Britain in relation to the question of blockade apart from the general orders in council. This was made one of the causes of the war in Madison's war message of June 1, 1812, and repeated in the report of the Committee on Foreign Relations two days later.

94

As early as 1800 Marshall, then Secretary of State, protested against the English blockade of Dutch ports, on the ground that they were "not effectually blockaded by a force capable of completely investing them." The British in this instance held that if the blockade was generally maintained it was sufficient, and that an occasional absence of a fleet from a blockaded port did not impair it. Marshall conceded that if such absence were occasioned by storm or accident that claim might hold, but not when a fleet was applied only a part of the time to maintain a blockade. A similar protest was made by the United States in 1801, in connection with the attempted blockade of Gibraltar by Spain. Again, in 1803, the American Government protested against the British order of June 17 of that year which declared the islands of Martinique and Guadaloupe in a state of blockade; the question in this case being a lack of previous notification and the fact that the islands themselves, instead of specific ports, were declared blockaded. In a note to the British representative at Washington, Secretary Madison wrote that the United

94 Marshall to King, Sept. 20, 1800; American State Papers,

States held such a blockade illegal; that she accepted as a proper definition of a blockade that which Great Britain herself had agreed to in a treaty with Russia in 1801, namely: "That in order to determine what characterizes a blockaded port, that denomination is given only to a port where there is, by the dispositions of the Power which attacks it with ships stationary or sufficiently near, an evident danger of entering."95 This was the definition which the American Government insisted upon in all the various negotiations carried on with the British Government. All blockades which were not confined to specific ports or places and which were not backed up by a force sufficient to endanger an attempt to enter were regarded as illegal and denominated mere fictitious or paper blockades. The United States also claimed that a notification should be announced in advance, and that individual ships sailing in ignorance of the blockade should be warned before attempting to enter the blockaded port.

The draft of the treaty which, in 1804, Monroe was instructed to present to the British Government contained articles upon blockade which declared that the term "blockaded port" should be applied "only to a port where there is, by the disposition of the Power which attacks it with ships stationary or sufficiently near, an evident danger in entering. . . . It is agreed

95 Madison to Thornton, Oct. 27, 1803; American State

that no vessel sailing from the ports of either [party] shall, although cleared or bound to a blockaded port, be considered as violating in any manner the blockade, unless on her approach towards such port she shall have been previously warned against entering the same."9" In the instructions given to Monroe and Pinkney May 17, 1806, Madison urged the importance of securing from the British Government an agreement upon the question of blockade. He dwelt especially upon the point of notification. In the proposed treaty which was signed by Monroe and Pinkney with Lord Holland and Lord Auckland, provision was made with reference to notification of vessels, similar to that contained in the Jay treaty of 1794; but no statement relative to the definition of blockade was given. This was one of the objections made by President Jefferson to the proposed treaty. After its rejection by the President, the American ministers attempted to secure an article upon blockade exactly like the one included in the draft of the treaty proposed in 1804.o Inasmuch as the Monroe-Pinkney negotiations upon all subjects failed, no advance was made on the subject of blockade.

98

In connection with the British order in council of

96 Convention between the United States and Great Britain; American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 82-83.

27 Madison to Monroe and Pinkney, May 20, 1807; American State Papers, For. Rel., III., 166–173.

98 Monroe and Pinkney to Canning, July 24, 1807; Ameri

A

May 16, 1806, the United States held that Great Britain attempted to establish a blockade contrary to the usages of nations, and this became a subject of discussion in all the subsequent negotiations over the orders in council. Great Britain insisted that it was a legitimate blockade which she was able to maintain with an adequate force.

CHAPTER III

DECLARATION OF WAR AND PEACE PROPOSALS

The negotiations of three administrations failing to remove the causes of grievance of the United States against Great Britain, the war cloud which had long been upon the horizon now drifted nearer. If the United States, prior to the declaration of war, had been represented at the court of St. James by a minister plenipotentiary of the ability of Albert Gallatin, instead of by a mere chargé d'affaires in the person of Jonathan Russell, it is possible that the war might have been averted; but, under the circumstances, there was much justification for the position of the ruling party at Washington, that the honor and independence of the United States were involved and that nothing short of war would now avail. Though there were undoubtedly sufficient reasons for war, not only with Great Britain, but also with France, they all would have disappeared upon the restoration of peace between those two countries.

The question of war with Great Britain was not settled wholly upon the grounds of justice or expediency. It became, fundamentally, a party issue. The Democratic party, constitutionally averse to Great