Opinion of the Court retary required the plaintiff to reinforce certain fittings and it elected to do the work. (9) The Secretary under the general authority conferred on him decided that the type plans of the foundations for the guns were too weak and plaintiff was required to strengthen them, this action being taken under specified clauses of the contract. The plaintiff claims that the change from a sheathed to an unsheathed vessel entitled it to a large sum. The board on changes determined that the change reduced the compensation. The plaintiff's original bid was upon a vessel sheathed of about 15,000 tons and unsheathed of about 14,600 tons. The explanation of the absence of exact displacement in the bid is that it had not been exactly calculated when the specifications upon which bids were predicated were presented and furnished the bidders. Before the bids were opened, however, the exact displacement had been calculated and was at plaintiff's disposal. The statement of the displacement at "about" so many tons is of relatively small importance since the specifications had to be and were changed materially in order to bring plaintiff's bid within the limit of appropriation. Plaintiff's bid was less per ton for an unsheathed than for a sheathed vessel. It contracted for a sheathed vessel of about 15,000 tons. It built an unsheathed vessel of 14,948 tons, and this was the tonnage as accurately figured before the bids were opened. The theory upon which plaintiff's claim is based as well as the testimony supposed to sustain it is vague and uncertain. The decision of the board, however, is conclusive. The item for constructing 50 rifle racks is not allowable. The whole number necessary was 340 and those furnished by the Government were used. It does not appear that any of plaintiff's racks were used. Presuming that it would have to make these racks, plaintiff submitted its drawings to the superintending contractor. These were approved by the Bureau of Construction and Repair. When later it was decided that the Government would furnish the racks the effect was to relieve plaintiff of constructing approximately 300 racks more and thus saving it at the price it claims for 50, about $9,800. The item for "whistles " is not allowed. The facts relative to it appear in Finding X. Opinion of the Court The defendant asserts a counterclaim in the sum of $229,800 for liquidated damages on account of 396 days alleged delays. The ninth section of the contract provides that if the completion of the vessel be delayed beyond the time fixed for its completion deduction should be made from the price stipulated for each day of delay in a specific amount, provided, however, that such delay "shall not have been caused by the act of party of the second part, or by fire or water, or by any strike or standout of workmen. or by other circumstances beyond the control of the " plaintiff. It is also provided that in case any question shall arise concerning deductions from the price of the vessel such question, with all the facts relating thereto, shall be submitted to the Secretary of the Navy for consideration,. and his decision thereon shall be conclusive and binding upon the parties to this contract." 66 * * * * The plaintiff's suit was brought in September, 1909. It was not until June, 1915, that the counterclaim was filed. The question of delays had been repeatedly before the Secretary before the vessel was completed. On September 11, 1905, he granted an extension of eighteen months and sixteen days "on account of delays caused by strikes" at plaintiff's shipyard. This extension carried the period for completion to September 23, 1905, and his order recited: "It being understood that this extension is to cover all delays from any cause whatever occurring prior to September 1, 1905." There were four other extensions at different times, in each of which the Secretary stated that the extension was because of "circumstances beyond the contractor's control," within the meaning of the contract. When the vessel was finally completed and the time for settlement arrived there was found to be due the contractors a balance of $70,000. No charge was made against plaintiff for liquidated damages—no deduction whatever was made from the contract price on that account. This was properly treated as settled by the Secretary's extensions of time. Evidently his action was deemed conclusive. Urging the finality of the findings of the board as to the compensation in the matters of changes, the defendant seeks to avoid the apparent inconsistency of its position with re Appendix gard to the Secretary's extensions of time, by invoking the principle that the Government can not be bound by the mistake of an officer, citing cases on that point. (Wisconsin Central Ry. Co. case, 164 U. S. 190, and others.) It is argued that the extensions and failure to deduct for liquidated damages were in excess of the authority conferred on the Secretary and that a mistake was made by him in "assuming to grant such extension." The language of the contract conferring power on the Secretary in this regard is very plain and manifestly was intended to obviate such a contention as that now made. See Gleason case, 175 U. S. 588, 604; Cramp case, 41 C. Cls. 164, 189. He granted extensions because of strikes, because of the Government's failure to supply armor, and because of circumstances beyond the contractor's control. The plaintiff's brief correctly states that "the Supreme Court and this court have repeatedly decided that the act of an officer of the United States in accordance with authority given him by a contract is binding upon both parties and is not subject to judicial review," citing the Kihlberg case, 97 U. S. 398, and Gleason case, supra. And it may be added that the principle thus stated is as applicable to the authority of the board which fixed compensation for changes as it is to that of the Secretary in authorizing extensions. The plaintiff is entitled to judgment for the items mentioned in Findings XII and XIII amounting to $118,036.38; and as to other items claimed the petition should be dismissed and the defendant's counterclaim should also be dismissed. And it is so ordered. HAY, Judge; DOWNEY, Judge; and BOOTH, Judge, concur. GRAHAM, Judge, took no part in the decision of this case. APPENDIX A NAVY DEPARTMENT, Washington, October 3, 1905. Decision. By the contract dated May 17, 1905, between the United States and the Fore River Shipbuilding Company for the construction of a scout cruiser, it is provided Appendix that "doubts or disputes" arising respecting the rights of the parties as determined by the contract shall be referred to the Secretary of the Navy for decision, his determination to be binding. In accordance with this provision the Fore River Shipbuilding Company has requested the Secretary to determine whether the said company will be entitled to compensation for such delays as may be caused (if any shall be caused) in the construction of the said cruiser by changes in the specifications made by the Navy Department, and also to determine what elements of damage would properly enter into the computation of compensation for such delays. It appears to the Secretary of the Navy that these questions are of great importance, but not of much difficulty. The rights of the parties depend entirely upon the contract, including, of course, as parts of that contract the various other papers made such by reference. In interpreting the contract, however, due weight must be given to wellknown facts affecting the subject matter and which may be reasonably presumed to have been present in the minds of the parties when they entered into it. One fact of great importance and to which exceptional prominence has been given in the history of naval architecture during the past 20 years is that changes in the views of authorized experts respecting the merits of vessels of war occur very frequently and at very short intervals, partly by reason of new scientific discoveries and inventions and partly by reason of the lessons of experience occurring in those intervals. It is a notorious fact, of which the Fore River Shipbuilding Company and also the Government unquestionably had notice when they signed this contract, that changes in the plans and specifications might be reasonably expected to be made, and it was therefore incumbent upon the company as well as upon the Government to stipulate distinctly and clearly in the contract what effect upon the rights and responsibilities of the parties would be produced by such changes. There is, in fact, in the second clause of the contract the following provision: 66 * * * And it is hereby further provided, and this contract is upon the express condition, that the drawings, plans, and specifications aforesaid may be changed, and that such alterations as are not contrary to law may be made in this contract by the party of the second part, but no such changes shall be made when the cost thereof shall, in the execution of the work, exceed five hundred dollars ($500), except upon the written order of the Secretary or Acting Secretary of the Navy; that if changes are thus made, the actual cost thereof, and the damage, if any, caused thereby, shall be Appendix ascertained, estimated, and determined by a board of naval officers appointed by the Secretary of the Navy, and that the party of the first part shall be bound by the determination of said board, or a majority thereof, as to the amount of increased or diminished compensation the said party of the first part shall be entitled to receive, if any, in consequence of such change or changes." So far as the Secretary is informed, this is the only provision relating to changes and their consequences, except the following: "All delays that the Secretary of the Navy shall find to be properly attributable to the party of the second part, or to its authorized officers or agents, and to have been delays operating upon the completion of the vessel within the time specified therefor in this contract, shall entitle the party of the first part to a corresponding extension of the period prescribed for the completion of the vessel." It will thus be seen that the contract provides for the determination, in a specified way, of the "actual cost" of changes and "the damage, if any, caused thereby." The word "damage" is evidently here intended to be taken in its accurate and technical meaning, as determined by the wellsettled jurisprudence of this country with respect to the law of damages. It is a well-settled principle of law that, in the absence of any special provision to the contrary, the damage caused by anything must be its direct and immediate consequence and not the result of any intermediate causes, which may have been themselves due to the act or omission on which the claim for compensation is founded. If it had been intended that the word should be interpreted in a different sense in this passage, it would have been very easy to have inserted a clause to that effect. The claim of the contractor in this case is, stated very briefly, that if changes be made, or suggested as likely to be made, by the department, and this fact leads it to delay the work on the vessel, so as to avoid the duplication of labor if the change shall be actually made, then all the consequences of such delays are to be construed a part of the "damage" to which it will be entitled. It seems to me very clear that this contention can not be sustained. The contract says nothing of delay as a cause of damage or as furnishing a foundation for a claim to compensation. It says distinctly that delays caused by changes shall not be charged against the contractor in estimating the period prescribed for the completion of the vessel. If it had been the intention of the parties that these delays should have |