Cato.

The constance of Cato Uticensis was all waye immoueable, in so moche as at sondry tymes, whanne he in the Senate egrely defended the publike weale with vehement and longe orations, agayne the attemptates of ambicious persones, he was by them rebuked and committed to prisone. But he therfore nat cessynge, but goinge towarde prisone, detected to the people, as he went, the unlefull purposes and enterprises of them by whome he was punisshed with the peryle that was imminent to the publike weale. Whiche he dyd with suche courage and eloquence that as well the Senate as the people drewe so about him, that his aduersaries were fayne for feare to discharge him. Who can sufficiently commende this noble man Cato, whan he redeth in the warkes of Plutarche of his excellent courage and vertue?a Howe moche worthyar had he bene to haue hadde Homere, the trumpe of his fame immortall, than Achilles, who for a lytle wenche contended with Agamemnon onely, where Cato, for the conseruation of the weale publike contended, and also resisted agayne Julius Ceasar and the greatte Pompey, and nat onely agayne theyr exanimatione totius exercitus, in oppidum castris propinquum defertur. Jacebat æger Tarsi, inque valetudine ejus adversa instantis victoriæ spes fluctuabat. Itaque convocati medici attentissimo consilio salutis remedia circumspiciebant. Qui cum ad unam potionem sententiam direxissent, atque eam Philippus medicus suis manibus temperatam Alexandro (erat autem ipsius amicus et comes) porrexisset, à Parmenione missæ literæ superveniunt, admonentes, ut rex insidias Philippi, perinde ac pecuniâ corrupti à Dario, caveret. Quas cum legisset, sine ullâ cunctatione medicamentum bausit, ac tunc legendas Philippo tradidit. Pro quo tam constanti erga amicum judicio, dignissimam à Diis immortalibus mercedem recepit: qui incolumitatis ejus præsidium falso interpellari indicio noluerunt.'Val. Max. lib. iii. cap. 8, ext. 6.

· Επαρθεὶς οὖν ὁ Καῖσαρ ἄλλον εἰσέφερε νόμον τὴν Καμπανίαν σχεδὸν ὅλην προσκατανέμοντα τοῖς ἀπόροις καὶ πένησιν. ̓Αντέλεγε δὲ οὐδεὶς πλὴν τοῦ Κάτωνος. Καὶ τοῦτον ἀπὸ τοῦ βήματος ὁ Καῖσαρ εἷλκεν εἰς δεσμωτήριον οὐδέν τι μᾶλλον ὑφιέμενον τῆς παῤῥησίας, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ βαδίζειν ἅμα περὶ τοῦ νόμου διαλεγόμενον καὶ παραινοῦντα παύσασθαι τοιαῦτα πολιτευομένους. Ἐπηκολούθει δὲ ἡ βουλὴ μετὰ κατηφείας καὶ τοῦ δήμου τὸ βέλτιστον ἀγανακτοῦν σίωπῇ καὶ ἀχθόμενον, ὥστε τὸν Καίσαρα μὴ λαν θάνειν βαρέως φέροντας, ἀλλὰ φιλονεικῶν καὶ περιμένων ὑπὸ τοῦ Κάτωνος ἐπίκλησιν γενέσθαι καὶ δέησιν προηγεν. Ἐπεὶ δὲ ἐκεῖνος ἦν δῆλος οὐδὲ μελλήσων τι ποιεῖν, ἡττηθεὶς ὑπὸ αἰσχύνης καὶ ἀδοξίας ὁ Καῖσαρ αὐτός τινα τῶν δημάρχων ὑφῆκε πείσας ¿¿‹λéσbai Tòv Károva.-Plut. Cato Minor, 33.

menaces, but also agayne theyr desyres and offres of aliaunce? Where of I wolde gladly haue made a remembrance in this warke if the volume there by shulde nat to moche haue increased, and becomen unhandsome.

Undoughtedly, constaunce is an honourable vertue, as inconstance is reprochefull and odious. Wherfore, that man whiche is mutable for euerye occasyon, muste nedes often repente hym, and in moche repentance is nat only moche foly, but also great detriment, whiche euery wyse man wyll eschue if he can. Wherfore to gouernours nothing is more propre than to be in theyr lyuyng stable and constant.

CHAPTER XX.

The true signification of Temperaunce a morall vertue. THIS blessed companye of vertues in this wyse assembled, foloweth Temperaunce, as a sad and discrete matrone and reuerent gouernesse, awaitinge diligently that in any wyse voluptie or concupiscence haue no preeminence in the soule of man. Aristotle defineth this vertue to be a mediocrite in the

pleasures of the body, specially in taste and touching. Arist. Eth. Therfore he that is temperate fleeth pleasures vo

⚫ 'Do nothing without advice, and when thou hast once done repent not.'Ecclesiasticus xxxii. 19. Montaigne was of the same opinion as Sir T. Elyot, for he says: 'Au demourant, ie hais cet accidental repentir que l'aage apporte . . . Si j'avois à revivre, ie revivrois comme i'ay vescu: ny ie ne plainds le passé, ny ie ne crainds l'advenir; et, si ie ne me deceois, il est allé du dedans environ comme du dehors.'-Essais, tom. iii. pp. 344, 347.

Adam Smith says: 'In the command of the appetites of the body consists that virtue which is properly called Temperance. To restrain them within those bounds, which regard to health and fortune prescribes, is the part of Prudence. But to confine them within those limits, which grace, which propriety, which delicacy, and modesty, require, is the office of Temperance.'- Theory of Mor. Sent. p. 34, ed. 1853.

Περὶ ἡδονὰς δὲ καὶ λύπας οὐ πάσας, ἧττον δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰς λύπας, μεσότης μὲν σωφροσύνη, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ ἀκολασία. Περὶ τὰς τοιαύτας δὴ ἡδονὰς ἡ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἡ

luptuous, and with the absence of them is nat discontented, and from the presence of them he wyllyngly abstayneth.3 But in myne oppinion, Plotinus, the wonderfull philosopher, maketh an excellent definition of temperaunce, sayenge, that the propretie or office therof is to couaite nothynge whiche maye be repented, also nat to excede the boundes of medyocritye, and to kepe desyre under the yocke of reason.b He that practiseth this vertue is called a temperate man, and he that doeth contrarye there to is named intemperate. Betwene whome and a persone incontynent Aristotelle maketh this diuersytye; that he is intemperate, whyche by his owne election is ladde, supposynge that the pleasure that is presente, or (as I mought saye) in ure shulde all waye be folowed. But the persone incontinent supposeth nat so, and yet he nat withstandinge dothe folowe it. The same autour also maketh a diuersitie betwene hym that is temperate and him that is continent; sayeng, that the continent man is suche one that no thinge will do for bodely pleasure whiche shall stande ἀκολασία ἐστὶν ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, ὅθεν ἀνδραποδώδεις καὶ θηριώδεις φαίνονται· αὗται δ' εἰσὶν ἁφή καὶ γεῦσις.—Arist. Eth. Nic, lib. ii. cap. 7 ; lib. iii. cap. 10. (13).

Ὁ δὲ σώφρων (λέγεται) τῷ μὴ λυπεῖθαι τῇ ἀπουσίᾳ καὶ τῷ ἀπέχεσθαι τοῦ ἡδέος. Arist. Eth. Nic. lib. iii. cap. II. (13).

This is not the author's own opinion, but is merely copied from Patrizi, who says: Academici palæstram doloris fortitudini relinquentes, dicunt temperantiam cerni in prætermittendis voluptatibus. Quâ opinione ductus, Plotinus Platonicus temperantiæ munus esse dixit, nihil appetere pœnitendum, nullâ in re metain moderationis excedere, et sub jugum rationis cupiditatem domare.'-De Regno a Reg. Instit. lib. vi. tit. 18. And Patrizi himself has taken the definition at second hand from Macrobius' Commentary on the Somnium Scipionis, as is evident on comparing the following passage in the latter: "Sed Plotinus inter philosophiæ professores cum Platone princeps, libro de virtutibus, gradus earum verâ et naturali divisionis ratione compositos per ordinem digerit . . . Temperantiæ (est) nihil appetere pœnitendum, in nullo legem moderationis excedere, sub jugum rationis cupiditatem domare.'—Lib. i. cap. 8, $$ 5, 7. The so-called definition, it may be observed, is not to be found in Plotinus, but is simply part of an abridgment by Macrobius of the works of that philosopher.

Ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀκόλαστος ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἡδέων πάντων ἢ τῶν μάλιστα, καὶ ἄγεται ὑπὸ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ὥστε ἀντὶ τῶν ἄλλων ταῦθ' αἱρεῖσθαι· διὸ καὶ λυπεῖται καὶ ἀποτυγ Xávwv kal èmiðvμŵv.- Arist. Eth. Nic. lib. iii. cap. 11. (14).

agayne reason.

The same is he which is temperate, sauynge that the other hathe corrupte desyres, whiche this man lacketh. Also the temperate man deliteth in nothynge contrarye to reason. But he that is continent deliteth, yet will he nat be ladde agayne reason. Finally, to declare it in fewe wordes, we may well calle hym a temperate man that desireth the thynge whiche he aught to desire, and as he aught to desyre, and whanne he aught to desyre.b Nat withstandynge there be diuers other vertues whiche do seme to be as it were companyons with temperaunce. Of whome (for the exchuynge of tediousenes) I wyll speke nowe onely of two, moderation and sobrenesse, whiche no man (I suppose) doughteth to be of suche efficacie, that without them no man may attayne unto wisedome, and by them wisedome is sonest espied.

CHAPTER XXI.

Of Moderation a spice of temperance.

MODERATION is the limites and boundes whiche honestie hath appoynted in spekynge and doynge; lyke as in rennynge passynge the gole is accounted but rasshenesse, so rennynge halfe waye is reproued for slownesse. In like wise wordes and

• Ο τε γὰρ ἐγκρατὴς οἷος μηδὲν παρὰ τὸν λόγον διὰ τὰς σωματικὰς ἡδονὰς ποιεῖν καὶ ὁ σώφρων, ἀλλ ̓ ὁ μὲν ἔχων ὁ δ ̓ οὐκ ἔχων φαύλας ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος οἷος μὴ ἥδεσθαι παρὰ τὸν λόγον, ὁ δ ̓ οἷος ἥδεσθαι ἀλλὰ μὴ ἄγεσθαι.—Arist. Eth. Nic. lib. vii. cap. 9. (11).

· Διὸ δεῖ τοῦ σώφρονος τὸ ἐπιθυμητικὸν συμφωνεῖν τῷ λόγῳ· σκοπὸς γὰρ ἀμφοῖν τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐπιθυμεῖ ὁ σώφρων ὧν δεῖ καὶ ὡς δεῖ καὶ ὅτε· οὕτω δὲ τάττει καὶ δ Xóyos.-Arist. Eth. Nic. lib. iii. cap. 12. (15).

• These are enumerated by Patrizi as follows: Temperantiam comitantur modestia, verecundia, pudor, abstinentia, castitas, honestas, moderatio, parcitas, sobrietas, pudicitia.'-De Regno et Reg. Inst. lib. vi. tit. 18.

This metaphor, as usual, is borrowed from Patrizi, who says: 'Moderatio actionem metitur, ne fines, quos honestas præscripsit, aut non attingat, aut longius progrediatur. Ut enim in currendi certaminibus, ultra metas currere temeritatis

actes be the paces, wherin the witte of man maketh his course, and moderation is in stede of the gole, whiche if he passe ouer, he is noted either of presumption or of foole hardinesse; if he come short of the purpose, he is contemned as dulle, and unapte to affaires of great importaunce. This vertue shall best be perceiued by rehersinge of examples shewed by noble men, whiche is in effecte but dayly experience.

Fabius Maximus, beinge fyue tymes Consul, perceyuinge his father, his graundefather, and great graundefather, and diuers other his auncetours to haue had often tymes that most honorable dignitie, whan his sonne, by the uniuersall consent of the people, shulde be also made consul, he ernestly intreated the people to spare his sonne, and to gyue to the house of Fabius as hit were a vacation tyme from that honoure, nat for that he hadde anye mystrust in his sonnes vertue and honesty, but that his moderation was suche that he wolde nat that excellent dignitie shulde alway continue in one familie. Scipio Affricanus the elder, whan the senate and people had purposed that accordinge to his merites he shuld haue certaine statues or images set in al courtes and places of assembly, also they wold haue set his image in triumphant apparaile within the capitole, and haue granted to him to haue ben consul and Dictator during his lyfe; he, nat withstandyng, wolde nat suffre that anye of them shulde be decreed, either by the acte of the senate, or by the peoples suffrage. Where in

esse videtur, sic vix è carceribus progredi, ignaviæ.'-De Regno et Reg. Inst. lib. vi. tit. 24.

So Montaigne says: 'L'archer qui oultrepasse le blanc fault, comme celuy qui n'y arrive pas ; et les yeulx me troublent à monter à coup vers une grande lumiere, esgalement comme à devaler à l'ombre.'—Essais, tom. i. p. 295.

Fabius vero Maximus cum à se quinquies, et à patre, avo, proavo, majoribusque suis sæpenumero consulatum gestum animadverteret, comitiis, quibus filius ejus summo consensu consul creabatur, quàm potuit constanter cum populo egit, "ut vacationem aliquando hujus honoris Fabiæ genti darent:" non quòd filii virtutibus diffideret (erat enim illustris), sed ne maximum imperium in unâ familiâ continuaretur. Quid hâc moderatione valentius, aut efficacius; quæ etiam patrios affectus qui potentissimi habentur, superavit?'-Val. Max. lib. iv. cap. 1, § 5.