Her Majesty's Government cannot consent to pursue the matter or 20. Jan. 1875. to take part in any further negotiations or Conferences upon it. || In my despatch of the 28th of September I stated, that Her Majesty's Government desired it to be distinctly understood, that, by authorizing the signature of the Final Protocol, they did not accept the rules thereto annexed. A careful consideration of the whole matter has convinced them, that it is their duty firmly to repudiate, on behalf of Great Britain and her allies in any future war, any project for altering the principles of international law, upon which this country has hitherto acted, and above all to refuse to be a party to any agreement, the effect of which would be to facilitate aggressive wars, and to paralyse the patriotic resistance of an invaded people. || Your Excellency will read this despatch to Prince Gortchakow, and furnish him with a copy of it. I am, &c. Derby. Nr. 5379. RUSSLAND. Min. d. Ausw. an den kaiserl. Botschafter in London. St. Pétersbourg, le 24 Janvier, 1875. Nr. 5379. M. le Comte, M. l'ambassadeur d'Angleterre m'a donné, d'ordre de son 5. Febr. 1875, gouvernement, communication d'une dépêche de lord Derby, datée du 20 janvier et dont je joins ci-près une copie pour votre information. || Je me suis fait un devoir de porter cette pièce à la connaissance de Sa Majesté l'Empereur. Notre Auguste Maître a été sensible à la manière dont lord Derby apprécie la pensée d'humanité qui l'a inspiré en convoquant les gouvernements européens à une entente commune dans le but de rechercher les moyens d'adoucir, autant qu'il est possible, les rigueurs de la guerre. Sa Majesté Impériale regrette d'autant plus la résolution du gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique de ne point s'associer à cette délibération. Il eût été désirable que la voix d'une grande nation telle que l'Angletterre se fit entendre dans une enquête dont l'objet paraissait avoir rencontré ses sympathies. Le gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique est seul juge des motifs qui lui dictent cette abstention. Il ne nous appartient pas d'entrer en polémique à ce sujet. Toutefois, comme la dépêche de lord Derby renferme un jugement des points de vue et des actes de la conférence de Bruxelles, je n'ai pas cru inutile de faire quelques observations sur la manière dont nous les envisageons. || Elles sont consignées dans la notice ci-jointe, dont Votre Excellence est autorisée à donner copie |