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perceyued, but by some exterior signe, and that is either by laudable reporte, or excellencie in vesture, or other thinge semblable. But reporte is nat so commune a token as apparayle. For in olde tyme kynges ware crownes of golde, and knightes onely ware chaynes. Also the moste noble of the


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the sensibility of the man to those indications of general Esteem. In Civil Society are established marks of Public Honour, as Rank, Titles, Decorations, and the like.'- Whewell, Elem. of Morality, p. 90, 4th ed.

• Selden, who has written a learned discourse on this subject, says, “Th diadem strictly was a very different thing from what a crown now is or was. And it was no other than only a fillet of silk, linnen, or some such thing. Nor appears it that any other kind of crown was used for a Royal Ensigne, except only in some kingdoms of Asia, but this kind of fillet, untill the beginning of Christianitie in the Roman Empire. After referring to the crown of gold which David is said (2 Sam. xii. 30) to have taken from the spoils of the Ammonites, and to those worn by the Persian kings, he says that in the Roman Empire the laurel or fillet was the usual mark of dignity, and that Aurelian was the first to adopt the diadem. “But not long after Aurelian the diadem became in Constantine the Great a continuall wearing. Habitum regium gemmis, et caput exornans perpetuo diademate, saies Victor (Epit. cap. xli. 14). After Constantine this kind of diadem was in common use, but so that his neerer successors did not so scrupulously alwaies reject the Laurel as he had done ; at least, in their coins it is not alwaies omitted. But the fashion of their Diadems (as farre as I haue obserued) continued most usually the same with that of Constantine. And thence it is that S. Hierom speaks of ardentes Diadematum gemmas regum in his time. But afterward the Imperiall diadem became to be ordinarily increast with additions of other parts that went from eare to eare ouer the crown of the head, and at length over a gold Helme on a cap, which made it somewhat like the close crowns of later time worn upon caps. And of the Helme together with this Diadem was the close crown of the Eastern Empire (as I think) since composed . . . The use of crowns and coronations thus deduced from Constantine the Great was an example which the rest of the Kings of Europe followed. The Kings of France had crowns in their inaugurations before the beginning of the Western Empire ... Among the English kings Geoffrey of Monmouth saies that King Athelstan first used it.'-- Titles of Honor, cap. viii. pp. 156-169.

Segar, Norroy king-at-arms in the reign of Elizabeth, deduces the custom of Knights being invested with chains or collars from the Romans, and says, 'It hath bene also a custome ancient, that Princes did giue collars as a singular demonstration of fauour and honour. Plinie reporteth that the Romanes did giue unto their confederates a collar of gold, and to their owne citizens a collar of siluer. (Nat. Hist. lib. xxxiii. cap. 10.) When Manlius in single combat had slaine a French man (sic), he tooke from him a collar of golde, all bloodie, and put the same about his owne necke in token of victorie. After which time he was

Romanes ware sondry garlandes, whereby was perceyued their

O creatures moste unkynde and barrayne of Justyce that will denie that thinge to their god and creatour, whiche of very duetie and right is gyuen to hym by good reason afore all princes, whiche in a degree incomparable be his subiectes and vassals. By whiche oppinion they seme to despoyle hym of reuerence, which shal cause all obedience to cease, wherof

surnamed Torquatus, because Torques in the Latine signifieth a collar or chaine ... It is also seene that Princes soueraigne doe at this day bestow chaines or small collars upon men of vertue or fauour, and in token thereof (for the most part) a picture or model of the giuer is thereat pendant, which collar the Knight or Gentleman that receiueth it ought carefully to keepe during his life.'-Honor, p. 61, ed. 1602. Ashmole, who was Windsor Herald in Charles the Second's reign, denies that the collar or chain was an emblem of the Equestrian Order among the Romans, but quotes authorities to prove that it was an ensign of knightly dignity among the Germans, and says, “ It may be safely presumed that collars were badges of knighthood among the ancient Gauls, since they were bestowed upon valiant men, and such as had rendered themselves conspicuous by acts of prowess and chivalry, as a worthy recompense of their virtue. And from Pliny it appears that the ancient Gauls were wont to wear them in fight, for as Scheffer notes upon his words, no other thing can be understood by the word "auro" than torques. The like may be said of the ancient Britons, Danes, and Goths, among whom it was customary to wear them, as denoting such as were remarkable for their valour. But in later times it was the peculiar fashion of Knigits among us to wear golden collars, composed of SS or other various works, so that those monuments are known to belong to Knights, on whose portraitures such ornaments are now found.'-Order of the Garter, p. 30, ed. 1672.

• Aulus Gellius devotes a chapter of the Noctes Atticæ, lib. v. cap. 6, to the description of the various wreaths, and the causes for which they were bestowed, whilst Tertullian examines at some length in his book De Corond Militis, the origin and object of this form of decoration, and condemns it as savouring of idolatry. At a still earlier date the Greeks were in the habit of bestowing olive garlands as rewards for distinguished merit. Athenienses hoc invento gloriantur, ut qui primi oleaginâ coronâ de Republicâ bene meritos cives, et fortes Imperatores ac duces decoraverint, quam quidem ex oleâ ad honorem Palladis, virtutis ac sapientiæ Deæ, fieri voluerunt. Et coronatus dicitur Thrasybulus, qui patriam à tyrannis liberavit, quem fide, constantiâ, et animi magnitudine, nemo Atheniensium unquam vicit, duxitque satis pro meritis suis in patriam oleaginam coronam esse, cum magna munera et patriæ prope imperium ei deberetur.'—Patrizi, De Instit. Reipub. I b. ix. tit. 6. In Sparta such garlands were held in particular esteem, as being the emblems of emancipation ; thus, in the account of the enfranchisement of the 2,000 Helots who were afterwards assassinated in the eighth year of the Pelopon

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will ensue utter confusion, if good christen princes meued with zeale do nat shortely prouide to extincte utterly all suche opinions.


The thre noble counsayles of reason, societie, and knowlege. VERELY the knowlege of Justyce is nat so difficile or harde to be attayned unto by man as it is communely supposed, if he wolde nat willingly abandone the excellencie of his propre nature, and folisshely applicate him selfe to the nature of creatures unreasonable, in the stede of reason embrasinge sensualitie, and for societie and beneuolence folowinge wilfulnesse and malice, and for knowlege, blynde ignoraunce and forgetfulnesse. Undoughtedly reason, societie called company, and knowlege remayninge, Justice is at hande, and as she were called for, ioyneth her selfe to that company, which by her feloship is made inseperable ; wherby hapneth (as I mought


nesian war, we read that οι μεν εστεφανώσαντό τε και τα ιερά περιήλθον ώς ήλευθεpwuévou.—Thucyd. lib. iv. cap. 80.

• The view held by Hume was that this virtue (Justice) derives its existence entirely from its necessary use to the intercourse and social state of mankind,' but this notion is now generally rejected. “That justice is highly useful and necessary in society, and, on that account, ought to be loved and esteemed by all that love mankind, will readily be granted. And as justice is a social virtue, it is true also, that there could be no exercise of it, and perhaps we should have no conception of it, without society. But this is equally true of the natural affections of benevo. lence, gratitude, friendship, and compassion, which Mr. Hume makes to be the natural virtues.'-Reid's Works, vol. ii. p. 652, ed. 1863.

Mr. Hume, in arguing that public utility is the sole origin of justice, supposes a state of human nature in which all society and intercourse between man and man is cut off, and thence infers that so solitary a being would be as much incapable of justice as of social discourse and conversation,' but the answer to this is that a being so situated would be equally incapable of all such virtues of the affections as friendship, generosity, compassion. “If this argument,' says Dr. Reid, “prove justice to be an artificial virtue, it will, with equal force, prove every social virtue to be artificial.'—Works, vol. ii. p. 660, ed. 1863.


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saye) a vertuous and moste blessed conspiracie. And in thre very shorte preceptes or aduertisementes man is persuaded to receyue and honoure iustyce. Reason bedynge him do the same thinge to an other that thou woldest haue done to the.b Societie (without which mannes lyfe is unpleasaunt and full of anguisshe") sayeth, Loue thou thy neighbour as thou doest

• This is in accordance with the theory of Plato, who by analogy to the constitution of the perfect state before alluded to, considered the soul as tripartite, and composed of three faculties or elements : (1) Reason, the governing principle ; (2) Energy or the irascible passions ; (3) Appetite, or the concupiscible passions. When each of these three faculties of the mind confined itself to its proper office, without attempting to encroach upon that of any other ; when Reason governed, and the Passions obeyed, then the result was that complete virtue which Plato denominated Justice. Και ανδρείον δή, οιμαι, τούτω τώ μέρει καλούμεν ένα έκαστον, όταν αυτού το θυμοειδές διασώζη διά τε λυπών και ηδονών το υπό του λόγου παραγγελθέν δεινόν τε και μή. Ορθώς γ, έφη. Σοφόν δέ γε εκείνη τη σμικρό μέρει το και ήρχε τ' εν αυτώ και ταύτα παρήγγελλεν, έχον αυ κακείνο επιστήμην εν αυτή την του ξυμφέροντος εκάστω τε και όλο το κοινό σφών αυτών τριών όντων. Πάνυ μεν ούν. Τί δέ ; σώφρονα ου τη φιλία και ξυμφωνία τη αυτών τούτων, όταν το τε άρχον και το αρχομένω το λογιστικών δμοδοξώσι δείν άρχειν και μη στασιάζωσιν αυτά; Σωφροσύνη γούν, ή δ' ός, ουκ άλλο τί έστιν, και τούτο, πολεώς τε και ιδιώτου. Αλλά μεν δή δίκαιός γε, και πολλάκις λέγομεν, τούτω και ούτως έσται. Πολλή ανάγκη. Τί ούν;

είπον εγώ μή πη ημίν απαμβλύνεται άλλο τι δικαιοσύνη δοκείν είναι, ή όπερ εν τη πόλει εφάνη; Ουκ έμοιγε, έφη, δοκεί. -Do Rep. lib. iv. cap. 16.

• The idea contained in this sentence was expanded by Hobbes in the following manner. • There is an easy rule to know upon a sudden, whether the action I be to do, be against the law of nature or not. And it is but this, That a man imagine himself in the place of the party with whom he hath to do, and reciprocally him in his. Which is no more but changing (as it were) of the scales. For every man's passion weigheth heavy in his own scale, but not in the scale of his neighbour. And this rule is very well known and expressed in this old dictate : ‘Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.'-Works, p. 46, ed. 1750. According to Gibbon this maxim of justice was promulgated, four hundred years before the publication of the Gospel, in a moral treatise of Isocrates : & πάσχοντες υφ' ετέρων οργίζεσθε, ταύτα τοις άλλοις μη ποιείτε. ---See Decline and Fall of Rom. Emp. vol. vii. p. 6ι, note, ed. 1855.

• 'Man,' says the writer so often quoted, 'is a gregarious, or more properly a social animal. He is nowhere found, nor can he exist, in any other state than in Society of some form or other ... Men desire to act, and are fitted to act, in common; declaring and enforcing rules by which the conduct of all shall be governed: they thus act as governors, legislators, judges, subjects, citizens. Without such community of action, and such common rules really enforced, there can be no tolerable comfort, peace, or order. Without civil society, man cannot act as man.'—Whewell, El. of Mor, pp. 36, 37.

thy selfe. And that sentence or precept came from heuyn, whan societie was firste ordayned of god, and is of suche autoritie that the onely sonne of god beinge demaunded of a doctor of lawe whiche is the great commaundement in the lawe of god, aunswered, Thou shalte loue thy lorde god with all

Mat. xxii. thy harte, and in all thy soule, and in all thy mynde, that is the firste and great commaundement. The seconde is lyke to the same Thou shalte loue thy neyghbour as thy selfe. In these two commaundementes do depende all the lawe and prophetes. Beholde howe our sauiour Christe ioyneth beneuolence with the loue of god, and nat onely maketh it the seconde precept, but also resembleth it unto the firste ?

Knowlege also, as a perfeyte instructrice and mastresse, in a more briefe sentence than yet hath ben spoken, declareth by what meane the sayd preceptes of reason and societie may be well understande, and therby iustice finally executed.b

That this The words be these in latine, Nosce te ipsum, whiche is sentence in englysshe, know thy selfe. This sentence is of olde nosce te ip

sum knowe writars supposed for to be firste spoken by Chilo or thy selfe some other of the seuen auncient Greekes called in latin Sapientes, in englysshe sages or wise men. Other knowlege do accomodate it to Apollo, whome the paynimes ho- of iustyce.


to the verye


· See Matt. xxii. 35-40.

By the expression knowledge,' or 'self-knowledge,' the author probably intended to designate Conscience or a Moral Sense or Moral Faculty. So interpreted, the explanation of Justice given in the text would seem to anticipate the definition of that virtue proposed by modern intuitive moralists. Thus Dr. Reid says, “It may be granted to Mr. Hume, that men have no conception of the virtue of justice till they have lived some time in society. It is purely a moral conception, and our moral conceptions and moral judgments are not born with us. They grow up by degrees, as our reason does. Nor do I pretend to know how early, or in what order, we acquire the conception of the several virtues. The conception of justice supposes some exercise of the moral faculty, which, being the noblest part of the human constitution, and that to which all its other parts are subservient, appears latest.'—Works, vol. ii. p. 653, ed. 1863.

• . Rursus mortales oraculorum societatem dedere Chiloni Lacedæmonio, tria præcepta ejus Delphis consecrando, aureis literis, quæ sunt hæc: Nosse se quemque ; et nihil nimium cupere ; comitemque æris alieni atque litis esse miseriam.'—Plin.

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