Further Correspondence respecting the Affairs of Egypt

[In continuation of "Egypt Nos. 25 and 26 (1884)."]

No. 1.

Lieutenant-General Sir F. Stephenson to the Marquis of Hartington.-(Communicated to the Foreign Office, June 28.)

(Telegraphic.)

Cairo, June 27, 1884, 4.50 P.M. MAY require reinforcements in the course of next month. Should be glad if two battalions from Mediterranean were held in readiness at short notice.

No. 2.

The Marquis of Hartington to Lieutenant-General Sir F. Stephenson.-(Communicated to the Foreign Office, July 1.)

(Telegraphic.)

YOURS 27th June.

War Office, July 1, 1884, 11·15 A.M.

Two battalions will be held in readiness accordingly.

No. 3.

Lord John Hay to the Secretary to the Admiralty.—(Received at the Foreign Office,

(Telegraphic.)

July 3.)

Suakin, June 28, 1884, 4.30 P.M.

MASON BEY from Massowah reports last news of Gordon 27th April in a letter to Mudir of Kassala. Mudir reports all quiet at Kassala. Large caravan 1,500 camels from Kassala reached Massowah 23rd June. Cairo informed.

No. 4.

Mr. Egerton to Earl Granville.-(Received July 3, 6.30 P.M.)

Cairo, July 3, 1884, 5.40 P.M.

(Telegraphic.) FOR the last three days there has been no telegraph communication beyond Dongola.

No. 5.

My Lord,

Mr. Egerton to Earl Granville.-(Received by telegraph, July 4.)

Cairo, July 4, 1884.

IT is certain that the state of ignorance in which we are in Cairo respecting the events that are occurring on the other side of the Atmour and at Dongola is most injurious, and that every effort should be made to put a stop to it,

Your Lordship will remember that in the last week of May Major Kitchener was charged to push on with his Foggaras towards Abu Hamad, but by the advance of the rebels, and also, perhaps, by the insubordination of Saleh, he was unable to do so, and compelled to confine himself to visiting his frontier posts of defence, and to observing and following the enemy.

The latter, who do not appear to have been very numerous, having failed in suborning his Ababdiehs, retreated at his approach.

It is undoubtedly right that we should do our utmost to know whether the forces of the rebellion be really formidable, for it would be most regrettable that the rebellion should be allowed to spread further north than necessary, or that disproportionate effort should be made to combat it.

I therefore went to the Generals and the War Minister (Nubar Pasha being away at Alexandria) and spoke respecting this necessity for more accurate information, and we agreed that Major Kitchener should be asked either to cross the desert himself to Abu Hamad, or to take steps to find out with accuracy the state of things there.

As regards Dongola, I suggested that an English and an Egyptian officer should go to Dongola to endeavour to enter into communication with the Kabbabish, and at the same time collect all obtainable information respecting that province, and also, if possible, respecting the state of things about Khartoum.

Dongola is but five days from the end of the railway from Wady Halfa, and the journey did not seem, more especially during Ramadan, a particularly dangerous

one.

It was the opinion, however, of the Minister of War (and in this Nubar Pasha, whom I saw to-day, concurred) that an Englishman might run risk from the fanaticism of the people, and for this reason the Generals did not think it necessary that an Englishman should be sent.

My idea that it would be advantageous to send an Englishman was founded on the belief that the people were less moved by fanaticism than by the desire of being on the strongest side, and that the appearance in Dongola of an English officer, combined with the news which has now spread everywhere that English regiments have been moved up the river to Keneh and Assouan, might have a good moral effect.

Sir Evelyn Wood has, in consequence of the decision arrived at, asked one of his best Egyptian officers to go to Dongola, a request which the latter at once agreed to. I may mention that a telegram asking for reinforcement has just come from the Mudir of Dongola, which mentions that he has incorporated in a new battalion (the 5th) which he is forming twenty-eight soldiers and a Lieutenant who escaped from Berber when it capitulated.

My Lord,

Mr. Egerton to Earl Granville.-(Received by telegraph, July 4.)

Cairo, July 4, 1884.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that Nubar Pasha has this afternoon shown me a telegram from the Mudir of Dongola, dated from Debbah, to-day, stating that the Mudir had informed his soldiers of the Government offer to give them a year's pay if they would hold Dongola six months longer; but that in order to hold out he wanted ammunition, men, horses, money, clothes, and the provisions necessary for the soldiers; that if these supplies were not sent, it would be excusable if he and his troops were compelled to surrender; that his soldiers had declared that if reinforcements, be they only the battalion from Wady Halfa, were not sent, they would retreat towards the north, and the consequence of this would be confusion and panic amongst the inhabitants, and this would certainly be taken advantage of by the

enemy.

Under these circumstances the Mudir repeats that it would be absolutely necessary that he should have the Wady Halfa battalion placed at his disposal, in order to maintain the authority of the Khedive amongst the population, and to save bloodshed; this he considers the sole means of preventing the loss of the province.

I asked Nubar Pasha to come with me to see Generals Stephenson and Wood, and, after consultation with them, a telegram was addressed to the Mudir, to the effect that

if he finds that he is unable to defend the province with the means at his disposal, he had better come away with those who wish to leave, after destroying the military stores which he cannot remove; arrangements would then be made to form a depôt of provisions on the road to Wady Halfa, in order to supply the refugees in their journey to Egypt.

It does not at all appear clear from the telegrams I have seen from the Mudir by what enemy he is, at present, threatened, the news furnished by him being generally most vague and unsatisfactory. It seems clear, however, that his men and he hold that more than the promise of money is necessary to induce them to defend the very important post they occupy.

Sir,

I have, &c.

EDWIN H. EGERTON.

(Signed)

No. 7.

Earl Granville to Mr. Egerton.

Foreign Office, July 4, 1884.

MR. CLIFFORD LLOYD points out in his Report, inclosed in your despatch of the Sth ultimo,* that the gaol delivery which he had commenced in consequence of the condition of the Egyptian prisons was postponed, owing to the opposition which it met with in certain quarters, upon the understanding that the work should be continued by a Commission appointed for the purpose. But that arrangement has not been carried out, and I have accordingly to instruct you to ascertain from the Egyptian Government what measures are being taken for completing this reform, the urgent necessity for which must be apparent to them.

I am, &c.

Sir,

No. 8.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Sir J. Pauncefote.-(Received July 5.)

Admiralty, July 3, 1884.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, extracts from letters dated the 14th and 16th June, from Vice-Admiral Lord John Hay, respecting the state of affairs at Suakin, and the steps that have been taken for the defence of that place.

A similar communication has been made to the War Office.

(Extract.)

Vice-Admiral Lord John Hay to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

Suakin, June 14, 1884. I HAVE not yet inspected the town of Suakin and its defences, but shall do so this evening.

Commodore Molyneux seems satisfied that the force present of marines and Egyptian troops is ample for the security of the town and the inner line of defences, including the wells.

To secure it from frequent annoyance from harassing attacks by small bodies of the enemy would require a much larger force than is now here.

The numbers that Osman Digna has collected together are variously estimated at from 5,000 to 7,000. They must, however, always labour under difficulty as regards water supply in any endeavour to make a serious attack.

Their present attempts have been in small numbers and very feeble in effect.

*See "Egypt No. 25 (1884)," p. 94, No. 163.

While the moon lasts no serious night attack could be made, and there has been no evidence as yet of any disposition to attack in daylight.

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

(Extract.)

Vice-Admiral Lord John Hay to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

"Helicon," at Suakin, June 16, 1884. REFERRING to telegrams of this date regarding the defence of Suakin and its sanitary condition, I have little to add on these subjects; nevertheless, perhaps it may be useful that I should make some few remarks.

I have been in communication with Colonel Chermside, the Civil Egyptian Governor, and I have heard the opinions of the Commodore and other officers, including Lieutenant-Colonel Ozzard, R.M.L.I.

The conclusions I have arrived at, as stated in my telegram, are that the town and its defence and wells are safe from any attack that can be reasonably anticipated.

The well forts are of a strength far exceeding anything I had imagined. This improvement is, I believe, due to the skill and energy displayed by Colonel Chermside. The great anxiety regarding Suakin, viz., in connection with its water supply, has been thus practically set at rest.

Any opinion that has been formed by those who saw Suakin at the time the troops embarked would be of little value now, as since Commodore Molyneux's arrival great improvements have been effected in the various small forts and other works in the line of defence, and new works have been made or are in progress.

The force under Osman Digna is variously estimated, but is probably more than 4,000. The distance of the wells is 12 miles, so that the supply of so great a force for a sustained attack would be a very formidable operation, and ample notice of such an intention would be received in Suakin.

The climate of Suakin is not an unhealthy one either for natives or Europeans when properly housed. But undoubtedly the marines may be expected to suffer from the long continuance of great heat, and without the comforts and protection of substantial barracks. I propose, therefore, to relieve them by means of the "Lochard," from time to time, as opportunities offer, for which purpose about a sufficient number of marines have been sent out to keep up a constant relief of the garrison of 600, which I propose for the present to maintain at Suakin.

The Commodore's arrangements for the defence of Suakin seem judicious and effective, and I think complete confidence may be felt in his performance of this duty.

The Commodore informs me that every attention is given to all his wishes by the officers in command of the Egyptian battalions. I may venture to remark that great benefit may be expected to result from this newly-formed force, gaining practice and experience as they are now doing in the presence of the enemy, under the advantage of confidence inspired by the presence of so large a body of marines associated with them for the defence of Suakin.

No. 9.

Mr. Egerton to Earl Granville.-(Received July 6.)

(Telegraphic.) Cairo, July 6, 1884, 11.45 A.M. CHERMSIDE reports that Bishareen have reported to Osman Digna of British troops being at Assouan. Other messengers brought him news from Assouan Bedouins that some British, with Ababdieh escort, had arrived. These messengers were put in irons by Osman Seyyed Mohammed. A Suakin merchant arrived near Sinkat from Kordofan, and said Osman's news generally was false. Was also put into confinement by the latter. It is clear, therefore, that Osman wishes to keep monopoly in supply of information.