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Mixed Arbitral Tribunals. La jurisprudence des tribunaux arbitraux mixtes institutés par les Traités de Paix. Robert Ruze. R. Dr. Inter. et Légis. Comp. 1922. 3rd series. 3:22.
Nationality. Un droit uniforme sur la nationalité. A. E. Bles. R. Dr. Inter. et Légis. Comp. 1921. 3rd series. 2:513.
Naturalization. Laws of the Soviet Government. Isaac A. Hourwich. Amer. Bar Ass. J. Apr. 1922. 8:229.
Navigable waterways. Notes sur le statut relatif au régime des voies navigables d'interet international. Jean Hostie. R. Dr. Inter. et Légis. Comp. 1921. 3rd series. 2:532.
Philippines. Plight and Hope of the. Walter Robb. N. Amer. R. June 1922. 215:761.
Poland. Deutsche Hypotheken in den früher preussischen Gebieten Polens. Th. Niemeyer. Zeitschrift für Inter. Recht. 1921. 29:213.
Reprisals. Flieger-Raids auf offene Städte als völkerrechtliche Repressalie. Jean Spiropulos. Zeitschrift für Inter. Recht.
29:189. Versailles Treaty. Die Steuerpflicht der früher deutschen, jetzt EntenteStaatsangehörigen, insbesondere der Elsass-Lothringer, nach dem Friedensvertrag von Versailles. Fritz Stier-Somlo. Zeitschrift für Inter. Recht. 1921. 29:263.
Die Wirkungen des Friedensvertrages von Versailles und des sich anschliessenden polnischen minoritätenschutzvertrages auf die subjektive Steuerpflicht nach den grossen Abgabegesetzen. Schmalz. Zeitschrift für Inter. Recht. 1921. 29:206.
Treaty of Versailles. Die Auflösung der Vorkriegsverträge nach $299a des Vertrages von Versailles. Dr. J. Partsch. Zeitschrift für Inter. Recht. 1921. 29:295.
War Risk Insurance. L'assurance contre les risques de guerre et la navigation sans feux ou en convoi pendant la guerre de 1914-1918. E. Audouin. R. Inter. Dr. Maritime. 1922. 33:239.
Washington Conference. Naval Policy and the Naval Treaty. RearAdmiral W. V. Pratt, U. S. N. N. Amer. R. May 1922. 215:590. Quincy Wright. Amer. Pol. Sc. R. May 1922. 16:285.
HOPE K. THOMPSON.
THE ARMISTICES 1
BY GENERAL TASKER H. BLISS
This work was published early in the course of the Paris Peace Conference. Even at that time its title was somewhat misleading. Practically all of the so-called secret documents contained in it, including the extracts from the proceedings of the Allied Council which adopted the armistice terms, had already been published in every country that took any interest in the war. A considerable part of the work is devoted to the activities of the Socialistes, the Syndicalistes and the Internationalistes towards effecting a peace before the war should be fought to a conclusion; as well as to the so-called "affaires” of Caillaux, Bolo Pasha, Prince Sixte de Parme, et al., based upon the current publications of the press. These are probably what the author means by the "Négotiations Secrètes.”
That part of the work which relates to the armistices consists, mainly, of the proceedings, then already published, of the Allied Council at Versailles, October 31-November 4, 1918. This Allied Council consisted of the Supreme War Council, to which were attached representatives, designated ad hoc, of Japan and of several of the smaller allied countries. It is important to remember that the Supreme War Council itself consisted solely of the political representatives of Great Britain, France, Italy and the United States, to whom were attached, but not as voting members of the Council, a military representative of each of those four countries, as an adviser for his own government.
The author of this work gives the impression that the above-mentioned Allied Council drew up the terms of the armistices. This is not the fact. Its official proceedings show that when it met it had before it drafts for its consideration. Its sole function was
Its sole function was to trim the edges and round-off the corners, in doing which there was an opportunity to consider points raised by the smaller Powers that had not been represented in the preparation of the drafts. Nor does the author discuss the reasons or motives that governed the consideration of these drafts, by paragraphs or in their entirety. He fails to note that this Council adopted not four but two armistices, because two had been entered upon before the Council met. Nor does he note the significance of prior consideration being given to the armistice with Austria-Hungary. This prior consideration was due to the fact that the
1 Mermeiz: Les Négociations Secrètes et les Quatre Armistices, avec Pieces Justificatives. 5th edition. Paris: 1921. Librairie Ollendorff. Pp. 355.
Allies knew that Austria-Hungary would accept any conditions for an armistice. The armistice with this Power was, therefore, approved first and sent to General Diaz to put into effect. One of its articles provided that,
“The Allies shall have the right of free movement over all roads, rail and waterways, in Austro-Hungarian territory, and of the use of the necessary Austrian and Hungarian means of transportation.
“The Armies of the Allied and Associated Powers shall occupy such strategic points in Austria-Hungary at such times as they may deem necessary to enable them to conduct military operations or to maintain order."
The underscored words should be noted in connection with subsequent remarks of the reviewer on the armistice with Germany. Suffice it to say here that a plan of further military operations against Germany, should such be necessary, had already been prepared in anticipation of the above condition in the Austrian armistice and to meet the extreme contingency of Germany refusing an armistice after she had herself asked for it. This plan was submitted to the Supreme War Council and approved by it late in the day of November 4, 1918, in its
Resolutions in regard to operations against Germany through Austria
1. To approve the plan of operations against Germany through Austria proposed by Marshal Foch, General Bliss, General Wilson and General di Robilant.?
2. That Marshal Foch shall have the supreme strategical direction of operations against Germany on all fronts, including the Southern and Eastern.
3. That the Military Advisers of the British, French, Italian and United States Governments shall immediately examine the following questions:
“(a) The possibility of taking immediate steps to send a force, which shall include the Czecho-Slovak forces on the French and Italian fronts, to Bohemia and Galicia, with the following objects:
"To organize these countries against invasion by Germany;
“To prevent the export to Germany of oil, coal, or any other material, and to render these available to the Allied forces;
“To establish aerodromes for the purpose of bombing Germany.
In the opinion of the reviewer, the conditions of the armistice with Austria, which showed Germany that such a plan of operations was on the cards, would have obliged the latter Power to accept any conditions that might have been proposed in the armistice with it. For reasons to be given, he believes that had the proper conditions been imposed, real peace would have been brought much nearer and Europe at this moment would be more advanced in the process of recovery from the war.
* Committee appointed by the Supreme War Council to prepare a plan of operations.
3 Commander-in-chief of the Army of the East, who had operated from his base in Macedonia and had already concluded armistices with Bulgaria and Hungary.