ing." Many of the provisions of this statute framed for the purpose of securing its object have been repealed, but the preamble of the statute and its first section are as follows: "Forasmuch as the horrid, impious, and execrable vices of profane cursing and swearing (so highly displeasing to Almighty God and loathsome and offensive to every Christian) are become so frequent and notorious that unless speedily and effectually prevented they may justly provoke the Divine vengeance to increase the many calamities these nations may labour under: And whereas the laws now in being for punishing these crimes have not answered the intents for which they were designed by means of difficulties attending the putting such laws into execution: For remedy whereof may it please Your Most Excellent Majesty that it may be enacted, and be it enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal and Commons in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, that from and after the 1st day of June 1746 if any person or persons shall profanely curse or swear and be thereof convicted on the oath of any one or more witness or witnesses before any one justice of the peace for any county, city, riding, division, or liberty, or before the mayor, justice, bailiff, or other chief magistrate of any city or town, corporate, or by the confession of the person offending, every person or persons so offending shall forfeit or lose the respective sums hereinafter mentioned, that is to say, any day labourer, common soldier, common sailor, or common seaman, one shilling; every other person under the degree of a gentleman, two shillings; and every person of or above the degree of a gentleman, five shillings; and in case any such person shall after conviction offend a second time, every such person shall forfeit and lose double and for every other offence after a second conviction treble the sum first forfeited by any offended for profane cursing and swearing as aforesaid."

By various statutes passed between 1823 and 1893 many of the subsidiary provisions of this statute have been repealed. Thus in 1823 a section enacting that the Act should be read quarterly in the churches, under penalties for the omission of such reading, was repealed (4 Geo. 4, c. 31). So, too, under the Statute Law Revisions Act 1867, the Summary Jurisdiction Act 1884 (47 & 48 Vict. c. 43), and the Public Authorities Protection Act 1893 (56 & 57 Vict. c. 61) many ancillary provisions for the enforcement of this Act have been repealed, but one of these provisions still remains the law of the land, whereby "a constable wilfully and wittingly omitting the performance of his duty in the execution of this Act and convicted thereof shall forfeit or lose the sum of forty shillings to be levied off his goods and chattels, and, in case the goods and chattels be not sufficient, it shall be lawful to commit the offender to prison, to remain there and to be kept to hard labour." In the face of this provision of a statute still extant, "more effectually to prevent profane swearing," there is a grim irony in the rebuke of the magistrate, recorded in the Times, to the constable who preferred the charge of swearing against the prisoners accused, "I think you should be more judicious."

This Act of George II., which may now be regarded as forgotten and dormant, had not at a time comparatively recent become practically obsolete through desuetude. As recently as 1863 a conviction, under sect. 1 of this statute, by two justices of Buckinghamshire, removed by certiorari to the Court of Queen's Bench, charging that the defendant did profanely curse one profane curse (setting it out twenty several times repeated), and adjudging him for this said offence to forfeit the sum of £2, being a cumulative penalty at the rate of 2s. for each repetition of the oath, was held good: (Reg. v. Scott, 4 B. & S.,

p. 368). In Blackstone's Commentaries, published in 1765, this statute of George II. is cited, and the offence of profane and common swearing is stated to be allied to the offence of blasphemy, "though in an inferior degree." In the earlier editions of Stephen's Blackstone the dissertation by Blackstone on the offerce of profane and common swearing and his sketch of the principal provisions of the Act of George II. are retained. They, however, find no place in the later editions of Stephen's Blackstone, although in the edition of 1868-the sixth edition-pointed reference is made in a note to the case of Reg. v. Scott, which supplies conclusive evidence that the Act was not dormant in 1863. No reference, moreover, is made to the offence of swearing in Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law nor in Kenny's Outlines of Criminal Law. In Harris' Criminal Law, of which the thirteenth edition was published in 1919, it is stated, "Profane swearing is punishable on summary conviction by fine," and in a footnote reference is made to the statute of George II. In the "Index to the Statutes still in force to the 31st Dec. 1920," the statute of George II. is included, and the repeal of certain provisions as to penalties and procedure set forth. In 1863, when the case of Reg. v. Scott was decided, no provisions as to penalties and procedure had been repealed, with the sole exception of the provision requiring the statute to be read at stated periods in church, and the penalties prescribed in the case of the neglect of that provision.

This statute, which is still extant as substantive law, while many of the provisions for rendering its operation effective— in other words, the adjective law relating thereto have been repealed, cannot be regarded as yet another instance of that curious conservation of our English legislators, to which Mr. Lecky directs attention, who have constantly allowed a law to become dormant rather than repeal it. In this case, while the law against swearing has not been actually repealed-a concession to the moral sensibilities of the community-it has been rendered virtually dormant by the actual repeal of many of the provisions by which it was enforced, whose application was probably deemed to be out of harmony with the trend of public opinion by reason of their harshness and encroachment on constitutional rights and liberties. The statute of George II., which has been designedly unrepealed in relation to the offence with which it deals, while many of the sections by which it was enforced have been repealed, so as to render the existence of the statute forgotten, may be regarded as an object lesson, supplied by the statute-book, of deference to the moral sense of the community, which would have been outraged by a total repeal of the statute, accompanied with concession to public opinion by the repeal of special provisions enforcing the observance of the statute which are in themselves inconsistent with the popular conception of the liberty of the subject.-Law Times.

Cases of Interest

VALIDITY OF CONTRACT BY PARENT TO SURRENDER CUSTODY OF CHILD.-In Hooks v. Bridgewater, 229 S. W. 1114, the Texas Supreme Court held, apparently contrary to the weight of authority, that a contract by a parent to surrender his child to another, in consideration of the latter's promise to leave his property to the child at death, is void as against public policy. The reasoning of the court was as follows: "A parent has no property interest in his child, and should not be permitted to deal with his child as property. It was so held in Legate v. Legate, 87 Tex.

248, 28 S. W. 281, but the proposition needs no authority for its support. The law should not encourage the relinquishment by parents of their children, and the renunciation of a sacred relation imposed by nature, merely for the children's enrichment, by placing the seal of validity upon a contract in which a parent in effect barters his child away for a property return. It is more concerned in fostering and maintaining that relation, and guarding its valuable and wholesome influences, than in promoting the child's financial prosperity. Let it be once held that a parent's contract of this kind is valid and may be enforced, and every parent will be free to transfer his children to anyone willing to pay them well for the bargain. We are unwilling to subscribe to such a doctrine. It tends to the destruction of one of the finest relations of human life, to the subversion of the family tie, and to the reversal of an ordering of nature which is essential to human happiness and the security of society. It reduces parental duty and the child's welfare to the sordid level of financial profit, and would license the easy surrender of that duty for merely the child's financial advantage. The custody of a child is not a subject-matter of contract, and therefore can constitute no consideration for a contract."

RIGHT OF PERSON SIGNING PROMISSORY NOTE TO SHOW THAT HE SIGNED MERELY AS WITNESS.-In Figari v. Olcese (Cal.) 195 Pac. 425, it was held that one who, with knowledge of the payee, has signed a note as witness, and has qualified his signature by prefixing the word "Witness" to it, may show that his name was written and accepted in that capacity alone. Said the court: "Even where one has joined apparently as a maker of a note, he may show by parol evidence, as against the payee, that he has signed, with the knowledge of the payee, in a different capacity and with a different liability, where, as here, such facts are pleaded. Civ. Code, § 2832; 3 R. C. L. p. 1138; Kelly v. Gillespie, 12 Iowa 55, 79 Am. Dec. 516; Spencer v. Alki Point Transp. Co. 53 Wash. 77, 132 Am. St. Rep. 1058, 101 Pac. 509; Gillett v. Taylor, 14 Utah 190, 60 Am. St. Rep. 890, 46 Pac. 1099; Windhorst v. Bergendahl, 21 S. D. 218, 130 Am. St. Rep. 715, 111 N. W. 544; Farmers' Nat. Gold Bank v. Slover, 60 Cal. 387; Casey v. Gibbons, 136 Cal. 368, 68 Pac. 1032. This is true for the purpose of showing that an apparent principal is only bound as a surety, notwithstanding the appending of the word 'surety' after the signature does not in itself change the liability of the party so signing. Aud v. Magruder, 10 Cal. 282; Southern California Nat. Bank v. Wyatt, 87 Cal. 616, 25 Pac. 918. It surely follows that where the signer, with the knowledge and assent of the payee, has signed only as a witness, and has qualified his signature on the note itself by so significant a designation as the word 'Witness,' he may be permitted to show that his name was written and accepted in that capacity alone. It may be admitted that it is an unnecessary and unusual precaution to have the execution of a promissory note witnessed, but it appears that all of the parties to this transaction were unfamiliar with business customs and requirements, and the respondent testified that this was his first experience with a promissory note."

STOPPING AUTOMOBILE ON STREET CAR TRACK TO DISCHARGE GUEST AS NEGLIGENCE.-In Fitch v. Bay State Street Ry. Co. 237 Mass. 65, 129 N. E. 423, it was held that the driver of an automobile may be found not to be negligent so as to deprive him of a right of action for injuries to his wife when the car is struck by a street car, although in order to discharge two invalid guests in front of their home he stops the automobile in the gutter adjacent to the sidewalk with a portion of it on the street car track which runs along the side of the road at a time when no street car is in sight, if the automobile traffic in the street makes

such position safer and more convenient for the discharge of the guests than a position would be which was outside the car tracks. It was also held that a woman riding in an automobile with her husband and guests may be found not to be negligent in remaining in the car when her husband stops it at a time when no street car is in sight, adjacent to the curb, with a portion of it on the street car tracks which run along the side of the road, in order more easily to discharge his invalid guests, especially if she sees her son run back to stop a street car when it appears in sight, so as to permit her to hold the street car company liable for injuries inflicted upon her by colliding with the automobile. The court said: "It is plain that it could not be ruled as matter of law that either plaintiff acted heedlessly, or was willing to take the chance of being injured. The plaintiffs were lawfully using the street, and the conduct of Mr. Fitch, in stopping and in assisting the Snows to reach their home, the jury could say, was justifiable under the circumstances for the needs and welfare of his guests. Evensen v. Lexington & B. Street R. Co. 187 Mass. 77, 72 N. E. 355; Chaput v. Haverhill, G. & D. Street R. Co. 194 Mass. 218, 220, 80 N. E. 597. The present case is distinguishable from Lawrence v. Fitchburg & L. Street R. Co. 201 Mass. 489, 87 N. E. 898, where the plaintiff, knowing that a car was approaching, deliberately stopped his automobile on the track without taking any precautions whatever for the personal safety of his wife or of himself. Mrs. Fitch, who had seen her son run back and meet the approaching car when it was quite a distance away, well may have had no reason to anticipate that the motorman would not see the automobile and avoid running into it. If, in the light of what happened, she overstayed, a 'plaintiff is not to be charged with negligence because of a mere error of judgment, especially when the circumstances are such as to call for speedy decision and action.""

PROOF OF HABIT OR CUSTOM OF PERSON KILLED AT RAILROAD CROSSING WITH RESPECT TO EXERCISE OF CARE AND CAUTION.-In Wallis v. Southern Pacific Co. (Cal.) 195 Pac. 408, it was held that in the absence of an eyewitness of a crossing accident in which one attempting to drive a team across a railroad track was killed, evidence was admissible of his habit of care and caution under such circumstances. In the course of an exhaustive opinion reviewing the authorities, the court said: "We do not understand that the authorities which uphold the admissibility of this class of testimony only in the absence of direct evidence base the condition of its admission upon an entire absence of other evidence as to collateral facts that may uphold an inference as to what happened, but upon the absence of direct testimony of any eyewitness that the thing did or did not occur. In this case there was no direct testimony. The law governing this class of evidence is perplexingly inharmonious. The weight of authority, however, seems to uphold its use under the conditions stated, that there is an absence of satisfactory testimony of eyewitnesses as to the fact in controversy, while other decisions and authorities consider it legitimate evidence without such condition. This limitation upon the introduction of such testimony seems rather illogical. If the fact of the existence of habits of caution in a given particular has any legitimate evidentiary weight, the party benefited ought to have the advantage of it for whatever it is worth, even against adverse eyewitnesses; and if the testimony of the eyewitnesses is in his favor, it would be at least a harmless cumulation of evidence to permit testimony of his custom or habit. . . Most of the text-writers seem to recognize the competency of such testimony. 10 R. C. L. p. 955, § 127, thus states the doctrine: 'A habit of doing a thing is naturally of probative value as indicating that on a particular occasion the thing was done as usual, and, if

clearly shown as a definite course of action, is constantly admitted in evidence'; but recognizes the limitation upon such evidence by adding: The weight of authority seems to be against admitting evidence of general conduct under proven circumstances, to show conduct of the same kind under similar circumstances on a particular occasion, when there were eyewitnesses of the occurrence.' ... We think the evidence excepted to in this case was properly admitted. The weight of this class of evidence, of course, depends upon the nature of the act and the fixity of the habit, but that is a question which can properly be left to the jury under proper instructions."

DUTY OF AUTOMOBILE OPERATOR TO HAVE HEADLIGHT SUFFICIENT TO SHOW RAILROAD CROSSING.-In Serfas v. Lehigh, etc. R. Co., 270 Pa. St. 306, 113 Atl. 370, reported and annotated in 14 A. L. R. 791, the court held that it is the duty of the operator of an automobile traveling by night to have such a headlight as will enable him to see in advance the face of the highway, and to discover a grade railroad crossing, and that he cannot excuse his failure to stop, look, and listen before crossing a railroad track, by pleading darkness. Said the court: "To vindicate the judgment, it is only necessary to consider the question of contributory negligence. The deceased, who was familiar with the road and crossing, was driving from 15 to 20 miles per hour, and admittedly did not stop until upon the track, and then only because of a shout from the rear brakeman, who saw the impending collision, which instantly resulted. The deceased openly violated the inflexible rule requiring the traveler to stop, look, and listen before entering upon a railroad track. The only excuse offered is the darkness, which is insufficient. There was possibly some slight artificial light there from a trolley car standing near by and from electric lights on a high pole; but, entirely aside from this, it is the duty of a chauffeur traveling by night to have such a headlight as will enable him to see in advance the face of the highway and to discover grade crossings, or other obstacles in his path, in time for his own safety, and to keep such control of his car as will enable him to stop and avoid obstructions that fall within, his vision. For example, it is the chauffeur's duty to keep his car under such control that whenever his headlight has brought a grade crossing into view he can stop before reaching it. Such crossing is not invisible by day, nor, when an auto is equipped with proper lights, by night; in either case, the chauffeur must discover its presence and stop before driving thereon. We have never held darkness an excuse for failure to perform this absolute duty, but the contrary. Anspach v. Philadelphia & R. R. Co. 225 Pa. 528, 28 L. R. A. (N. S.) 382, 74 Atl. 373; Eline v. Western Maryland R. Co. 262 Pa. 33, 104 Atl. 857. In the language of our Brother Kephart in McGrath v. Pennsylvania R. Co. 71 Pa. Super. Ct. 1, 3: 'It is the duty of the driver of a car, driving on a dangerous highway on a dark, stormy night, to have his car under such control that he may stop or turn it away when objects intercepting his passage come within range of the rays of light from his lamps. If he drives so fast that he cannot avoid what ordinary prudence would make a known obstruction, he is guilty of negligence.'

DUTY OF CARRIER OF LIVE STOCK WITH RESPECT TO CONDITION OF STOCK PENS OR YARDS.-In Lane v. Oregon Short Line R. Co. (Idaho) 198 Pac. 671, reported and annotated in 15 A. L. R. 197, it was held that no inference of negligence can be drawn from the failure of a carrier to provide its stockyards with patented locks, unless the circumstances are shown to be such that a prudent person would have provided locks. The court, reviewing the facts, said: "Respondent, Lane, recovered a judgment against appellant railroad company for damages to an interstate shipment

of lambs, alleged to have been wholly and entirely due to the careless and negligent manner in which the stockyards in the village of Shoshone were managed and controlled by appellant. An agent of respondent accompanied the shipment under a shipping contract which provided that the shipper would, at his own risk and expense, load, unload, care for, feed, and water the stock until delivery of the same to consignee at destination.' When the lambs reached Shoshone they were unloaded by respondent's agents and placed in the stock pens provided by appellant, and were fed by respondent. The gates were fastened by pins which dropped into hasps, and were not provided with patented locks. After feeding the lambs, respondent's agent fastened the gates and left the sheep unattended. During the night a large number of the lambs escaped from the pens, and thirty-eight of them were lost. In the morning the gates were found closed, and in the same condition in which they had been left the night before . . . It is claimed that the failure to provide the gates with patented locks was negligence. No inference of negligence can be drawn from such failure, unless there was a showing of such circumstances that a prudent person would have provided locks, as, for example, that others in the community locked their pens and corrals in which live stock was kept at night, or that sheep or other livestock had escaped from the pens previously, or that it was customary for railroad stockyards to be provided with locks. Beckman v. Southern P. R. Co. 39 Utah 472, 118 Pac. 118; Ft. Worth & D. C. R. Co. v. Gatewood, Tex. Civ. App. 185 S. W. 932; Colsch v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 149 Iowa 176, 34 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1013, 127 N. W. 198, Ann. Cas. 1912C, p. 915. The court instructed the jury, at the request of respondent, that the gates should be so secured that they could not be opened by anyone who attempted to interfere with the possession of the property, without committing a crime. This instruction does not state the proper measure of the duty of the carrier of live stock when unloaded into the yards for food and rest, accompanied by the shipper under a contract such as was executed in this case. Under such circumstances, the carrier is not an insurer, and its duty is performed when it furnishes suitable yards in proper condition and reasonably secure."

9

ACCEPTING CHECK FOR LARGER AMOUNT THAN DUE AS LARCENY.-In Hedge v. State (Tex.) 229 S. W. 862, it was held that one who accepts a check for a larger amount than is due, with intent to appropriate the surplus to his own use and benefit, is guilty of larceny. On a motion for a rehearing the court said: "Counsel appointed to defend, with disinterested fidelity has filed an able motion for rehearing, urging that what appellant took was in fact a check for $1,061, and that, inasmuch as he was rightfully entitled to part of the proceeds of said check, he was part owner of the property so taken, and hence guilty of no offense. We are unable to agree to the soundness of this proposition under the facts of this case. If A owes B $7.50, and by mistake gives in settlement a check for $75, which B accepts, places in his pocket, and presents at the bank, and, upon payment to him by the bank of the $75 called for by said check, conceives the intent to appropriate the $67.50 excess, he would be guilty of theft of such excess. Illustrations might be multiplied. One might be given a trunk or grip by the owner, to be carried to a certain point, or a carrier might receive a coat to be taken to a shop to be pressed, and in either illustration a $100 bill might be found therein, and if the party who had received the trunk, grip or coat originally conceived at the time of finding the money an intent to appropriate it, and did so appropriate it, it occurs to us that his offense would relate to the time of the appropriation of the money. In the instant case the bank lost nothing; the check

was genuine, and drawn by the maker for the sum stated. The owner lost the $424, and the loss was not that of the bank. We think at the time appellant acquired said money, if his acquisition was accompanied with the intent at the time to appropriate said excess, it made him guilty of theft of the money. If charged with the theft of the check, there might be ground for the contention. A check in a sense is property whose value is wholly relative, and, unless there be money of the drawer in the bank named therein at the time of presentment for payment, said check but evidences an agreement to pay, and is subject to explanation, contradiction, or entire defeat of value, as are other similar instruments. It does not even operate as an assignment of funds, or the extinguishment of a debt, except the money be on hand in the bank and be paid upon presentment. We think one who receives a check and uses the same as a means to fraudulently obtain money not his own, with intent to appropriate same, and who does so appropriate it, may be charged and convicted of theft of such money if the case made by the pleading and submitted in charge to the jury is based on an intent to appropriate, entertained and executed when said money comes into the possession of the person who received said check and presented it for payment."

New Books

Essays on Constitutional Law and Equity. By Henry Schofield, M.A., LL.B., late Professor Northwestern University Law School. 2 vols. Boston: The Chipman Law Publishing Co. 1921.

The late Professor Schofield was a member of the faculty of Northwestern University Law School from 1901 to 1918 and taught Equity and Constitutional Law. Previously he served as assistant corporation counsel of the city of Chicago, and also as assistant to the Solicitor General of the United States at Washington. The essays contained in the two volumes at hand were contributed to the Illinois Law Review, and have been collected here by the Faculty of Law of Northwestern University. Professor Schofield was a rare scholar and profound thinker, and at the time of his death in the year 1918 these qualities were generally recognized as belonging to him. The Constitutional topics covered by these volumes include the relations of the Federal and State courts under the Constitution, the full faith and credit clause, trial by jury, interstate commerce, due process of law, punishment, religious liberty and liberty of the press, the obligation of contracts clause, and the power of appointment to public office. The subjects in Equity which are discussed relate to specific performance; construction, reformation and rescission of written instruments; relief against torts; relief against proceedings at law; subrogation and exoneration, and administration of assets. Students of the subjects treated by Professor Schofield can hardly afford to be without these volumes which represent the mature thought of a great teacher.

A New Constitution for a New America. By William MacDonald. New York: B. W. Huebsch, Inc. 1921.

Mr. MacDonald has views which, if adopted, would necessitate a radical change in our Constitution. He would make the Cabinet responsible to Congress, thereby taking a page from the political history of England, and would increase the powers of the lower house of Congress and change its representation. He is in favor of some sort of group representation as well as representation

based on population. He suggests a few changes with respect to the Senate, and has something to say with regard to the Presidency. Mr. MacDonald is pretty well satisfied with the federal courts as they now exist, but he would provide for administrative courts and he is opposed to the arbitrary authority now exercised by federal courts by means of receivership and injunctions. The book is exceedingly well written, and we have found it an interesting criticism of the Constitution as it now exists.

Law School Notes

Association of American Law Schools

The Association of American Law Schools met in Chicago, December 29 to 31. The officers of the Association are: Arthur L. Corbin, Yale Law School, New Haven, Connecticut, President; Henry Craig Jones, Law School, University of Illinois, Secretary and Treasurer. The Association is composed of fifty-four law schools. The program consisted of a discussion of the recent report of the Carnegie Foundation on "Training for the Public Profession of the Law," and round table conferences on various branches of the law.

Cornell University College of Law

Judge Frank Irvine, for seven years a Public Service Commissioner for the second district in the State of New York, delivered three lectures in December to the senior class on the subject of the making of rates for Public Service Commissions, valuations of Public Service property, and practice before Public Service Commissions.

Judge Irvine is recognized as one of the foremost authorities in the East on these questions.

Indiana University School of Law

The total number of students in the classes of the Indiana University School of Law for the twelve weeks summer session of 1921 and the fall semester of 1921-22, excluding duplications, is 235.

The following new courses have been added for the current year: a course of 18 lectures in the first semester by Mr. Justice Ewbank of the Supreme Court of Indiana on "Appellate Procedure under the Law of Indiana"; a course of 18 lectures in the second semester by the Hon. Charles W. Moores of the Indianapolis Bar on "The New Growth in Constitutional Law"; a course, running through the second semester, by Professor Britton in Legal Bibli- • ography; and a series of moot court cases, supplementing the regular moot court work of the school, and based each on the facts of a recent actual case in a State or Federal court. Each moot court case in this series is to be conducted under the immediate supervision and criticism of one of the lawyers in the trial of the actual case.

The lectures on The New Growth in Constitutional Law are designed to supplement the regular course in Constitutional Law running two hours a week through the year and based on Hall's

cases.

The only change this year in the resident faculty of the Law School is in the addition of Professor William E. Britton, who comes to Indiana from the Law Faculty of the University of Illinois. Professor Britton began his work at Indiana with the opening of the current semester. He has the courses in Agency

and Negotiable Instruments and Legal Bibliography. He will also have charge of the development of a law course for the new School of Commerce at Indiana University.

University of Minnesota Law School

The University of Minnesota Law School has an enrollment of 297. The entering class is 153, an increase of 39 per cent over the first year class of last year.

The first year curriculum has been changed by taking out Carriers and Persons and substituting therefor an introductory course on Actions and Equity. A course in Public Utilities is offered to third year students.

The faculty has been increased by the appointment of George E. Osborne, B.A. Cal. 1916, LL.B. Harv. 1919, S.J.D. Harv. 1920, as assistant professor of law. During his course in Harvard Law School Mr. Osborne was president of the editorial board of the Harvard Law Review. He was, last year, assistant professor in the University of West Virginia, where he was editor-in-chief of the Law Quarterly. Mr. Osborne's subjects are the introductory course in Actions and Equity, Sales, and Trusts.

Professor A. A. Bruce taught the subject of Equity during the summer session at Northwestern University Law School.

Professor Noel T. Dowling was engaged during the summer with the Legislative Drafting Service of the United States Senate. Work was provided by the Law School during the summer quarter for second and third year students. The enrollment was 58, twice the number of the preceding year. The increase was surprising because credits earned in summer work no longer enable students to avoid attendance for the three regular academic years.

The summer instruction was given by Professors Ballantine, Fletcher, and Paige.

News of the Profession

WISCONSIN BAR ASSOCIATION.-The 1922 meeting of the Wisconsin Bar Association will be held in Fond du Lac next June.

VETERAN KANSAS LAWYER DEAD.-James A. Smith, 82 years old, of Girard, Kansas, is dead. He was once a probate judge, and fought in the civil war.

DEATHS IN MISSOURI include Judge M. G. Dale of Richmond; Judge Allen E. Dent of Hannibal, and Judge A. D. Burns of Platte City.

WEST TENNESSEE BAR ASSOCIATION.-The semi-annual meeting of the West Tennessee Bar Association was held at Memphis in December. This association was organized in 1921.

DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL OF DELAWARE DEAD.-Albert Worth, deputy attorney general for Sussex county, is dead. He was born in Philadelphia in 1875.

FORMER TEXAS JUDGE RESUMES PRACTICE OF LAW.-Former Chief Justice Nelson Phillips of the Texas Supreme Court has taken up the practice of law in Dallas with Murphy Townsend.

STARK COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION OF ILLINOIS.-Members of the Stark County Bar of Illinois have recently organized a bar association and have elected W. W. Wright of Toulon president.

DEATH OF PIONEER LAWYER OF MINNEAPOLIS.-Frank C. Griswold, of Minneapolis, died in December, aged 83 years. He was born at Griswoldville near Hartford, Connecticut.

YELLOWSTONE COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION OF MONTANA.—The fifteenth annual banquet of this association was held at Billings, Montana, recently. Colonel O. F. Goddard presided.

LEADING WEST VIRGINIA LAWYER DEAD.-William P. Hubbard, a leading lawyer of Wheeling, West Virginia, is dead. He was president of the class of 1863 of Wesleyan University of Middletown, Connecticut.

SPRINGFIELD BAR ASSOCIATION.-At a well attended meeting of the Springfield Bar Association of Missouri Senator Frank M. McDavid was elected president and Lou S. Haynes secretary.

SAN FRANCISCO DEATHS.-Alexander F. Morrison, a San Francisco attorney, died in Singapore recently. He was a member of the law firm of Morrison, Dunne & Brobeck. Rufus C. Thayer of the same city died in November.

MILWAUKEE BAR ASSOCIATION.-Dean Henry M. Bates of the University of Wisconsin Law School addressed the Milwaukee Bar Association recently on "State Sovereignty and the Expansion of National Powers."

VIRGINIA DEATHS.-The profession in Virginia has lost by death Albert Blanchard of Bristol, who was born in Madisonville, Tennessee, and studied law at the University of Virginia; also Judge J. Frank Yoakley of Blountsville.

ILLINOIS BAR ASSOCIATION. Dr. Nicholas Murray Butler, president of Columbia University, and Hon. C. A. Severance, president of the American Bar Association, were speakers at a banquet of the Illinois Bar Association held at Chicago, December 10.

WELL KNOWN OREGON ATTORNEY DEAD.-Marion Francis Dolph, of Portland, Oregon, died in November. He was the son of former United States Senator Joseph M. Dolph, and was once a football star at Williams College, Massachusetts.

NASSAU COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION OF NEW YORK.-Assistant District Attorney Elvin N. Edwards of Freeport, Long Island, was elected president of the Nassau County Bar Asociation for the year 1922 succeeding Earl J. Bennett of Rockville Centre.

LAKE COUNTY BAR ASSOCIATION OF ILLINOIS.-This association was recently addressed by Stanley Tuthill of Chicago, who discussed the "Blue Sky Law." Judge Benjamin H. Miller of Libertyville presided. The meeting was held at Waukegan.

DEATH OF GEORGIA JUDGE.-Judge L. B. Shannon of the City Court of Jeffersonville, Twiggs county, Georgia, is dead at the age of 63. He was born in Missouri and his father was at one time president of the University of Missouri.

DALLAS BAR ASSOCIATION.-Justices Dexter Hamilton of Corsicana and Robert M. Vaughn of Hillsboro; District Judge H. E. Gilbert of Dallas, and United States District Attorney Henry Zweifel of Granbury were guests at a recent banquet of the Dallas Bar Association.

PROMINENT CHICAGO ATTORNEY PASSES AWAY.-The death of Frank L. Shephard, prominent Chicago attorney, is announced. He was a partner of the late Judge Jesse A. Baldwin, was born in 1867, and attended Beloit College and Chicago Law School.

PENNSYLVANIA JUDGE GIVEN TESTIMONIAL BANQUET.-Members of the Washington County Bar Association of Pennsylvania, on December 20, gave a testimonial banquet to Judge J. A. McIlvaine of the Washington County Court who resigned after rounding out thirty-five years as a judge.