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Sea, including the waters of Alaska within the dominion of the United States, for the enforcement of the acts of Congress approved April 6 and 24 and June 5, 1894,
during the season of 1896. (United States Answer, Exhibit 9.)
The fact that the Kate had among her catch two seal skins that presented the appearance of being shot, when neither guns nor ammunition, except powder for the signal gun, were found on board, did not seem to the Commander of the United States Behring Sea Fleet, when the Kate was brought to him at Unalaska, "proof of guilt sufficiently strong to justify sending the vessel to court," and he ordered her immediate release; but at the same time he commended the captain of the Perry for his strict "obedience to orders to 'seize any vessel having seal skins on board that appear to have been shot.'” (United States Answer, Exhibit 11.)
In the circumstances, while there is no question of the bona fides of the officer making the seizure, it is evident that his superior officer did not consider that there was reasonable ground for the seizure. It follows, therefore, that on the evidence presented here, it must be held that the seizure of the Kate was unjustifiable, and the United States Government is responsible for any damage resulting from this seizure as the case stands.
II. As to the measure of damages:
The estimated probable catch of the Kate during the period from August 26 to September 7th inclusive, is fixed by the claimants as 145 seal skins at a value of $7.55 each, amounting to $1,094.75. This estimate is based on the catch of the Schooner Dora Sieward, which had sixteen canoes, while the Kate had twelve, being twelve-sixteenths of the 329 seals skin taken by the Dora Sieward during that period, less the 102 seal skins taken during the same period by the Kate.
A comparison of the catch of the Kate with the catch of the Dora Sieward shows that during the period between August 23rd and 26th inclusive, the Kate took 76 seals and the Sieward 166; and after the return of the Kate to the locality where she was seized, she took during the period between September 8th to 15th inclusive, 49 seals and the Sieward 102. As measured by the Sieward, the efficiency of the Kate was somewhat higher after her return, following her seizure, than prior thereto, but the efficiency of the Kate was always less than one-half the efficiency of the Sieward, as shown by a comparison of their catches day by day. Therefore, as the claimants have asked that compensation for loss of catch for the period during which she was illegally prevented from sealing should be based on a comparison with the actual catch of the Dora Sieward during the same period, the claimants cannot complain if fifty per cent (50%) of the catch of the Dora Sieward is taken as the probable catch lost by the Kate.
Inasmuch as the sealing operations of the Kate on August 26th were not disturbed, the last canoe not having come on board until 7 P.M. of that day, the total catch being 45 seals, compensation should be allowed for the period of August 27th to September 7th inclusive, based on one-half of the Sieward's catch of 247 seals during that period, less the 57 seals taken by the Kate during that period, showing a loss of 67 seal skins, which at the price of $7.55 represents a loss of $508.05.
The Tribunal, therefore, considers that the damages for this detention should be fixed at $508.05 for her loss of profits, and $500 for the trouble occasioned by her illegal detention.
Inasmuch as the profits for the estimated catch of the Kate during the period of detention have been allowed, there was no pecuniary damages suffered on account of the detention of the officers and the crew.
As to interest:
The British Government in their oral argument admit that the 7% interest claimed in their memorial must be reduced to 4% in conformity with the provisions of the Terms of Submission.
It appears from a note addressed by the British Ambassador at Washington to the Secretary of State, dated February 15, 1897, that this was the first presentation to the Government of the United States of a claim for compensation in this case. (United States Answer, Exhibit 16.) Therefore, in accordance with the Terms of Submission, section IV, the Tribunal is of the opinion that interest should be allowed at 4% on the $508.05 damages for loss of profits, from February 15, 1897, to April 26, 1912, the date of the confirmation of the schedule.
FOR THESE REASONS The Tribunal decides that the United States Government shall pay to the Government of His Britannic Majesty, on behalf of the claimants, the sum of One thousand and eight dollars and five cents ($1,008.05), with interest at four per cent (4%) on Five hundred and eight dollars and five cents ($508.05) thereof, from February 15, 1897, to April 26, 1912.
The President of the Tribunal,
BOOK REVIEWS *
French Foreign Policy from Fashoda to Serajevo. By Graham H. Stuart,
Ph.D. New York: Century Co., 1921, p. 375. Bibliography and Index.
In this volume, Dr. Stuart has given an interesting study of the foreign policy of the French Government from 1898 to 1914. It is an attempt, he claims, “to portray impartially the policy of the French foreign office, from the crisis of Fashoda to the crime of Serajevo. Before 1898, French foreign policy seemed for the most part to be merged in her colonial policy; after the death of the Archduke Ferdinand, the foreign policy of France was inextricably mingled with the foreign policy of her allies. In the critical intervening period, the policy of the Quai Dorsay stands forth against the cloudy background of European diplomacy."
The book begins with an introductory chapter on the "International Situation in 1898," the Dual and Triple Alliances, and the FrancoBritish relations of that period. Then follow three chapters which have no apparent relation to one another: one on “Fashoda” including a discussion of the Franco-British agreement of 1898, the first Peace Conference at the Hague and the policy of France and Germany in regard to the Boer War, the second on “French Diplomacy in the Orient” concerning “the Cretan Affair," French interests in Turkey, the Boxer Rebellion and adjustments with Siam, and the third dealing with French "Diplomatic Relations with Italy and the Pope." The next seven chapters cover the history of the “Entente Cordiale” and Moroccan affairs from the signing of the agreements with Great Britain and Spain in 1904 down to the Agadir incident and the FrancoGerman treaty of 1911. The twelfth and last chapter is entitled "Toward the World War," and is concerned with the “ministry of M. Poincaré” and the awakening of France to the danger of an European war.
One wonders why this last chapter was written in its present form. The obvious intention of the author seems to have been to bring down his narrative from the Franco-German treaty of 1911 to the murder at Serajevo in 1914. At least, he should have done this to justify the title of his work. But he has contented himself with giving a brief account of the general development of political affairs within France and in the Balkans during that period, without attempting to connect the trend of affairs in the Balkan Peninsula with the murder of the Archduke Ferdinand or the causes of the Great War. Indeed, he has made no effort to trace the history of French diplomatic activities in relation to Balkan affairs or the problems of Asia
* The Journal assumes no responsibility for the views expressed in signed book reviews. — ED.
Minor during the years 1904–1914. In view of the important bearing of the competition of France, Germany, Russia and Great Britain in the Turkish Empire (leading to the economic partition of Asiatic Turkey in June, 1914) on the political situation in Europe and on European expansion in Africa, no account of the French foreign policy during this period is complete without an analysis of their policy in regard to the progress of affairs in the Ottoman Empire.
In discussing the Fashoda episode, the author fails to make clear the intimate connection of this incident with the Franco-British competition in Africa. He ignores the colonial developments of the preceding quarter of a century, making no reference even to the fundamental facts enumerated in such secondary sources as Keltie's Partition of Africa, Johnson's Colonization of Africa or Harris's Intervention and Colonization in Africa. It is not often that one can construct an historical narrative by beginning with one conspicuous diplomatic controversy and ending with an international crime having no connection with the original controversy. Some French writers have attempted this method of composition with varying success. And Dr. Stuart has evidently followed their example in this instance. But his book would have been more complete and infinitely more valuable, if he had given us a study of French foreign policy from about 1890 to 1914 (particularly of those years when M. Hanotaux and M. Delcassé were directing the foreign and colonial policy of France), confining his attention to the field of North African and Near Eastern diplomacy. He has gained nothing by his excursions into the more distant regions of South Africa, and of the Far East. And the value of the seven chapters on Moroccan affairs—the best portion of the volume-would have been greatly enhanced.
A number of curious errors occur here and there through the book, which are possibly due to faulty proof reading. The author refers to Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter as "Herr von Kiderlen" on pages 302, 304, 308 and 310 and as “Herr Kiderlen” on pages 310, 312, 313, and 314. And on page 217, Elihu Root is named as Mr. and M. Root; while Mr. Balfour is called M. Balfour (as if he were a Frenchman) on page 105.
The author has a pleasing, straightforward style; and both the student and the diplomatic expert will find it interesting. But the frequent use of French words and quotations will prove tiresome to the average British or American reader. The volume, on the whole, is a creditable piece of work; and it should find a useful place on the reference shelves of university, college, and city libraries.
NORMAN DWIGHT HARRIS.
Die Satzung des Völkerbundes. Commentaries by Dr. Walter Schücking and
Dr. Hans Wehberg. Berlin: Franz Vahlen, 1921, pp. xxiii, 521.
The League of Nations has ceased to be a mere project. So long as it was a project, the literature dealing with it was largely non-technical. Now that fifty-one member states have adopted this method of regulating their international relations within the scope of the League, treatises like the present will follow the method of jurisprudence. It is perhaps easier to dispense with legal aid in the creation of a plan than in its interpretation and detailed execution. It is probably not wise to do so in the former stage; it is impossible in the latter.
The book before us is a commentary on the Covenant, viewed as a constitutive statute. Political and historical material enter into the text only so far as required for legal elucidation. The authors are well known German publicists, active for many years before the war in liberal activities devoted to better international relations, which signifies that their influence was not appreciable until after the war. Dr. Schücking then became a member of the official German delegation at Versailles. Dr. Wehberg is head of the Division of International Law in the German League of Nations Union.
The introduction and the historical portions are complete, without being ponderous. The narrative begins with ancient times but is not involved with minutiae. The projects for a league advanced prior to and during the war are explained in some detail and a fairly complete picture is given of the development of the league plan at Paris. The authors are not to be blamed for laying too much emphasis on certain plans which had practically no influence in the deliberations, as these were widely published, where others were not. The proposals of the Fabians and of General Smuts are deemed by the authors to have been more highly regarded than any of the others, while the influence of the conference of the thirteen neutral Powers which met at Paris in March and April, 1919, is considered negligible, like that of the proposals made by the German delegation at Versailles. “This most solemn compact which was intended to realize the centuries-old dreams of the civilized world, came to be, then, not the result of common detailed deliberations, but was presented to humanity as the dictate of the victor” (p. 17). Notwithstanding a few complaints of similar character, the prevailing tone of the authors is not unfavorable to the League, thus differing from the judgment of one of their former colleagues, the late Dr. Fried, to whom, together with the late Dr. Lammasch, the book is dedicated. Indeed, the authors believe the results to be most promising. While they disapprove of the hegemony of the Great Powers, they believe the League to be especially valuable because of its opportunities for quick initiative; "the League is not merely a community of law but a community of work, having positive tasks” (p. 116). They also maintain that it is a layman's error to regard as war the use of force by a community of states against an offending state. The perfect idea of law