Opinion of the Court thereupon cease making or proceeding with the material so designated," and read alone this paragraph would seem to sustain the defendant's contention as to the right of the United States to terminate the contract at any time; but there are significant provisions beside the one quoted and certainly very materially modifying it. It is not infrequently the case that a general statement in a contract read alone seems to mean one thing, but that subsequent provisions properly applied to it change entirely its meaning. Following the quoted provision it is said that “the contractor shall, however, complete the manufacture of shell then actually in process," and further it is provided that, "in the event of the cancellation of this contract as in this article provided, the United States will inspect the completed shell then on hand and the shell then in the process of manufacture when completed, and will pay to the contractor the price herein agreed upon for each and every unit accepted by and delivered to the United States." It clearly appears from the record in this case, and indeed it would seem that it must be a matter of common knowledge, that many processes are required in the manufacture of shrapnel, beginning with the cutting-off process, followed by the heat-treating and machining of the shell, and the various subsequent processes down to the point of loading and finally finishing, and that at any time, in the midst of the performance of a contract such as this, shells would be found in various stages of completion. It would be wholly unreasonable to assume that a given number of shells could pass from the first process to a state of completion within any one day so that upon termination of the contract the contractor would be found with a completed number of shrapnel on the one hand and with materials and component parts only upon the other. It follows as a reasonable conclusion, and one which is in fact fully supported by the record in this case, that when, in its midst, a contract such as this was terminated the contractor would necessarily be found with a large number of shells in every possible stage of partial completion. With this view of the actual situation existing in connection with the performance of such a contract, there appears very Opinion of the Court manifest reason why the right to cancel the contract should have carried with it modifying provisions looking to the completion of such shrapnel as had been put in process at the time it was determined to cancel, and consideration of the provisions written into this contract require that conclusion. If there were room for doubt upon consideration of these provisions themselves, there seems to be little doubt as to the construction which was put upon them by the parties. There is no doubt that when communications were received by the plaintiff with reference to the termination of this contract, the plaintiff always maintained that it had a right, under the contract, to complete such shrapnel as was "in process," and the record leaves little room to doubt that this contention on the part of the plaintiff was conceded by the representatives of the United States. The first communication on the subject was not an order canceling the contract, but it was in the form of a request, to which the plaintiff did not see fit to accede. The second communication, while savoring of a notice, was nevertheless in its essential parts a request, and to this the plaintiff again did not see fit to accede. As to these two communications, it is also to be observed that the final notice of February 27, 1919, stated that it superseded all prior notices. It was evidently regarded by the contracting officer as the final and the only effective notice. But before the issuance of that notice and subsequent to the plaintiff's contention, after receipt of the first two communications, that it had a right under the contract to complete all shrapnel then in process, a very significant feature of the matter is found in the communication from the Pittsburgh district ordnance office to the Government inspector at plaintiff's plant to the effect that the plaintiff would be permitted to complete 149,958 shrapnel under its contract. That communication, under the circumstances, can be regarded as nothing else than a recognition of the right of the plaintiff to complete all shrapnel put in process, and the fact that the United States had no right under article 8 to cancel the contract without permitting the completion of the shrapnel put in process is clearly recognized by the contracting officer when in his indorsement of February 27, 1919, he stated that he had signed and forwarded "a notice of breach of the above contract." Opinion of the Court While it is to be said that if the contracting officer was mistaken as to the legal effect of the action he had taken and his action did not, in effect, amount to a breach of the contract, the United States would not be bound by the erroneous construction which he had put upon his own action; yet irrespective of its legal effect in that respect, this action and the communications cited all indicate very clearly the construction which was put by the respresentative of the Government upon article 8 of the contract as to the conditions under which the United States might cancel, and justify the conclusion that upon the part of the contracting officer the action taken was regarded as a breaching of the contract and not as an authorized cancellation. The construction to be put upon the language itself, supplemented, if necessary, by the construction put upon it by the parties, leaves room for no other conclusion than that the contract was breached and that the rights of the plaintiff are for consideration on that basis. The rule as to the measure of damages in such circumstances is well established and it is scarcely necessary to review the many authorities holding that the true measure is the difference between the contract price which the contractor would have been entitled to receive upon completion of the contract and the cost to him of its completion, with one other element for consideration. In one of the older cases, frequently cited, this element is expressed as a "reasonable deduction for the less time engaged and for release from the care, trouble, risk, and responsibility attending the full execution of the contract." United States v. Speed, 8 Wall. 77 at 85. The proposition was well stated by Judge Hay in Broadbent Portable Laundry Corporation v. United States, 56 C. Cls. 132, in the following language: "The court will also take into consideration the relief of the contractor from responsibility for a large part of the contract, and for the time and trouble which a full performance would have required and imposed upon it and the release of contractor's plant for other work. And as it was relieved by relinquishment of a large part of the contract by the United States of all the responsibility and risks involved in so much of it, as well as from devoting its Opinion of the Court time and attention to it to that extent, there must be a reasonable deduction from the probable profits on those accounts. In the application of the principles above laid down there is always difficulty; each case must be determined by its own circumstances." It is scarcely necessary to review the state of the account as between the parties and to discuss the elements which entered into that account on both sides. The record is very satisfactory upon all these questions and the findings have specifically treated each item necessarily entering into the account, followed by a summary thereof, which is to be found in Finding VIII. Upon the question of the deduction to be made on the theory above stated the court can find no basis in the record for any accurate mathematical determination of the correct amount. In fact the very principle itself involves elements which are necessarily speculative to an extent and not susceptible of accurate determination. We deem it the duty of the court, under such circumstances, to exercise its judgment as best it may in the light of all the facts which in any manner tend to aid it in forming a correct conclusion and thus determine the amount which its judgment dictates as fair to be deducted on this account. This amount the court has determined and it is indicated, not as a finding, but in its conclusion of law, predicated upon the findings. ess. There is one other feature of the case which must receive consideration. When the original contract was executed, accompanied by detailed specifications, it was found that there was some omission to state the physical properties required as a result of the prescribed heat-treating procIt appears that the plaintiff had been engaged in the manufacture of shrapnel shells for the United States under a former contract and it had assumed that the requirements under this contract would be the same as those under the former contract, but when attention was called to the omission in this respect, representatives of the Government indicated requirements which were very much in excess of those which had been anticipated by the plaintiff. After considerable negotiation these requirements were modified to some extent but were left upon such a basis that the plaintiff was Opinion of the Court required to install additional and unanticipated facilities for heat treatment, which it did at an expense to it of $16,302.50, and this amount it seeks to recover. While it is possibly true that upon the showing made in the record with reference to this feature of the contract work the plaintiff, if not otherwise precluded, might be entitled to recover this amount, we are of the opinion that it is precluded by reason of the fact that subsequent to the determination of the exact requirements of the Government in this respect, the plaintiff entered into a supplemental contract in which, with some modifications as to payments, evidently for the benefit of the plaintiff, the contract price for the shrapnel was again stipulated as it had been in the original contract. It would not be unreasonable to assume the possibility that the additional benefits accruing to the plaintiff under the supplemental contract in the matter of payments to be made might have been regarded as adequate compensation for the additional burdens assumed in the matter of heat-treatment processes, but however that may be, the supplemental contract specified the price to be paid by the United States for completed shrapnel at a time when the plaintiff was fully informed as to the requirements, and by this fact alone the plaintiff is to be regarded as precluded from claiming any additional compensation on the account stated. GRAHAM, Judge; HAY, Judge; BOOTH, Judge; and CAMPBELL, Chief Justice, concur. ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL DOWNEY, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: The defendant's motion for a new trial herein has been under advisement for a considerable length of time, due largely to the fact that under leave granted by the court to submit testimony in support of that branch of the motion predicated on section 175 of the Judicial Code, intended to be within reasonable limits, the testimony of forty-five witnesses has been taken and the burden imposed of reading and abstracting 775 pages of typewritten matter, besides exhibits. That in other respects responsibility for delay herein may not seem to rest upon the court, it is to be said that a |