EXTRACTS FROM THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CON- PORTIONS OF THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL, MADE AUGUST 6, 1787, RE- ART. V.-Sect. 1. The Senate of the United States shall be chosen by the legislatures of the several States. Each legislature shall choose two members. Vacancies may be supplied by the executive until the next meeting of the legislature. Each member shall have one vote. Sect. 2. The Senators shall be chosen for six years; but immediately after the first election they shall be divided, by lot, into three classes, as nearly as may be, numbered one, two, and three. The seats of the members of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year; of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year; of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year; so that a third part of the members may be chosen every second year. Sect. 3. Every member of the Senate shall be of the age of thirty years at least; shall have been a citizen in the United States for at least four years before his election; and shall be, at the time of his election, a resident of the State for which he shall be chosen. Sect. 4. The Senate shall choose its own President and other officers. ART. VI. Sect. 1. The times, and places, and manner of holding the elections of the members of each House shall be prescribed by the legislature of each State; but their provisions concerning them may, at any time, be altered by the Legislature of the United States. Sect. 2. The Legislature of the United States shall have authority to establish such uniform qualifications of the members of each House with regard to property as to the said legislature shall seem expedient. Sect. 3. In each House a majority of the members shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day. Sect. 4. Each House shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members. Sect. 5. Freedom of speech and debate in the legislature shall not be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of the legislature; and the members of each House shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at Congress and in going to and returning from it. Sect. 6. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings; may punish its members for disorderly behavior; and may expel a member. Sect. 7. The House of Representatives, and the Senate when it shall be acting in a legislative capacity, shall keep a journal of their proceedings; and shall, from time to time, publish them; and the yeas and nays of the members of each House on any question shall, at the desire of one-fifth part of the members present, be entered on the Journal. Sect. 8. Neither House, without the consent of the other, shall adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that at which the two Houses are sitting. But this regulation shall not extend to the Senate when it shall exercise the powers mentioned in the article. Sect. 9. The members of each House shall be ineligible to, and incapable of holding, any office under the authority of the United States during the time for which they shall respectively be elected; and the members of the Senate shall be ineligible to, and incapable of holding, any such office for one year afterwards. Sect. 10. The members of each House shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained and paid by the State in which they shall be chosen. DEBATES. THURSDAY, August 9, 1787. Article V, section 1, was then taken up. Mr. Wilson objected to vacancies in the Senate being supplied by the executives of the States. It was unnecessary, as the legislatures will meet so frequently. It removes the appointment too far from the people, the executives in most of the States being elected by the legislatures. As he had always thought the appointment of the executive by the V legislative department wrong, so it was still more so that the executive should elect into the legislative department. Mr. Randolph thought it necessary, in order to prevent inconvenient chasms in the Senate. In some States the legislatures meet but once a year. As the Senate will have more power, and consist of a smaller number than the other House, vacancies there will be of more consequence. The executives might be safely trusted, he thought, with the appointment for so short a time. Mr. ELLSWORTH. It is only said that the executive may supply vacancies. When the legislative meeting happens to be near the power will not be exerted. As there will be Mr. WILLIAMSON. Senators may resign or not accept. This provision is therefore absolutely necessary. but two members from a State vacancies may be of great moment. On the question for striking out "vacancies shall be supplied by the executives "— Pennsylvania, ay, 1; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no, 8; Maryland, divided. Mr. Williamson moved to insert after "vacancies shall be supplied by the executives," the words, "unless other provisions shall be made by the legislature" (of the State). Mr. ELLSWORTH. He was willing to trust the legislature or the executive of a State, but not to give the former a discretion to refer appointments for the Senate to whom they pleased. On the question on Mr. Williamson's motion Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 4; New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, no, 6. 66 vacan Mr. Madison, in order to prevent doubts whether resignations could be made by Senators, or whether they could refuse to accept, moved to strike out the words after cies," and insert the words, "happening by refusals to accept, resignations, or otherwise, may be supplied by the legislature of the State in the representation of which such vacancies shall happen, or by the executive thereof until the next meeting of the legislature." Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. This is absolutely necessary; otherwise, as members chosen, into the Senate are disqualified from being appointed to any office by section 9 of this article, it will be in the power of a legislature, by appointing a man a Senator against his consent, to deprive the United States of his services. The motion of Mr. Madison was agreed to nem. con. Mr. Randolph called for a division of the section, so as to leave a distinct question on the last words, "each member shall have one vote.' On the question on the first section, down to the last sentenceNew Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, ay, 7; Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, no, 3; South Carolina, divided. (In the printed Journal, Pennsylvania, ay.) Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to insert, after the words, "immediately after," the following: "they shall be assembled in consequence of," which was agreed to nem. con., as was then the whole section. Article V, section 3, was then taken up. Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to insert fourteen, instead of four years' citizenship as a qualification for Senators; urging the danger of admitting strangers into our public councils. Mr. Pinckney seconded him. Mr. Ellsworth was opposed to the section, as discouraging meritorious aliens from emigrating to this country. Mr. PINCKNEY. As the Senate is to have the power of making treaties and managing our foreign affairs, there is peculiar danger and impropriety in opening its door to those who have foreign attachments. He quoted the jealousy of the Athenians on this subject, who made it death for any stranger to intrude his voice into their legislative proceedings. Colonel Mason highly approved of the policy of the motion. Were it not that many not natives of this country had acquired great credit during the Revolution, he should be for restraining the eligibility into the Senate to natives. Mr. Madison was not averse to some restrictions on this subject, but could never agree to the proposed amendment. He thought any restriction, however, in the Constitution, unnecessary and improper-unnecessary, because the national Legislature is to have the right of regulating naturalization. and can by virtue thereof fix different periods of residence as conditions of enjoying different privileges of citizenship; improper, be cause it will give a tincture of illiberality to the Constitution; because it will put it cout of the power of the national Legislature, even by special acts of naturalization, to confer the full rank of citizens on meritorious strangers, and because it will discourage the most desirable class of people from emigrating to the United States. Should the proposed Constitution have the intended effect of giving stability and reputation to our Government, great numbers of respectable Europeans, men who love liberty and wish to partake its blessings, will be ready to transfer their fortunes hither. All such would feel the mortification of being marked with suspicious incapacitations, though they should not covet the public honors. He was not apprehensive that any dangerous number of strangers would be appointed by the State legislatures if they were left at liberty to do so, nor that foreign powers would make use of strangers as instruments for their purposes. Their bribes would be expended on men whose circumstances would rather stifle than excite jealousy and watchfulness in the public. Mr. Butler was decidedly opposed to the admission of foreigners without a long residence in the country. They bring with them not only attachments to other countries, but ideas of government so distinct from ours that in every point of view they are dangerous. He acknowledged that if he himself had been called into public life within a short time after his coming to America, his foreign habits, opinions, and attachments would have rendered him an improper agent in public affairs. He mentioned the great strictness observed in Great Britain on this subject. Dr. Franklin was not against a reasonable time, but should be very sorry to see anything like illiberality inserted in the Constitution. The people in Europe are friendly to this country. Even in the country with which we have been lately at war we have now and had during the war a great many friends, not only among the people at large, but in both houses of Parliament. In every other country in Europe all the people are our friends. We found in the course of the Revolution that many strangers served us faithfully, and that many natives took part against their country. When foreigners, after looking about for some other country in which they can obtain more happiness, give a preference to ours, it is a proof of attachment which ought to excite our confidence and affection. Mr. Randolph did not know but it might be problematical whether emigrations to this country were, on the whole, useful, or not, but he could never agree to the motion for disabling them. for fourteen years, to participate in the public honors. He reminded the convention of the language held by our patriots during the Revolution, and the principles laid down in all our American constitutions. Many foreigners may have fixed their fortunes among us under the faith of these invitations. All persons under this description, with all others who would be affected by such a regulation, would enlist themselves under the banners of hostility to the proposed system. He would go as far as seven years, but no farther. Mr. Wilson said he rose with feelings which were perhaps peculiar; mentioning the circumstance of his not being a native, and the possibility, if the ideas of some gentlemen should be pursued, of his being incapacitated from holding a place under the very Constitution which he had shared in the trust of making. He remarked the illiberal complexion which the motion would give to the system, and the effect which a good system would have in inviting meritorious foreigners among us, and the discouragement and mortification they must feel from the degrading discrimination now proposed. He had himself experienced this mortification. On his removal into Maryland he found himself, from defect of residence, under certain legal incapacities which never ceased to produce chagrin, though he assuredly did not desire, and would not have accepted, the offices to which they related. To be appointed to a place may be a matter of indifference. To be incapable of being appointed is a circumstance grating and mortifying. Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. The lesson we are taught is that we should be governed as much by our reason and as little by our feelings as possible. What is the language of reason on this subject? That we should not be polite at the expense of prudence. There was a moderation in all things. It is said that some tribes of Indians carried their hospitality so far as to offer to strangers their wives and daughters. Was this a proper model for us? He would admit them to his house, he would invite them to his table, would provide for them comfortable lodgings, but would not carry the complaisance so far as to bed them with his wife. He would let them worship at the same altar, but did not choose to make priests of them. He ran over the privileges which emigrants would enjoy among us, though they should be deprived of that of being eligible to the great offices of Government; observing that they exceeded the privileges allowed to foreigners in any part of the world; and that as every society, from a great nation down to aclub, had the right of declaring the conditions on which new members should be admitted, there could be no room for complaint. As to those philosophical gentlemen, those citizens of the world, as they called themselves, he owned he did not wish to see any of them in our public councils. He would not trust them. The men who can shake off their attachments to their own country can never love any other. These attachments are the wholesome prejudices which uphold all governments. Admit a Frenchman into your Senate, and he will study to increase the commerce of France; an Englishman, and he will feel an equal bias in favor of that of England. It has been said that the legislatures will not choose foreigners, at least improper ones. There was no knowing what legislatures would do. Some appointments made by them proved that everything ought to be apprehended from the cabals practiced on such occasions. He mentioned the the case of a foreigner who left this State in disgrace, and worked himself into an appointment from another to Congress. On the question on the motion of Mr. Gouverneur Morris to insert fourteen in place of four years New Hampshire, New Jersey, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 4; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no, 7. On the question for thirteen years, moved by Mr. Gouverneur Morris, it was negatived, as above. On ten years, moved by General Pinckney, the votes were the same. Dr. Franklin reminded the convention that it did not follow, from an omission to insert the restriction in the Constitution, that the persons in question would be actually chosen into the legislature. Mr. RUTLEDGE. Seven years of citizenship have been required for the House of Representatives. Surely a longer time is requisite for the Senate, which will have more power. Mr. WILLIAMSON. It is more necessary to guard the Senate in this case than the other House. Bribery and cabal can be more easily practiced in the choice of the Senate, which is to be made by the legislatures, composed of a few men, than of the House of Representatives, who will be chosen by the people. Mr. Randolph will agree to nine years, with the expectation that it will be reduced to seven, if Mr. Wilson's motion to reconsider the vote fixing seven years for the House of Representatives should produce a reduction of that period. On the question for nine years— New Hampshire, New Jersey, Delaware, Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, ay, 6 Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Maryland, no, 4; North Carolina, divided. The term "resident" was struck out, and "inhabitant" inserted nem. con. Article V, section 3, as amended, was then agreed to nem, con. (198). Article V, section 4, was agreed to nem. con. Article VI, section 1, was then taken up. Mr. Madison and Mr. Gouverneur Morris moved to strike out "each House," and to insert "the House of Representatives"; the right of the legislatures to regulate the times and places, &c., in the election of Senators being involved in the right of appointing them; which was disagreed to. A division of the question being called for, it was taken on the first part down to “but their provisions concerning," &c. The first part was agreed to nem. con. Mr. Pinckney and Mr. Rutledge moved to strike out the remaining part, viz, "but their provisions concerning them may at any time be altered by the Legislature of the United States.' The States, they contended, could and must be relied on in such cases. Mr. GORHAM. It would be as improper to take this power from the national Legislature as to restrain the British Parliament from regulating the circumstances of elections, leaving this business to the counties themselves. Mr. MADISON. The necessity of a general government supposes that the State legislatures will sometimes fail or refuse to consult the common interest at the expense of their local convenience or prejudices. The policy of referring the appointment of the House of Representatives to the people, and not to the legislatures of the States, supposes that the result will be somewhat influenced by the mode. This view of the question seems to decide that the legislatures of the States ought not to have the uncontrolled right of regulating the times, places, and manner of holding elections. These were words of great latitude. It was impossible to foresee all the abuses that might be made of the discretionary power. Whether the electors should vote by ballot, or rira voce, should assemble at this place or that place, should be divided into districts or all meet at one place, should all vote for all the Representatives or all in a district vote for a number allotted to the district-these, and many other points, would depend on the legislatures, and might materially affect the appointments. Whenever the State legislatures had a favorite measure to carry they would take care so to mold their regulations as to favor the candidates they wished to succeed. Besides, the inequality of the representation in the legislatures of particular States would produce a like inequality in their representation in the national Legislature, as it was presumable that the counties having the power in the former case would secure it to themselves in the latter. What danger could there |