Knowing how earnestly sands constantly you wish for peace, I cannot lend a letter to you without dropping a word on that subject; to mark that my wishes are still in unison with yours. After the barbarities your nation has exercised against us, I am almost ashamed to own that I feel sometimes for here misfortunesandscher insanities. Your veins are openy and your best blood continually running. You have now got a little ariny into Georgia, and are thumphing in thate success. Dovyduiexpect ever to seo that army again? I know not what General Lincoln or General Thompson may be able to effect against them; but if they stay through the summer in that climate, there is ad certain General Fever that I apprehend will give a good account of most of them. Perhaps you comfort yourselves that our loss of blood is as great as yours. But as physicians say, there is a great differences in the facility of repairing that loss between lan old body and a youngone.America adds tos herq numbers annually $150,000 souls. She therefore grows faster than you can diminish her, and will out-grow all the mischief you can do her. Have you the same prospects? But it is unnecessary for me to represent to you, or you to me, the mischiefs each nation is subjected to by the warts we all see clear enough the nonsense of continuing it; the difficulty is where to find sense enough to put an end to it.Adieu, my dear friend, and believe me, &c. B.FRANKLIN, 900shing Isandoq belico a janz digi

FROM DAVID HARTLEY, ESQ. TO DR. FRANKLIN. to to 99

MY DEAR FRIEND,

London, April 22, 1779.

The bearer of this and some other pa

pers (Mr.) is a very sensible and worthy gentleman,

with whom I had the pleasure of contracting an acquaintance since the commencement of the American troubles, originally upon the business of the American prisoners. It as a satisfaction to me at all times to have found him a friend to the restoration of peace between the two countries. It has likewise been an additional satisfaction and confirmation to me in my own thoughts upon that subject, to find that his sentiments, I think upon most, or all of the subjeats upon which we have conversed, have coincided with mine. We both seem possessed of the opinion, that some plan of opening a negociation, upon preliminaries, which each side might find to be a sufficient security to itself, might be practicable: land then, your sentiment, which you gave ome in a letter some years ago, might have it's free scope and effect, viz. A little time given for cooling might have excellent effectssorg & siarad yse by: 26 Jul

The sentiments I have opened to you in my late letters for some months past, and which I have reduced in an inclosed paper, into a more specific shape, seem to me, upon very repeated reflection, storopromise the fairest ground of good expectation. These propositions originate from myself, as admediator. I have communications with both sides, buts no authority to make proposals from either; and perhaps neither side, if dowere to put the propositions separately to each (being myself unauthorized) might give me positive consent. Each side separately might say No, from what is called political prudence; and yet each side nught secretly wish that the offer could be made, with a done first from the other party. I think the proposition of a truce for five or seven years, leaving all things in the present dispute in statu quo, must be advantageous to all parties, if it were only in consideration that a general satis

factory peace to all parties may come among the excellent effects of time given for cooling. We can but fight it out at last. War never comes too late; wisdom may step in between.These matters have stolen upon us, and have arisen to great and formidable consequences from small and unexpected beginnings; but henceforward, we should know by experience what to expect. 19If the rage of war could but be abated, for a sufficient length of time for reason and reflection to operate, I think it would never revive. I cannot pretend to forecast the result of any negociation, but I think war would snotdrevives which is all that I want for my argument. Peace is a bonum in sewhereas the most favourable events of war are but relatively, lesser evil; certainly they are evils malu in se, not bona in sew oe for on it hard. 19 LÀ GÌ'SI ad hope that awcessation of hostilities would produce a renewal of reflection but even toli take the argunient at the worst advantaged the two parties are at a cooling distance of three thousand miles asunder. If the flames of war could be but once extinguished, does not the Atlantic ocean contain cold water enough to prevent their bursting out again ?I am very strongly of opinione that the two nations of Great Britain and North America, would accord to the proposition of antrace for cooling.I cannot say whether a Britishs ministry would accord to it, because they wont tell metersnor canel say whether an American plenipotentiary would accord to it, because probably you will not tell me put myself into your hands however, when I tell you frankly I am of opinion that both would accord to it, if there could be a done first on either side, to bind the bargain first. You have the odds of me in this matter, because you know one half of the question;

and I cannot give you any proof on the other side, but only my own presumptive judgment, upon observation, and upon a course of reasoning in my own thoughts así te sv But for France my judgment would be, that if the tif, proposition of the proposed preliminaries should he agrees able to America, France would do very unhandsomely to defeat it by their refusabord likewise think it the interest of France, because their interest leads them to go htona certain point, and no further. There is a disparity in the operation of the terms of the alliance on the part of France, and on the part of America. The more vigour ously France interposes, the better for America; impro portion to their exertions, they create, less or more, diversion of the British force; this reasoning goes straight forward for America; but it is not so with France. There issan certain points to France, beyond which their work would fails and recoil upon themselves; if they werento drive the British ministrys totally to abandon the American war, it would become totally a French was The events of a twelvemonth past seem to bear testimony to this course of reasoning. The disadvantage upon the bargain, 40 America, is, that the efficacy of the French alliance to them presupposes their continuance in the war.anoTh demur to France is, that the liberation of their new ally recoils with double weight of the war upon themsel without any ulterior points of advantage in view, as de pendent upon that alliance.bob think the interest of all parties coincides with the proposition of preliminaries. The proposed preliminaries appear to me to be just and equitable to all parties; but the great object with me is to come to some preliminaries; I could almost add, whatever those preliminaries might be, provided a suspension

of arms for an adequate term of years were one, Ithink it would be ten thousand to one against any future renewal of the war. It is not necessary to enter at large into the reasons which induce me to think; that the British ministry as well as the American plenipotentiary would consent to the terms of the proposed preliminaries for indeed I do not know that dan founded in that opinion with respect to either, but stillel believe sit of bothon But what dán g private person do in such a case wishing to be a mediator for peace, having access too both parties, but equally unt certain of the reception of this mediation on either side ? Imust hesitate to take any publics step, as by a proposi tion in parliaments or hyany other means to drive the parties to an explanation upon any specific proposals; and yet I am very unwilling to det the session pass without some proposition, upon which the parties may meet, if they should be so inclined, bass I suspect them to beI have been endeavouring to feel pulses for some months, butrallnis dumb show. I cannot say indeed that I meet with any thing discouraging; to my apprehension, either as to equitableness or practicability of the proposition for preliminaries. Ifaly could but simply receive sufficient encouragement that should not run any hazard of obstructing any other practicable propositions, by obtruding mine, I should be very much satisfied to come forward, in that case, with mine, fosfurnish ar beginning at least which might lead to peace, ‚elov vlenmort

There is nothing that I wish so much as to have an opportunity of seeing and conversing with you, having many things to say to you ; but if that cannot yet happen, I have only to say, that whatever communication you may think proper to make to me which may lead to peace,

V