allowed a veto as to the establishment of new ways, which, in the very user thereof by the public, are evidenced to be of general advantage. If a way be voluntarily traversed by the people at large, it must be presumed to be beneficial to them; if it be of benefit, the law justly charges the parish with its reparation. It is almost a contradiction in terms, to say that the parish can dissent from a way, which the public have appropriated. The principle, upon which the liability to repair is founded, is, that the public shall be at the expence of keeping in good order their own ways. The parish is selected only as the means whereby that charge can be effected. Wherever a way is become a public way, then the parish must maintain it, as the agent for the people. Therefore, the intervention of the parish, as a parish, is not until after the public nature of the way is established. That is done through its adoption by, and, as a necessary consequence, its utility to, the people at large. Upon principle, then, the concurrence of the parish is not requisite; and in practice it is difficult to see how its dissent could be made manifest. Mr. Justice Bayley instances the case of bridges; and argues, that as the county has a power of indicting a newly-erected bridge, so the parish should have the privilege of negativing the dedication of a highway. The two cases, however, are by no means parallel. A public bridge is that which is erected in a highway; if it be not required, its erection is an obstruction of the way, and may be indicted; if it be beneficial, the county shall repair it. But under all circumstances, the passage over the bridge is a matter of necessity, not of choice. No one can traverse the highway without passing along the bridge; and it follows, that its user by the public is no evidence of their consent to its erection, nor any criterion of its utility. But if a bridge be of public utility, and be used by the public, they are obliged to repair it, though built by an individual: aliter, if built by him for his own benefit, and so continued, without public utility, though used by the public. And if a bridge built by an individual, and dedicated to the community, is not what it seems to be, but is of imperfect and inartificial construction, the public may reject and indict it for a nuisance, after discovering the cheat, though their previous conduct might, under different circumstances, have amounted to an acceptance (a). And if a bridge is thrown over a highway, and the public derive no benefit from it greater than they enjoyed before it was built, the builder is bound to repair it (b). But very different from that of a bridge is the situation of a highway. No necessity exists to compel the people to the use of it. Their adoption of it is an act purely voluntary; and instead of being a doubtful criterion of its utility, is a decisive proof to that effect. The different nature of the evidence required, then, is the sole cause of this distinction between highways and bridges. If a bridge be of public utility the county cannot refuse to maintain it, neither can they indict it; if a highway be of public utility, the parish must repair it. But in the one case the fact of the benefit derived, is proved by the very act which brings the way into existence; whereas, in the other case, additional evidence is required. Mr. Justice Bayley appears to have argued from the defenceless situation of the parish. If, however, the (a) Rex v. The Inhabitants of West Riding, Yorkshire, 2 East, (b) Rex v. Kerrison, 3 M. & S. 526. 1 common law be defective in the protection afforded to the parish, its deficiency is supplied by the late Highway Act(a), which provides for the extinction of such highways as are not of general advantage. SECONDLY.-Highways may be created by Turnpike Acts, Inclosure Acts, or other Acts of Parliament, containing specific enactments for such purposes (b). The quality of these ways must, of course, depend upon the nature of the enactments, in the respective Acts by which they are brought into existence. The provisions contained in any such Act, must be strictly complied with, before the way can be established, or the liability to repair it be enforced. Therefore where notices were required to be given, but appeared not to have been given, the proceeding under the Act was held to be invalid (c). In one case (d), a railway was made under authority of an Act of Parliament, by which the proprietors were incorporated; and by which it was provided that the public should have the beneficial enjoyment of the same. The Company having determined to render one branch of the rail-road impassable, caused the iron tram-plates thereon, for a space of several hundred yards, to be taken up, and thereby destroyed that branch. An application was thereupon made to the Court of King's Bench, for a mandamus to compel the Company to re-instate the (d) Rex v. The Severn and (a) 55 Geo. 3. c. 68. See post, Haslingfield, 2 M. & S. 558. Chapter V. (b) See Sutcliffe v. Greenwood, Wye Railway Company, 2 B. & A. 8 Price, 535. 646. (c) Rex v. The Inhabitants of E2 of its utility. But if a bridge be of public utility, and be used by the public, they are obliged to repair it, though built by an individual: aliter, if built by him for his own benefit, and so continued, without public utility, though used by the public. And if a bridge built by an individual, and dedicated to the community, is not what it seems to be, but is of imperfect and inartificial construction, the public may reject and indict it for a nuisance, after discovering the cheat, though their previous conduct might, under different circumstances, have amounted to an acceptance (a). And if a bridge is thrown over a highway, and the public derive no benefit from it greater than they enjoyed before it was built, the builder is bound to repair it (b). But very different from that of a bridge is the situation of a highway. No necessity exists to compel the people to the use of it. Their adoption of it is an act purely voluntary; and instead of being a doubtful criterion of its utility, is a decisive proof to that effect. The different nature of the evidence required, then, is the sole cause of this distinction between highways and bridges. If a bridge be of public utility the county cannot refuse to maintain it, neither can they indict it; if a highway be of public utility, the parish must repair it. But in the one case the fact of the benefit derived, is proved by the very act which brings the way into existence; whereas, in the other case, additional evidence is required. Mr. Justice Bayley appears to have argued from the defenceless situation of the parish. If, however, the common law be defective in the protection afforded to the parish, its deficiency is supplied by the late Highway Act(a), which provides for the extinction of such highways as are not of general advantage. (a) Rex r. The Inhabitants of West Riding, Yorkshire, 2 East, (b) Rex v. Kerrison, 3 M. & S. 526. SECONDLY.-Highways may be created by Turnpike Acts, Inclosure Acts, or other Acts of Parliament, containing specific enactments for such purposes (b). The quality of these ways must, of course, depend upon the nature of the enactments, in the respective Acts by which they are brought into existence. The provisions contained in any such Act, must be strictly complied with, before the way can be established, or the liability to repair it be enforced. Therefore where notices were required to be given, but appeared not to have been given, the proceeding under the Act was held to be invalid (c). In one case (d), a railway was made under authority of an Act of Parliament, by which the proprietors were incorporated; and by which it was provided that the public should have the beneficial enjoyment of the same. The Company having determined to render one branch of the rail-road impassable, caused the iron tram-plates thereon, for a space of several hundred yards, to be taken up, and thereby destroyed that branch. An application was thereupon made to the Court of King's Bench, for a mandamus to compel the Company to re-instate the (d) Rex v. The Severn and (a) 55 Geo. 3. c. 68. See post, Haslingfield, 2 M. & S. 558. Chapter V. (b) See Sutcliffe v. Greenwood, Wye Railway Company, 2 B. & A. 8 Price, 535. 646. (c) Rex v. The Inhabitants of |