THE REVISION OF THE REPARATION CLAUSES OF THE TREATY OF VERSAILLES AND THE CANCELLATION OF INTER-ALLIED INDEBTEDNESS The Earl of Balfour, Acting British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in a note respecting war debts sent to the diplomatic representatives at London of France, Italy, the Serb-Croat-Slovene State, Roumania, Portugal and Greece, on August 1, 1922, requested those governments to make arrangements for dealing to the best of their ability with the loans owing by them to the British Government. He took occasion to explain, however, that the amount of interest and repayment, for which the British Government asks, depends not so much on what the debtor nations owe Great Britain as on what Great Britain has to pay America. "The policy favored by His Majesty is", says the Earl of Balfour, "that of surrendering their share of German reparation, and writing off, through one great transaction, the whole body of inter-Allied indebtedness." But such a policy, he states, is difficult of accomplishment because, "with the most perfect courtesy, and in the exercise of their undoubted rights, the American Government have required this country to pay the interest accrued since 1919 on the Anglo-American debt, to convert it from an unfunded to a funded debt, and to repay it by a sinking fund in twenty-five years. Such a procedure is clearly in accordance with the original contract. His Majesty's Government make no complaint of it; they recognise their obligations and are prepared to fulfil them. But evidently they cannot do so without profoundly modifying the course which, in different circumstances, they would have wished to pursue. They cannot treat the repayment of the Anglo-American loan as if it were an isolated incident in which only the United States of America and Great Britain had any concern. It is but one of a connected series of transactions, in which this country appears sometimes as debtor, sometimes as creditor, and, if our undoubted obligations as a debtor are to be enforced, our not less undoubted rights as a creditor cannot be left wholly in abeyance".1 The requirement of the American Government, referred to by the Earl of Balfour, is contained in the Act of Congress, approved February 9, 1922, "To create a commission authorized under certain conditions to refund or convert obligations of foreign Governments held by the United States of America." This commission, consisting of five members and known as the "World War Foreign Debt Commission" is, by the law, authorized, subject to the approval of the President, "to refund or convert, and to extend the time of payment of the principal or the interest, or both, of any obligation of any foreign Government now held by the United States of America, arising out of the World War, into bonds or other obligations of such foreign Government in substitution for the bonds or other obligations of such 1 The note has been printed and published as a British Parliamentary Command Paper, No. 1737 (Miscellaneous No. 5, 1922). Government now or hereafter held by the United States of America, in such form and of such terms, conditions, date or dates of maturity, and rate or rates of interest, and with such security, if any, as shall be deemed for the best interests of the United States of America." A proviso limits the authority of the commission to extend the time of maturity of such bonds or other obligations beyond June 15, 1947, which is the last date of maturity of the war bonds subscribed by the American people from the proceeds of which these foreign loans were made, or to fix the rate of interest at less than 414 per centum per annum. The authority granted by the Act ceases at the end of three years and Section 3 expressly stipulates "That this Act shall not be construed to authorize the exchange of bonds or other obligations of any foreign Government for those of any other foreign Government, or cancellation of any part of such indebtedness except through payment thereof." 2 In view of the previous history of proposals which sought to involve the Allied debt to America with the subject of the payment of war costs and reparations, and the categorical refusal of American representatives to consider them, the note of the Earl of Balfour of August 1, 1922, may be regarded as in the nature of a protest against this policy of the United States Government finally formulated and adopted in the Act of Congress of February 9, 1922. It will be observed in the British note of August 1, 1922, that a revision of the reparation clauses is given as an inducement for the United States to cancel the war debts. In addition, certain reasons are given to justify the protest against the Act of Congress. The Earl of Balfour states that the Allies "were partners in the greatest international effort ever made in the cause of freedom; and they are still partners in dealing with some, at least, of its results. Their debts were incurred, their loans were made, not for the separate advantage of particular States, but for a great purpose common to them all, and that purpose has been, in the main, accomplished". Furthermore, he asserts that, among the many economic ills from which the world is suffering, "must certainly be reckoned the weight of international indebtedness, with all its unhappy effects upon credit and exchange, upon national production and international trade". And, he asks, "How can the normal be reached while conditions so abnormal are permitted to prevail?" In order to make clear the full meaning, so far as America is concerned, of the British proposal of "writing off, through one great transaction, the whole body of inter-Allied indebtedness", it should be understood that America owes no debts that can be written off in return for a writing off of the debts owing to her, and the net result to America of the "one great transaction" would be the outright cancellation, without consideration, of the inter-Allied indebtedness to the United States, amounting in round numbers to $10,000,000,000. In the absence of the United States as a party to the Treaty of Versailles 2 Public No. 139, 67th Congress. and of American claims seriously affected by the reparation clauses of that treaty, one would naturally infer from the British protest that the United States was in some way responsible for the clauses which it is proposed to revise downwards if America will pay the price. The published accounts of the discussions leading up to the adoption of the reparation clauses of the treaty show that such is not the case. On the contrary, they show that these provisions were adopted in the face of the vigorous opposition of the American delegation. "The President and his financial advisers", writes Mr. Bernard M. Baruch, a principal American member of the Commission on Reparation of the Peace Conference, "passed days and weeks vainly endeavoring to convince their colleagues in the Allied and Associated Governments that it was impossible for Germany to pay anything like the sums required under the categories. They further submitted that even if this were possible, the Allied Governments could not afford, and would in time recognize that it was not to their advantage, to exact payments that could be made only at the expense of their own trade. Therefore, in the American view it was to the interest of the Allied and Associated Governments to fix a reasonable, definite amount that Germany could pay and that they could afford to have her pay." 113 The same authority has supplied the verbatim text of a memorandum of the American delegation in support of its contention for the fixation of a definite sum of reparations. The memorandum gives the two principal arguments against that course as follows: (a) It is impossible to tell today just how much Germany might be able to pay within the next generation. A miscalculation might release Germany, at heavy cost to the Allies, from a just liability which, it would subsequently develop, Germany was fully capable of discharging. Germany's liability should, therefore, be expressed elastically, so as to insure the utilization of Germany's full future capacity of payment to make good the almost unlimited damage caused by her. (b) The political situation among the Allies is so unsettled, and the popular expectation of relief by payments from Germany runs so high, that it might have serious political consequences to name definitely Germany's liability. Even the highest figure which has been considered would disappoint popular expectations.1 The answer of the American delegation to these arguments is given in the same memorandum as follows: With respect to the latter argument, it may be observed that the financial and economic situation of Europe is so serious that no government would adopt, merely as a matter of domestic politics, a policy which is not defensible on its merits. The only political consequences to be taken into account are those relating to the stability of govern The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty, New York: Harper and Brothers, 1920, p. 52. 4 ment in general. It is conceivable that a severe popular disillusionment at this time might lead to social unrest, which would have really serious national and international consequences. It seems far more probable that to continue to perpetuate uncertainty as to the amount of Germany's payments will merely postpone an awakening until a time when the situation may be even more critical. In the intervening period the people will not have exerted their fullest efforts to aid themselves, as would have been the case had they earlier realized their real situation. With regard to the argument that there is danger today of underestimating Germany's capacity to pay, it may be said that this risk is perfectly real and fully recognized. It is, however, a risk which must be balanced against the risk of attempting to secure from Germany more than she can pay, or adopting a procedure which destroys Germany's incentive to pay. Of the two risks the latter is infinitely the more serious. To seek too much jeopardizes the whole; to obtain too little involves only the loss of the difference between what is, and what might have been, paid. It is further to be observed that what the world requires, and requires immediately, is a new basis of credit. A dollar today is probably worth two dollars five years from now. A definite obligation assumed by Germany, under conditions which warrant us in believing that Germany herself has the will and believes she has capacity to discharge. such obligation, will serve as an immediate basis of credit. A far larger amount assumed under equally satisfactory conditions eighteen months from now would not begin to have the same practical value. Also a larger amount imposed today at the point of the bayonet and in the face of declarations by Germany (which will be accepted by conservative persons throughout the world) that the sum is far in excess of her capacity, would prove of little or no value as a basis of credit." The American memorandum contains the following criticism of the reparation plan then under consideration and finally adopted by the Allies: The present reparation plan is, in our opinion, open to the serious objection that it may, in practice, operate to destroy economic incentive on the part of the present generation in Germany. Germany is set a task without end, and the more she labors the more will be taken from her. Furthermore, little is obtainable under the plan in the immediate future, aside from the deliveries of bonds, which will not command the confidence of investors because, among other things, they may be followed by an indefinite amount of similar bonds. And it will be in the interests of Germany herself to destroy popular confidence in the initial installments of bonds taken from her, as once these bonds acquire any marketable value, still further issues will be taken from Germany. Europe's need is immediate. Any substantial delay in securing from Germany an obligation having a substantial present value may involve consequences which will approach a disaster. The risks involved in delay far outweigh the difference between such definite sum as might be fixed today and the most optimistic estimates which have been made as to Germany's capacity." 5 The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty, pp. 67-68. Ibid., pp. 68-69. The view which gave primary consideration to the exigencies of British and French internal politics prevailed over the dictates of farseeing statesmanship, and now, over three years after the signature of the treaty, the question of reparations appears to be as far from settlement as it was then, Europe in the meantime suffering the evils of the policy of opportunism so clearly foreseen and definitely pointed out by the American delegation to the Peace Conference. Under the circumstances, is it reasonable to expect America to forego the payment of a sum, the lending of which added twofifths to the national debt, in order to induce the Allies to pursue now a policy urged upon them by American representatives at the Peace Conference and which, as demonstrated by subsequent events, they should have then adopted in their own self-interest? 7 The argument repeated by the Earl of Balfour that America was a partner in the prosecution of the war and is consequently responsible for a full share of the partnership liabilities dates back also to the Peace Conference. Mr. Baruch points out that during the discussion of the amount of German reparations, the following intimation was conveyed to the American delegation: If you ask us to lessen our claims upon Germany for indemnity, which she admits she owes, what will you do for the loan made to us for the prosecution of a war which was as much your war as our war, the amount of which clearly exceeds our ability to pay unless we are allowed to get the last possible dollar out of Germany? 8 Mr. Baruch explains that "of course, it was generally recognized that the indebtedness of the Allies to the United States had no relation to Germany's reparation obligations to the Allies", that "the United States, relatively speaking, had no great direct interest in what Germany was to pay, but she had a sincere desire for all nations concerned that the world should not be thrown into disorder and its commerce deranged by an attempt to create and collect a debt which could not be paid", but that "the most that the "In this connection see the article on "Reparations" by Mr. Thomas W. Lamont, one of the American financial representatives at the Peace Conference, in the volume entitled What really happened at Paris, New York, Charles Scribners Sons, 1921. In discussing "The Power of Clemenceau and Lloyd George", Mr. Lamont says: "It sounds absolutely unwarranted for me to place my opinion against those of two chiefs of state like Clemenceau and Lloyd George; yet I am convinced, as I was at the time, that they were wrong, that they entirely misread their own constituencies when they believed that if they adopted the business course of fixing the German indemnity and proceeding to collect it they would, because of the disappointment of their voters, be turned out of office. All I feel is, if at this critical juncture both M. Clemenceau and Mr. Lloyd George had had a little more confidence in their own strength they would have joined with President Wilson and settled this question of German indemnity once for all, thus avoiding, to a considerable measure, the terrible consequences of continued unsettlement that have plagued Europe and the whole world since the Peace Conference adjourned and left the German indemnity question open." (pp. 265, 268). The Making of the Reparation and Economic Sections of the Treaty, p. 52. |