the Japanese occupation of Formosa with satisfaction owing to the close trade relations of Formosa with the British merchants in China, and now he intervened and became the mediator of the dispute. An agreement was signed October 31, 1874.21

LEW CHEW ISLANDS, 1879

Closely associated with and intimately related to the Formosan dispute, was the controversy over the possession of the Lew Chew Islands, which lie north of Formosa, and command another avenue to the sea-borne trade with China.

The Lew Chews were one of those satellite states like Korea, Annam, Siam, and Burmah. The Lew Chewians had their own king, but he received investiture from the Emperor of China, and further testified to his dependence by sending periodical tribute-bearing embassies which handed over their gifts to the customs tautai at Foochow, by whom they were sent to Peking.22

The American relation to the Lew Chew controversy was more intimate than to the Formosan question. In 1854, Commodore Perry had made a treaty with the King of the Lew Chews in which the suzerainty of China was not recognized except by the fact that the treaty was dated according to the Chinese calendar and was written in Chinese. Perry regarded the Lew Chews as of great strategic importance and it is to be feared that his plan for the future of the Lew Chews contemplated something very like an American protectorate over the islands. He saw in Great Lew Chew a possible American "Malta," or "Colombo," or "Hong-kong." In these days it is difficult for Americans to realize the force of the arguments which Perry used, but at that time American ambitions in the Pacific, while by no means a part of official American policy, were most pronounced.23

The Japanese also had a claim upon the Lew Chews because of the fact that the inhabitants of the islands had been accustomed to pay tribute yearly to the Prince of Satsuma. When feudalism was abolished in Japan, this claim of Satsuma upon the islands was vested in the Mikado, and the Japanese, who had not overlooked the strategic value of the islands, as well as the attention which Commodore Perry had paid to them, proceeded to assert their authority over the Lew Chews to the exclusion of the historic

21 Parliamentary Papers, China No. 2 (1875), Correspondence respecting settlement of the difficulty between China and Japan in regard to the Island of Formosa. Further Correspondence presented Mar. 9, 1875. Foreign Relations, 1875, p. 221, Williams to Fish, Nov. 12, 1874.

22 For a discussion of this most complicated question of the exact status of the Lew Chews vis a vis China, see Foreign Relations, 1880, p. 194, Dec. 11, 1879, Seward to Secretary of State.

23 Perry Correspondence, Sen. Ex. Doc. 34; 33-2, pp. 12 ff., 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 66, 81, 108-110, 112, 174.

Chinese claim of suzerainty. The conflicting claims of China and Japan were a subject of discussion for many years. In the treaty between China and Japan in 1874, for the settlement of the Formosan trouble, Japan cleverly inserted the following sentence: "The raw barbarians of Formosa once unlawfully inflicted injury on the people belonging to Japan, and the Japanese Government, with the intention of making the said barbarians answer for their acts, sent troops to chastise them." The treaty also stated that Japan had acted justly in the matter. Thus Japan cut the ground from under the Chinese claim of suzerainty over the Lew Chews, for the people referred to as belonging to Japan were Lew Chew sailors.24 The Chinese claim, in the judgment of the Japanese, no longer had a standing in international law, and when the Chinese discovered the way in which they had been outwitted, they fell back on sullen defiance. In 1879, the Lew Chew king was deposed by the Japanese because his emissaries had been seeking the good offices of the American and other ministers in Tokio, with a view to having the old relationship to China restored. The United States had contented itself, when Japan formally annexed the islands, with receiving assurances from Japan that American rights in the islands would in no way be disturbed, and never interfered with the program of Japan, regarding the controversy as purely between China, the King of the Lew Chews and Japan.

The points of irritation between China and Japan multiplied after the Formosan affair in 1874, and when General Grant visited Peking in 1879, the two nations were on the point of war. Grant saw very clearly that the European nations might seize the opportunity to enhance their own interests. It was, therefore, a matter of satisfaction to General Grant when the Chinese proposed and the Japanese agreed to submit the Lew Chew question to mediation.

After many conferences with the Chinese in Peking and a thorough review of the question in Tokio, General Grant wrote a letter, August 18, 1879, to Prince Kung, practically Prime Minister of China, which, before being sent, was shown to the Emperor of Japan and received his approval.25 In this letter Grant submitted the following proposals: (1) China to withdraw certain threatening and menacing dispatches which had been addressed to Japan on the subject; (2) each country to appoint a commission, and the two commissions to confer on the subject; (3) no foreign power to be brought into the discussion, but in case the commissions could not agree they might appoint an arbitrator whose decisions should be binding on both Japan and China.26

24 Stead, op. cit., p. 171.

25 China Despatches, Vol. 61, No. 33, Oct. 9, 1882, Young to Frelinghuysen. 26 John Russell Young, Men and Memories, Vol. 2, pp. 294-5. John Russell Young, Around the World with General Grant, Vol. 2, pp. 410-412, 415, 543-46, 558-60.

General Grant then took the opportunity to point out to China the necessity for peace. His language is interesting for its earnestness and as an indication of General Grant's conclusions on the impending conflict in Asia. He wrote:

In the vast East, embracing more than two-thirds of the human population of the world, there are but two nations even partially free from the domination and dictation of some one or other of the European Powers, with intelligence and strength enough to maintain their independenceJapan and China are the two nations. The people of both are brave, intelligent, frugal, and industrious. With a little more advancement in modern civilization, mechanics, engineering, etc., they could throw off the offensive treaties which now cripple and humiliate them, and could enter into competition for the world's commerce.

Japan is now rapidly reaching a condition of independence, and if it had now to be done over, such treaties as exist could not be forced upon her. What Japan has done, and is now doing, China has the power-and I trust the inclination-to do. I can readily conceive that there are many foreigners, particularly among these interested in trade, who do not look beyond the present and who would like to have the present condition remain, only grasping more from the East, and leaving the natives of the soil merely "hewers of wood and drawers of water" for their benefit. I have so much sympathy for the good of their (the foreigner's) children, if not-for them, that I hope the two countries will disappoint them.

It has been stated, and probably correctly, that General Grant went even so far as to recommend that Japan and China form an alliance against the western powers.

The Government of the United States, fearing that the good offices of the United States were being accepted by the two powers under a misapprehension that General Grant in some way officially represented the United States, instructed its representatives to make clear that he had acted in an entirely personal capacity.2

27

Both nations accepted General Grant's proposal and the two commissions met in Peking. After three months' discussion, they arrived at a settlement according to which the islands were to be divided.28 However, on the day fixed for the signatures, China suddenly withdrew the question from the commission and referred it to Chinese superintendents of trade at the northern and southern districts.29

"A glaring instance of international treachery" on the part of China, the North China Daily News (Jan. 27, 1883) called it, but it was subse

27 Foreign Relations, 1881, p. 243, Apr. 4, 1881, Blaine to Angell.

28 It has been frequently stated (cf. Robert P. Porter, Japan, the Rise of a Modern Power, p. 119; H. B. Morse, op. cit., Vol. II, p. 322) that General Grant himself proposed the partition of the islands between China and Japan. As a matter of fact, the most important point in the mediation by General Grant was that China and Japan should, if possible, settle their own disputes without the admission of any European into the controversy.

29 Foreign Relations, ibid., p. 229, Jan. 25, 1881, Angell to Secretary of State. See 1873, pp. 188, 553, 564; 1879, p. 637; 1880, p. 194, for details of entire controversy.

quently discovered that Japan, not content with the settlement of the Lew Chew question by itself, had, at the last minute, insisted upon the inclusion in the agreement of some additional provisions conferring new ports and trading privileges in China upon Japan.

China had been predisposed to settle the matter in 1880 because of the then strained relations with Russia, although the surrender of Chinese territory to a foreign power during the minority of the Emperor was a risk such as few Chinese statesmen would have dared to assume. As soon as the trouble with Russia was settled, the Lew Chew question again became the subject of great irritation. Li Hung Chang outlined China's position as follows: China would not under any circumstances consent to the destruction of the autonomy of the islands, or the division of them between Japan and China. He desired that the islands should be restored to their original condition of tributary states to both China and Japan. Failing this, he thought China would agree to enter into treaty stipulations with Japan, by which both powers would guarantee the absolute independence of the Lew Chews.30

In 1882, Li Hung Chang was prepared to fight Japan for the possession of the islands and war seemed imminent. The international situation remained the same. A war between China and Japan would be destructive to the best interests of both nations, and also detrimental to the interests of the United States. John Russell Young, then American Minister in Peking, who, as a newspaper correspondent, had accompanied General Grant around the world, and who was on very intimate terms with Li Hung Chang, strongly urged the Viceroy not to enter into hostilities with Japan. The question had passed beyond the stage where it might be controlled by considerations of justice. China had signed away her rights in the treaty of 1874. Japan had formally annexed the islands and had been administering them for several years. But more important even was the fact that China was in no condition to enter a war. Peace at any price was the only safe policy for the Empire.

The Lew Chew question was soon lost in the greater problem which confronted China in the aggressions of France upon her southern border, and the annexation of the Lew Chews by Japan became a fait accompli.

THE FRANCO-CHINESE WAR

While China was engaged in the controversy with Japan over the Lew Chews, other and even more serious problems arose with the foreign powers -with England over Burmah and the murder of Margery in 1874, with France over Tonquin, at about the same time, with Russia over Kuldja in 1879, and then again with France over Annam in 1884. Indeed, it was these distractions, probably, which diverted China from making war on

30 China Despatches, Vol. 58, No. 19, Nov. 24, 1881, Holcombe to Secretary of State.

Japan on account of the Formosan affair, or the Lew Chews, or Korea. To none of these larger disputes except the one with France was the United States in any way related.

At one time France appears to have selected Korea as a field for exploitation and even for annexation. In 1866, the French Chargé d'Affaires in Peking even announced to the astonished Yamen that France was about to annex Korea, but this representation was unauthorized by France, and a few years later France would seem to have concluded to seek territorial expansion only in the south. France made a treaty with Annam in 1862, and made a second one twelve years later in which France recognized the complete independence of Annam, and also acquired Cochin-China. China protested because the treaty, in effect, made France rather than China the suzerain over Annam. The matter remained in dispute until the latter part of 1883, when Li Hung Chang signed a convention with France according to which the Chinese troops were to be withdrawn from Annam, and the two nations were, jointly, to guarantee the independence of this territory which for two centuries had paid tribute to Peking. There was a sudden change of government in France and the convention was repudiated at Paris. The new French cabinet proposed an expedition to China, and a liberal credit was voted. Then a French officer, Riviere, was killed in an engagement with the Black Flags, an irregular company of troops which were supposed to be more or less supported by the Chinese government. War became all but inevitable. Indeed, it seems quite plain that France was seeking to provoke war for the sake of securing more territory in the South.

China, stung by the charges of bad faith, defiant and unhumbled, still quite ignorant of the weakness of the Empire, perhaps misled by encouragements from Germany and England, and quite underestimating the strength of France, was determined to yield no territory to France, and also not to yield suzerainty over Annam. At this point, John Russell Young, the American minister, whose relations with Li Hung Chang had become very intimate and confidential, and whose relations with the Tsung-li Yamen were cordial, pleaded for peace. The question was, as he tried to explain, not whether China was in the wrong or in the right, but whether she could afford a war with a foreign power. She had relatively few troops with a modern training, and they were in the North. There was no railroad to transport them to Annam, and the Chinese navy could not protect them by sea. France was studiously cultivating Japan, with a view to securing joint action against China. Russia was an eternal menace to the Chinese northern frontier. England was busy in Egypt, and presumably not unwilling that France should become involved in China. For China itself, war could only end in disaster.31

31 Mr. Young refers to this conference in Men and Memories, op. cit., p. 308.