Opinion of the Court the said quarries are still "open and free to the Indians to visit and procure stone for pipes so long as they so desire." The court decided (1) that the only interest possessed by the plaintiffs in and to the land known as the Red Pipestone Quarries was the right "to the free and unrestricted use of the Red Pipestone Quarries, or so much thereof as they have been accustomed to frequent and use for the purpose of procuring stone for pipes," and this right, guaranteed to plaintiffs by Article VIII of the treaty of April 19, 1858 (11 Stat. 743, 746), had been continuously secured to them since the date of said treaty by the United States in strict conformity with the terms of said treaty, and (2) that no amount was "legally and equitably due from the United States" to the plaintiffs. BOOTH, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court: This is an Indian claim before the court under special jurisdictional acts. The Yankton Sioux is one of the numerous bands of the Great Sioux Nation which anciently inhabited a vast territory in the northwestern section of the country. The Yankton Sioux were known as one of the several bands generally designated as the Sioux of the Missouri. The Government negotiated and concluded various treaties with the different bands, with a view to acquiring title to their lands and providing suitable reservations for their occupancy. As to these treaties, the terms of which appear in the findings of this court in case No. 31253, we need enter upon no discussion. Yankton Sioux v. United States, 53 C. Cls. 67. As usual in such cases disputations arose, claims upon the part of the Indians were asserted, and the controversy with respect to the same culminated in the acts of April 4, 1910, 36 Stat. 269-284, and March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1058-1065, referring the case to this court with the limited authority to report back to Congress the court's findings of fact with respect to the subject matter. The court, from a complete record, reported its findings of fact without comment or allusion to issues of law. On June 3, 1920, 41 Stat. 738, Congress enacted the special jurisdictional act under which the claim of the Yank Opinion of the Court ton Sioux is again before us. The grant of jurisdiction under this statute extended generally to the Sioux Tribe of Indians and comprehended all claims not heretofore determined by the court. Subsequently, on January 9, 1925 (Public No. 318, 68th Cong., 44 Stat. 730), while the case was pending under the act of 1920, Congress conferred jurisdiction upon the court to adjudicate the claim of the plaintiff Indians, long asserted and persistently adhered to, for the value of the Red Pipestone Quarries, as it may or may not appear from the findings of the court in case No. 31253. In other words, the final jurisdictional act recognized the verity of the findings reported in case No. 31253 and granted authority to adjudicate and determine the claim of the plaintiff Indians as the findings in the former case disclose it. The plaintiff Indians did not amend their petition after the passage of the act of 1925. The petition was filed July 31, 1924, and the petition should have been amended. Inasmuch as the record now before us and the original petition itself prefers no claim other than for the Pipestone Quarries, and in view of the fact that the findings in this case, in any event, would be but a duplication of the findings in case No. 31253, we think the state of the record sufficient for us to dispose of the case. On April 19, 1858, 11 Stat. 743, by express treaty stipulations, the plaintiff Indians ceded all of the lands owned, possessed, or claimed by them, wherever situated, for the sum of $1,650,000, payable in fifty years, at the time reserving for the band a reservation of 400,000 acres on the Missouri River. Not only was this a general relinquishment of all the lands mentioned, but the settlement comprehended all outstanding differences and was designed to conclude the claims of the band against the Government arising from any source whatever. The treaty of 1858 embraced the Pipestone Quarries, but from time immemorial the Sioux had enjoyed a common privilege of visiting the quarries and taking therefrom sufficient stone for pipes and Indian ceremonials. Article VIII of the treaty reserved to the Indians this ancient privilege. Manifestly it was at the time, and may now be, a right of value and importance; at least the Yanktons so appraised it and the Government recognized Opinion of the Court it. The right and privilege, however, was not akin to the right of occupancy, the recognized Indian tribal title. It was in the nature of an easement. Its extinguishment, had the Government ever done so, would not warrant the court in awarding a judgment in any such amount as here claimed. As a matter of fact, however, and the court so finds, the right has not been extinguished by the Government. On the contrary, the easement has been continuously recognized by the Government, and the Yanktons have never been denied the privilege. The quarries are now, and ever have been, open, free, and available to the Indians without let or hindrance upon the part of the Government. There is absolutely nothing in the record to even suggest a contrary finding. Article XII of the treaty of 1892, ratified by section 12 of the act of August 15, 1894, 28 Stat. 286, 314, 317-319, in nowise constitutes a recognition of title to the lands in question in the Indians. What the legislation covers is a mere grant of authority and direction to determine the validity of the Indians' persistently asserted claim to the lands. The terms of this article are sui generis. Manifestly, it imposed upon the Secretary of the Interior a duty it was impossible under the law to discharge. The Secretary was powerless to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under the law, and the imposition of duty without the added provisions indispensable to its performance was beyond the power of Congress in this respect. This court was confronted with a similar situation in the case of Muskrat v. United States, 219 U. S. 346. Other contentions are advanced by the plaintiff Indians. They are in the main predicated upon inferences said to be deducible from acts of Congress and a decision of the Supreme Court. We have examined them with care. A sufficient answer is found in the apparent fact that Congress, possessed with plenary power and authority over Indian tribal lands and property, in the whole course of its dealings with the matter here involved has carefully refrained from recognizing the validity of the claim here preferred, and in no instance has evinced a willingness to do more than refer the matter to a court for adjudication. This case stands out, in fact, as a Reporter's Statement of the Case conspicuous example of governmental recognition of In dian rights created by treaty stipulations. The complaint of the plaintiff Indians is, in our view of the record, without merit, and the petition will be dismissed. It is so ordered. HAY, Judge; DOWNEY, Judge; and CAMPBELL, Chief Justice, concur. GRAHAM, Judge, took no part in the decision of this case. AMERICAN SEATING COMPANY v. THE UNITED STATES1 [No. C-14.] On the Proofs Contract; additional order; increase in price.-A contractor is not entitled to any excess over the original price for additional articles delivered where it has not complied with the conditions providing for an increase in price, nor is it entitled to damages for the Government's refusal to award a contract at an increased price for such additional articles. The Reporter's statement of the case: Mr. Raymond M. Hudson for the plaintiff. Mr. Edward D. Hays, with whom was Mr. Assistant Attorney General William J. Donovan, for the defendant. Decided June 8, 1925. Motion for new trial overruled October 26, 1925. The following are the facts as found by the court: I. The plaintiff, American Seating Company, is a corporation duly organized under the laws of the State of New Jersey, and engaged in the manufacture of medical supplies, tables, and equipment at Grand Rapids, Michigan, and with offices in Chicago, Illinois. II. The Government advertised for bids for 200,000 bedside folding tables, and the plaintiff, among other bidders, bid on the same. An award was made to plaintiff for 50,000 tables at 55 cents each, the award for the amount called for being split up among three contractors. Under date of Writ of certiorari denied. Reporter's Statement of the Case September 4, 1918, plaintiff entered into a contract with the Government, in writing, a copy of which, marked "Exhibit A," is made an exhibit to the petition and is by reference made a part of this finding. This contract called for the manufacture and delivery, under the terms stated in the contract, of 50,000 bedside folding tables at 55 cents each, 5,000 to be shipped on or before September 23, 1918, and shipments at the rate of 10,000 per week thereafter until completed. These 50,000 tables were in due time manufactured and delivered by the plaintiff and were paid for in full by the Government at the contract price of 55 cents each. III. On November 4, 1918, the field medical supply depot of the Army sent to plaintiff a telegram, stating there would be awarded plaintiff an order for 150,000 additional tables at the contract price, and for plaintiff to advise immediately when it could start production and rate of delivery. The plaintiff declined to accept this award at the contract price of 55 cents per table, but proposed to accept the order for the 150,000 tables at 65 cents per table. No order was placed for the 150,000 tables nor was plaintiff's proposal accepted by the Government. IV. Under date of November 7, 1918, the officer in charge of the field medical supply depot, U. S. Army, issued to plaintiff a purchase order, number 4820, a copy of which is made Exhibit B to the petition, and is by reference made a part of these findings. This purchase order number 4820 called for 50,000 bedside folding tables, and was a 100 per cent increase of contract under the provisions of said contract of September 4. This contract provided in paragraph 8, article 1, that the quantities would be increased at the option of the Government and with the consent of the contractor not exceeding 100 per cent, and further that the price originally specified would be increased not to exceed 10 per cent thereof at the time the contractor accepted the quantity increase provided for, provided the contractor was able to present evidence satisfactory to the contracting officer of an increase in the cost of material, overhead, or labor sufficient to justify the increase in price. The plaintiff accepted this purchase order for 50,000 additional tables and proceeded |