Expedition from Suakin to Berber. Cannot be sent. General Gordon can remain at Khartoum or retire Objections to Zebehr Pasha as successor to General Dispatch of British troops for Berber. Reasons for Her Majesty's Government refusing to authorize. Telegram from General Gordon. Attack on rebels at Halfaya. Defeat. News from Obeid and Telegraphic communication with Berber restored. Instructions sent to General Gordon Telegram from General Gordon. Two Pashas shot for treachery at Halfaya. Answer from Mahdi. Majors Kitchener and Rundle. Sent to Berber, but Messages for General Gordon. Should be sent at once, or communication with Berber may be cut Telegram from General Gordon. Telegram from General Gordon. Has heard Zebehr People of Shendy. Said to have been massacred on way to Berber. Help sent to them Zebehr Pasha. Has telegraphed to General Gordon Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Egypt. (In continuation of "Egypt No. 12, 1884.") Sir, No. 1. Earl Granville to Sir E. Baring.* Foreign Office, March 25, 1884. HER Majesty's Government have had under their consideration your telegram of the 24th instant, in which it is suggested that a force of British troops should be sent from Suakin to Berber, with instructions to open up communication with Khartoum. Having regard to the dangers of the climate of the Soudan at this time of the year, as well as the extraordinary risk from a military point of view, Her Majesty's Government do not think it justifiable to send a British expedition to Berber, and they wish you to communicate this decision to General Gordon, in order that he may adopt measures in accordance therewith. Her Majesty's Government desire to leave full discretion to General Gordon to remain at Khartoum, if he thinks it necessary, or to retire by the southern or any other route which may be fouud available. No. 2. I am, &c. Earl Granville to Sir E. Baring. Foreign Office, March 28, 1884. Sir, For this purpose it is necessary to advert shortly to the previous history of Zebehr In When General Gordon was Governor-General of the Soudan, Zebehr's son Suleiman was at Shaka with his father's forces, some 10,000 strong, consisting of murderers and robbers, who made raids upon the negro tribes for slaves. General Gordon tried to dissolve these forces by peaceful means, and succeeded for a time; but in 1878 Suleiman raised a formidable insurrection, which was put down by Gessi Pasha with great difficulty, under the instructions of General Gordon, who tried and executed the emissaries sent to him by Suleiman, among whom was Zebehr's chief secretary. Suleiman himself was • Substance telegraphed. captured and executed by Gessi in July 1879, an action which General Gordon subsequently approved. The language of General Gordon as to the power of Zebehr and his responsibility for the worst abuses of the Slave Trade is clear and decided. "Zebehr," he says, "alone is responsible for the Slave Trade of the last ten years," and he notices with indignation a proposal made to him from Cairo in 1879, that Zebehr should be sent back to the Soudan. Such being the antecedents of Zebehr, it is not surprising that when General Gordon accepted the mission to proceed to Khartoum one of his first requests should have been that Zebehr should be carefully watched. Chérif Pasha had proposed to employ him at Suakin, and General Gordon, in a Memorandum of the 22nd January, written on his voyage to Alexandria, expressed the following opinion in respect to his employment: 66 My objection to Zebehr is this. He is a first-rate General, and a man of great capacity, and he would in no time eat up all the petty Sultans and consolidate a vast State, as his ambition is boundless. I would therefore wish him kept away, as his restoration would be not alone unjust, but might open up the Turco-Arabic question. Left independent the Sultans will doubtless fight among themselves, and one will try to annex the other; but with Zebehr it would be an easy task to overcome these different States and form a large independent one.' Colonel Stewart observed upon the same subject: "Zebehr's return would undoubtedly be a misfortune to the Soudanese, and also a direct encouragement to the Slave Trade. As he would be by far the ablest leader in the Soudan he could easily overturn the newly-erected political edifice, and become a formidable power." On his arrival at Cairo, General Gordon had a remarkable interview with Zebehr, who complained vehemently of the execution of his son and the confiscation of his property. At a Council, consisting of yourself, Nubar Pasha, Sir Evelyn Wood, General Gordon, and Colonel Stewart, held immediately after the interview, "Lieutenant-Colonel Watson, Egyptian army, was asked what he thought of sending Zebehr and Gordon together to the Soudan. He answered that, not alone he himself, but natives thoroughly conversant with both men, were of opinion that such a policy would entail the death of one or other of them. A letter was then read from General Gordon, in which he gave it as his opinion that Zebehr was far the ablest man in the Soudan; that if he were sent up, the Mahdi would probably soon disappear; and that, if it were thought advisable, he would go up with him, though thoroughly convinced that he was no friend of his. At General Gordon's suggestion you informed Zebehr that he would be allowed to remain at Cairo, and that the future treatment he would receive at the hands of the Egyptian Government depended in a great measure upon whether General Gordon returned alive and well from the Soudan, and upon whether, whilst residing at Cairo, Zebehr used his influence to facilitate the execution of the policy upon which the Government had determined. Notwithstanding this decision, General Gordon appears to have reconsidered the subject on his journey to Khartoum, and on his arrival at that place, on the 18th February, he proposed that, on his withdrawal from Khartoum, the British Government should appoint Zebehr as Governor of the Soudan, and give him "their moral support, but nothing more," taking from him certain engagements, and particularly one binding him not to go into Darfour or the Equatorial and Bahr-el-Gazelle provinces. In forwarding this recommendation for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government, you expressed your concurrence in General Gordon's opinion, that it was desirable that he should leave behind him the man most likely to preserve some settled form of government at Khartoum; and that, although there was no necessity to decide at once, you believed Zebehr to be the only possible man. You described him as undoubtedly possessing energy, ambition, and great local influence; that you "would not on any account risk putting Gordon in his power;" and you did not recommend his being promised the moral support of the British Government. Your conclusion was that, save from the point of view of English opinion, you saw no reason why Zebehr should not be proclaimed ruler of the Soudan, after General Gordon had arranged for the withdrawal of the garrisons and had left Khartoum, it being distinctly explained to him, in writing, that he must rely upon his own resources to maintain his position, Her Majesty's Government at that time had no reason to suppose that there was any pressing necessity for the announcement of a successor to General Gordon, whose arrival at Khartoum had been welcomed by the people; and you were informed on the 22nd that there were the gravest objections to General Gordon's proposal that a successor to him should be appointed by the British Government; that Her Majesty's Government did not, as yet, see the necessity of a special provision for the government of the country beyond the policy indicated in General Gordon's Memorandum of the 22nd January,* wherein he proposed to make over the country to the representatives of the different petty Sultans who existed at the time of Mehemet Ali's conquest; and that public opinion in England would not tolerate the appointment of Zebehr. You communicated the reply of Her Majesty's Government to General Gordon, who, in his answer, expressed a decided opinion that, in order to secure the future quiet of Egypt, it was necessary to subdue-or, to use his own expressive phrase, to "smash up "the Mahdi; and that he could not suggest any other successor than Zebehr. In forwarding, on the 28th February,† these opinions, you thus summed up the situation : "There are two courses to pursue. Either the Soudan may be evacuated, and no attempt made to establish any settled Government there, or the best measures of which the circumstances admit may be taken to set up some form of Government. General Gordon is evidently in favour of the latter course. I entirely agree with him. The attempt may not succeed, but I am very strongly of opinion that it should be tried. It will be a serious matter from every point of view, political, military, and financial, if complete anarchy reigns south of Wady Halfa, and anarchy will certainly ensue when Gordon comes away, if some measures be not taken beforehand to prevent it." Your conclusion, in which Nubar Pasha agreed, was that the objections to Zebehr were overrated, and that he should be allowed to succeed Gordon with a sum of money to start with, and an annual subsidy for five years dependent upon his good behaviour, so that he might be able to maintain a moderate military force. Her Majesty's Government on the perusal of General Gordon's advice were under the impression that he gave undue weight to the assumed necessity of an immediate evacuation of Khartoum, and they inquired whether it was urgent to make an arrangement at once to provide for his successor, expressing a hope that General Gordon would remain for some time. They were unwilling hastily to negative the proposal to employ Zebehr, and you were therefore informed that the opinion you had expressed would be carefully weighed before deciding upon the subject. You replied on the 4th March that General Gordon strongly pressed that Zebehr should be sent to Khartoum without delay, and that the combination at Khartoum of Zebehr with himself was an absolute necessity. "My weakness," he said, "is that of being foreign, and Christian, and peaceful, and it is only by sending Zebehr that this prejudice can be removed." In consequence of the confidence expressed by General Gordon that Zebehr would not injure him, you withdrew the objection you had previously expressed to Zebehr being sent to join General Gordon at Khartoum, and supported his recommendation. Up to this time Her Majesty's Government had entertained a hope that some other arrangement might have been made by General Gordon; but having to determine whether Zebehr should be sent or not, and looking to the opinions so recently expressed by General Gordon and Colonel Stewart as to the danger of making use of him, which it is not necessary to recapitulate here, they replied on the 5th March that they had no information in their possession which led them to alter the impressions produced by those opinions, and that unless those impressions were removed, they would not be able to take the responsibility of authorizing the mission of Zebehr. The telegrams subsequently received from you conveying further messages from General Gordon did not materially add to the considerations which had already been placed before Her Majesty's Government. The arguments in favour of employing Zebehr were stated with great force and ability by yourself and General Gordon. A strong conviction was expressed that his interest would prevent him from injuring General Gordon; that although he might have been concerned in stirring up the revolt of the tribes, there was no probability of his joining the Mahdi; and that his stay in Cairo must have taught him sufficient respect for British power to prevent him from entertaining any designs hostile to Egypt. If reliance could safely have been placed upon Zebehr to serve loyally with General Gordon, to act in a friendly manner towards Egypt, and to abstain from encouraging the Slave Trade, the course proposed was undoubtedly the best which could have been taken under the circumstances; but upon this most vital point General Gordon's assurances failed to convince Her Majesty's Government. They felt the strongest desire to comply with his wishes, but they were bound, at the same time, to exercise their own deliberate See "Egypt No. 7 (1884)," p. 2, No. 2. + See "Egypt No. 12 (1884)," p. 114, No. 169. Ibid., p. 140, No. 209. |