had been lost sight of in this discussion: in the first place. Europe, which might find such pretensions exorbitant and offer opposition; and, again, that modern rights, and the progress of all customs, were entirely antipathetic to such exigencies. I added that, as far as we were concerned, we could never agree to them. "We. can perish as a nation, but we cannot dishonor ourselves. However, the country itself was alone competent to give an opinion respecting any cession of territory. We have not any doubts as to its feeling, but we wish first to consult it. It is before the whole nation that Prussia must take up her position; and to speak plainly, it is clear that, led away by the frenzy of victory, she desires the destruction of France." The count protested against this conclusion, alleging the absolute necessity of a national guarantee. I continued: "If on your side it is not an abuse of power, covering secret designs, let us call an assembly together; we will hand it our powers, and it will appoint a definite government, who will be able to appreciate your conditions." "In order to carry out this plan," replied the count, "an armistice would be required, and I will not grant one at any price." The conversation took a more and more painful turn. Night came. I requested M. de Bismarck to give me a second interview at Ferrières, where he was going to sleep, and we each went our way. Desiring to fulfill my mission to the end, I had to raise several questions that we had argued, and to conclude them. Therefore, on meeting the count about half-past nine at night, I remarked to him that the information which I had come to obtain from him was intended to be transmitted to my government and to the public; therefore I should resume in conclusion our conversation, so as only to publish what had entirely been agreed upon between us. "Do not take that trouble," replied he, "you can publish it in extenso. I do not see any reason why it should not be divulged." We then resumed our discussion, which continued till midnight. I dwelt considerably upon the necessity of convoking an assembly. The count appeared to allow himself to be convinced by degrees, but returned to the armistice. I asked for a fortnight. We discussed the conditions. He only expressed himself very vaguely, and elected to consult the King. Consequently he adjourned the interview to 11 o'clock on the following day. I have only one more word to say, for in repeating this sad recital my mind is agitated by all those emotions which have tortured it during three mortal days, and I yearn to finish. I arrived at the Château of Ferrières at 11 o'clock. The count was coming from the King at a quarter to twelve, and I heard from him the conditions upon which an armistice would be granted; they were written in the German language, and a verbal communication was made to me of their purport. He asked as a guarantee the occupation of Strasburg, Toul, and Phalsburg; and as, in answer to a question from him, I had told him on the previous day that the assembly would take place in Paris, he wished in this case to have a fort dominating the city, as, for instance, that of Mont Valérien. I interrupted him by remarking. "It is much simpler to ask for Paris at once. How can you suppose that a French assembly could deliberate under your guns? I had the honor of informing you that I should faithfully communicate our interview to the government, and I hardly know if I dare mention to them that you have made such a proposal to me." "Let us seek some other combination," he replied. I spoke to him of a reunion of the assembly at Tours, no guarantee being given as far as Paris was concerned. I suggested he should speak of this to the King, and again speaking of the occupation of Strasburg, he added: "The town will fall into our hands; it is now only a matter of calculation for our engineers. Therefore I demand of you that the garrison shall surrender themselves prisoners of war." At these words I could not suppress my feelings, and rising, I cried: "You forget you are speaking to a Frenchman, M. le Comte. To thus sacrifice a heroic garrison whose behaviour has been admired universally, and more particularly by us, would be cowardice, and I promise not to say that you have offered me such a condition." The count replied that he had had no intention of hurting my feelings; that he conformed to the laws of war; and that, moreover, if the King gave his consent, this article might be modified. He returned in a quarter of an hour. The King accepted the proposal as to Tours, but insisted that the garrison of Strasburg should constitute themselves prisoners. I was perfectly exhausted, and feared for the moment that I should faint. Î turned away to hide the tears which suffocated me, and asking to be excused for my involuntary weakness, I took leave with these few words: "I made a mistake, M. le Comte, in coming here; but I do not regret it, I have suffered sufficiently to excuse myself in my own eyes, but in any case I only yielded to a feeling of duty. I will report to my government all that you have said, and should they consider it fit again to send me to you, however cruel the task for me, I shall have the honor of returning. I am grateful for the kindness you have shown me, but I fear that all that can be done is to let events take their course. The inhabitants of Paris are courageous, and resolved to make every sacrifice, and their heroism may change the course of events. If you have the honor of conquering them, you will never subjugate them. The whole nation is pos

solution. I leave, most unhappy, but nevertheless full of hope." I add nothing to this recital, too eloquent in itself. It enables me to conclude, and to inform you what is, in my idea, the aim of these interviews. I sought peace, and found an inflexible desire for conquest and war. I demanded an opportunity of interrogating France, represented by an assembly freely elected, and I was replied to by being shown the Caudine Forks, under which France must first pass. I do not recriminate. I content myself by relating facts, and publishing them to my country and to Europe. I ardently desired peace. I do not disguise the fact, and witnessing during three days the misery existing in our unfortunate country, I felt this desire increase within me to such an extent that I was forced to summon all my courage to my aid, so as not to fail in my task. I wished for an armistice almost as eagerly. I again confess it. I wished it so that the nation might be consulted respecting the redoubtable question that fatality had placed before You are now acquainted with the preliminary conditions which they desire to impose upon us. Equally with myself, and without discussion, you have been unanimously of opinion that snch humiliation should be rejected. I possess the profound conviction that in spite of the sufferings she is now enduring, and which she sees before her, France, indignant, shares our determination, and inspired by these feelings I addressed to M. de Bismarck the following dispatch, which closes our negotiations:

us.

"M. LE COMTE: I have faithfully reported to my colleagues of the government for the national defense the declaration that your excellency deigned to make to me. I regret to inform your excellency that the government could not entertain your propositions. They would accept an armistice in order to proceed to the election and meeting of a National Assembly, but they cannot subscribe to the conditions your excellency imposes. For my own part, I have the satisfaction of having done everything to stay the shedding of blood and to obtain the restoration of peace to the two nations, to whom it would prove the greatest blessing. I am only arrested by an imperious obligation which commands me not to sacrifice the honor of my country, which is determined upon an energetic resistance. I unite without reserve in this feeling, as do my colleagues. Goa, who judges us, will decide our destinies. I have faith in His justice. I have, &c.

"SEPTEMBER 24, 1870.'

"JULES FAVRE.

"I have finished, my dear colleagues, and you will think, as I do, that even if I have failed, my mission has not been totally useless It has proved that we have not deviated. As during the first days we cursed a war which was condemned by us beforehand, so also during the first days we rather accept it than dishonor. We have done more; we have abolished the equivocal position in which Prussia enclosed itself, and which Europe did not aid us to dissipate. On entering into our territory she gave the world her word that she attacked Napoleon and his soldiers, but she would respect the nation. We know to-day what to think of such statements. Prussia exacts three of our departments, two fortified towns, one containing 100,000 and the other 75,000 inhabitants, and eight or ten other places equally fortified. She is aware that the populations she wishes to tear from us will resist her, but she seizes them nevertheless; opposing the edge of her sword to the protestations of civic liberty and moral dignity. To a nation requesting the faculty of consulting itself, it proposes a guarantee of its batteries of howitzers planted on Mont Valérieu to protect the place of our deliberations where our deputies will vote. This is what we know and what I am authorized to inform you. Let the whole nation hear us and rise up, either to repudiate us when we advise it to resist à outrance, or to support with us this last and decisive trial. Paris is resolved upon it. The departments are organizing themselves and will come to our assistance. The last word has not been pronounced in this struggle, where might is combating against right. It depends upon our constancy whether it be spoken for justice and liberty.

"Accept, my dear colleagues, the fraternal homage of my unchanging devotion.

"JULES FAVRE, "Minister of Foreign Affairs.

"The VICE-PRESIDENT OF THE GOVERNMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE,

"Paris, September 21, 1870.'"

No. 482.]

No. 125.

Mr. Motley to Mr. Fish.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,

London, October 6, 1870. (Received October 18, 1870.) SIR: I have the honor to send herewith a copy of the correspondence between Earl Granville and Count Bernstorff, Prussian and North Ger

man ambassador, on the subject of neutrality and the exportation of contraband of war, extracted from the Times of 19th ultimo.

I have not sent it before because I have been expecting day by day that it would be published in the usual pamphlet form.

This I now find will not be the case for the present, as a rejoinder is soon expected from Count Bernstorff, which, perhaps, will necessitate a further reply from Lord Granville.

JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY.

[From the Times, Monday, September 19, 1870.]

BRITISH NEUTRALITY.

The following correspondence has passed between the ambassador of the North German Confederation and the secretary for foreign affairs:

“MEMORANDUM COMMUNICATED BY COUNT BERNSTORFF TO EARL GRANVILLE, SEPTEMBER 1, 1870.

"It would be waste of time at the present crisis to enter upon an exhaustive juridical examination of the existing neutrality laws and their ultimate bearing and scope. It is not too late, however, to glance in a practical manner at a question which every hour may cause fresh and momentous complications, especially as affecting national susceptibilities.

"In the first instance there is no question that France has wantonly made war on Germany. The verdict of the world, and especially the verdict of the statesmen as well as of the public of England, has unanimously pronounced the Emperor of the French guilty of a most flagitious breach of the peace. Germany, on the other hand, entered into the contest with the consciousness of a good cause. She was, therefore, led to expect that the neutrality of Great Britain, her former ally against Napoleonic aggression, however strict in form, would at least be benevolent in spirit to Germany, for it is impossible for the human mind not to side with one or the other party in a conflict like the present one. What is the use of being right or wrong in the eyes of the world if the public remains insensible to the merits of a cause? Those who deny the necessity of such a distinction forego the appeal to public opinion, which we are daily taught to consider as the foremost of the great powers.

"In examining from this point of view whether the neutrality of Great Britain has been practically benevolent as regards Germany, it is best to reverse the question and to put it in this shape: If Germany had been the aggressor, and, consequently, condemned by public opinion, in what way could the government and the people of the United Kingdom have heen able to avoid taking an active part in the struggle, and, at the same time, to prove to France their benevolent intentions? Being short of coal, the French would have been allowed to find here all they needed for their naval expeditions. Their preparations for war not being so far advanced and not so complete as they first thought, the French would have found the manufacturers of arms and ammunitions in this country ready to supply them with, and the British government willing not to prevent their obtaining here, all the material they wanted. This, we think, would have been the utmost aid which Great Britain could have granted to France, without transgressing the letter of the existing neutrality laws, had the parts of aggressor and attacked, of right and wrong, been the reverse of the present condition.

"In the face of the continuous export of arms, ammunition, coal, and other war material from this country to France; in the face of facts openly made a boast of by the French minister of war, and not denied by the British government, it is not necessary to prove that the neutrality of Great Britain, far from being impartial toward that party which has been pronounced to be in the right, is, on the contrary, such as it might possibly have been if that party had been wrong in the eyes of the British people and government. When defending the new foreign enlistment act in Parliament the representatives of the government declared that the law empowered the executive to prevent the export of contraband of war, but that in order to make it effectual toward the belligerents it ought to be generally enforced, and would thus even affect the commerce of this country with other neutrals. This statement, however, cannot be admitted, for there is no necessity to hamper the trade with neutral countries by preventing

in the least have been affected thereby. But the government, far from doing this, refused even to accept such propositions as might have prevented direct or clandestine exportation of contraband of war to France; besides, it cannot be admitted that such prohibitive measures could in reality damage the regular and lawful trade of the English people at large. They would merely prevent some rapacious individuals from disregarding the verdict of the nation, and realizing enormous profits which never would have legitimately been made under ordinary circumstances. The rapid increase of the private fortunes of a few tradesmen by such ventures could not appreciably add to the national wealth of the country. But, on the other hand, the nation will be held morally responsible for the blood which is being shed through the agency of those individuals. It will be said that the war would have ended sooner, and that less German soldiers would have been killed and wounded, had not the people and government of England permitted such abuses.

"It hardly could be seriously meant to say that the Germans are at liberty to bring each case before their prize courts, for it would be out of place thus to taunt Germany with not being mistress of the seas. The question is whether England may escape the just reproach on the part of Germany of having greatly increased the advantage France already possesses at sea, by fitting out her navy with the requisite material to attack the seaboards of Germany and annihilate its commerce, as well as of arming the French Garde Mobile with English breech-loaders, to be used against the German soldiers in the field.

"England will thus be accused of feeding a war which would have ended sooner had France been left dependent on her own resources. Hence the policy of the British government, notwithstanding the verdict of public opinion in this country in favor of the German cause, is, if not intentionally, at least practically, benevolent to France, without there being any real foundation for the excuse that the commercial interests of this country would be seriously affected by a different course.

"There is still another reason put forward by the British government in reference to their line of action. It is the allusion to Prussian neutrality during the Crimean war. Germany is told to consider that, at that time, arms and ammunition were freely exported from Prussia to Russia; and arms of Belgian manufacture found their way to the same quarter through Prussian territory in spite of a decree issued by the Prussian government prohibiting the transport of arms coming from foreign states.'

"Lord Granville says, in his circular of the 11th instant, that reflection upon these points may make the German nation inclined to take a juster view of the position now occupied by her Majesty's government.'

"All who recollect the political aspect of that time will admit that there is no real analogy between the two cases. At the period alluded to public opinion in Germany was very doubtful as to the wisdom of helping a Napoleon to become once more the arbiter of Europe. Besides, it was not a struggle for life and death between two nations equally matched, but it was a war waged in remote regions for remote interests by four powers against one, without the national existence of England being the least endangered.

"Had England alone been the enemy of Russia, the comparison of the two cases would be less wanting in point.

"However, it will be remembered how strongly Great Britain remonstrated at the time against the alleged wrong of Prussia. There is but one possible alternative. Either the complaints of the British government were founded, or they were not. If they really were, how can it be maintained at present that the complaints of Germany are unfounded, should even the great difference of the two cases be entirely disregarded? By declaring the present grievances of Germany devoid of foundation the British government disavow implicitly the bitter charges they preferred at the time, and condemn the ill-feeling created by them, and partly entertained ever since in this country against Prussia.

"It is absolutely impossible to conciliate, with any show of reason and logic, defending the justice of those charges on one side and refusing on the other to acknowledge the present grievances of Germany to be well founded.

This being true, there is but one motive which might be alleged as an excuse for the present policy of the British government toward Germany. That is to apply the principle of retaliation for an alleged wrong done a long time ago under circumstances completely different from the present situation in every possible respect.

"To establish in our times such a principle as a rule for the policy of a great nation would be too inconsistent with the general feeling and moral disposition of this country to admit of its being the intention of the British government.

"Should the position now occupied by the British government in regard to Germany, notwithstanding the admitted justice of her cause, continue to be maintained, it would be difficult even for the stanchest advocate of friendship between England and Germany to persuade the German nation that they have been fairly dealt by. "PRUSSIA HOUSE, August 30, 1870."

"EARL GRANVILLE TO COUNT BERNSTORFF.

"FOREIGN OFFICE September 15, 1870.

"M. l'AMBASSADOR: I have the honor to assure your excellency that her Majesty's government have not failed to consider most carefully the arguments contained in the memorandum which you did me the honor to place in my hands on the 1st instant, and have studied them the more attentively as they contain matter which has not hitherto been imported into discussions upon the duties of neutrals.

"The two principal positions assumed by your excellency are, first, that the attitude of Great Britain toward Prussia in the present war should be that of a 'benevolent neutrality; and, secondly, that there is no analogy between the course adopted by Prussia when Great Britain was at war with Russia and that adopted by Great Britain now that Prussia is at war with France.

"In examining these propositions her Majesty's government are relieved from the necessity of entering at present into the question whether Great Britain is honestly fulfilling her duties as a neutral. The point raised by you goes far beyond this. It amounts to a demand that her neutrality should be, both in spirit and practice, benevolent toward Prussia, and, consequently, as it would seem, unfavorable toward France. "Upon the declaration of hostilities, her Majesty's government publicly declared that they were desirous of maintaining their good relations with, and tendering their good offices to, both the belligerents, as far as was consistent with perfect neutrality. But the idea of a benevolent neutrality,' as explained by your excellency, is new, and it consequently becomes necessary to consider what is its meaning, and what would be its practical effect.

"It is obvious that your excellency cannot intend to lay down a principle applicable only to the present war; rules of international law cannot be confined to individual or exceptional cases; and this principle, if accepted, can only be so as a principle of international law, and, as such, susceptible of general application. This applied, then, its effect would be as follows: That, on the outbreak of a war between two nations, it would be the duty of each neutral to ascertain which belligerent was favored by the public opinion of its subjects, and to assume an attitude of neutrality benevolent toward that belligerent. But such neutrality should not, as I gather from your excellency's memorandum, be confined to sympathy, but should be exhibited in practice-that is to say, the measures adopted by each neutral should be favorable to one belligerent and proportionately unfavorable to the other. It seems hardly possible to push the examination further without finding ourselves met by insuperable difficulties. Where could the line be drawn between a departure from the usual practice, in order to confer material advantages on one belligerent state, to the exclusion of the other, and a participation in hostilities? The sympathies of nations, as of individuals, are not invariably influenced by abstract considerations of right or wrong, but are swayed by material interests and other causes. Neutrals would probably, therefore, be found ranged on different sides. What would be the material relations of such neutrals? What their relations with the belligerent to whom they were opposed? It seems hardly to admit of doubt that neutrality, when it once departs from strict impartiality, runs the risk of altering its essence, and that the moment a neutral allows his proceedings to be biased by predilection for one of two belligerents he ceases to be a neutral. The idea, therefore, of benevolent neutrality can mean little less than the extinction of neutrality.

"Passing to the second proposition laid down by your excellency, that there is no real analogy between the conduct of Prussia in the Crimean war and that of Great Britain in the present war, I find that this proposition is mainly rested on the ground that Great Britain, in the former war, was not fighting single-handed, and that public opinion in Germany was not enlisted in favor of the cause for which she was contending. These two reasons may be brought under the same head, as both can only be adduced with any weight in justification of a position of benevolent neutrality; but, as this justification was not preferred at the time by Prussian statesmen in discussing this question, it will be useful to consider what was the attitude of Prussia during the war waged by Great Britain and her allies against Russia, and what were the motives alleged at the time for her assuming that attitude.

"During the whole of the war arms and other contraband of war were copiously supplied to Russia by the states of the Zollverein; regular agents for traffic were established at Berlin, Magdeburg, Thorn, Königsberg, Posen, Bromberg, and other places, and no restraint was put upon their operations. But, besides this, although a decree was published in March 1854, prohibiting the transit of arms from other countries, and a farther decree in March 1855, prohibiting also the transit of other contraband of war, the transit trade from Belgium continued in full activity throughout the war. The Prussian government, when this state of things was brought to its notice, affirmed,