Page images
PDF
EPUB

with foreign nations on all subjects of trade and shipping" (p. 168), the author proceeds to discussion of "the next definite claim for representation in treaty-making," not observing that representation was not at all what New Brunswick had demanded. Chapter V has in its title "The claim of direct representation in treaty-making conceded" (p. 173); but the only claim was that persons should be permitted "to proceed to Washington in order to confer with the British Minister there, and to afford him information with respect to the interests of the British North American provinces" (p. 178; and see pp. 184-5). That was all that was conceded, and to it the author attaches unmerited significance (p. 186; see note 4 on p. 189). Not until a later year (1884) was the Canadian representative associated with the British and given, in effect, the conduct of the work of negotiation (p. 191). A later Colonial Secretary, Ripon, did not like that situation, and, in his despatch of 28 June 1895, declared that "To give the colonies the power of negotiating treaties for themselves without reference to her Majesty's government would be to give them an international status as separate and sovereign states, and would be equivalent to breaking up the Empire into a number of independent states" (p. 195). He added that nevertheless "it would be desirable, generally, therefore, that he [the British diplomat] should have the assistance, either as a second plenipotentiary or in a subordinate capacity, as her Majesty's government think the circumstances require, of a delegate appointed by the colonial government" (p. 196).

The Ripon limitations were disregarded, and the right of Canada to negotiate her own commercial treaties was recognized in 1907 in connection with the arrangements for the Franco-Canadian treaty of that year. Freedom to negotiate such treaties had thus been achieved (pp. 198-212). But while it is true as the author says that the movement for it "was a direct and immediate outcome of the successful assertion of fiscal freedom" (p. 211), it is not correct to add "in the years from 1850 to 1867 by the British North American provinces." The successful assertion was in 1859-as above stated. It will be observed that Canada was well on the way to freedom to make treaties while the Australian colonies were still under statutory inhibition to grant preferences outside Australia.

Minor Points. Chapter VIII opens with an interesting forecast of "Seven distinct Crises"-of "seven occasions in the period from 1846 to 1907 on which the Colonial Office and Governments in London had to decide whether they would make concessions to demands from the self-governing colonies for larger powers over their fiscal legislation, or over developments growing out of the power which had accrued to them in connection with their fiscal and commercial policies" (p. 154). The first was in 1850, when a Canadian statute providing for differential duties with other British American colonies was allowed to go into operation (pp. 154-5, 278). The second was in 1859, when the Galt statute providing for protective duties was allowed to go into

operation (p. 155). The third, referred to in a later chapter, had reference to Canadian representation during negotiations at Washington (pp. 161-2). After fifty pages of extraneous matter, the fourth crisis is stated to have been the Australian struggle of 1867-73 for the power to enact preferential tariffs (pp. 212, 278, 389). For specification of the remaining three crises the reader is left to his own insight. At p. 14 is the statement that "Revenue derived from the duties imposed by British Possessions Acts was, in accordance with the terms of sections in these acts, covered into the treasuries of the provinces." It was one of the principal grievances of the Opposition leaders in Lower Canada not only that these revenues were not so placed, but that until about 1818 the Governors would give no information as to their amount.

When referring to the opposition of the Colonial Office to the waywardness of the colonies with regard to lapses from free-trade principles, Mr. Porritt frequently mentions "the Government propaganda for a free trade Empire" (pp. 79, 111, 112–117, 194, 389). Of propaganda in the ordinary sense, there was none. Colonial Office interference is not propaganda.

It is far from accurate to say of the Dominions that "all these political civilizations, with their parliaments, cabinets, executive departments of state, and judicial systems, are fashioned to the last detail after English models" (p. 19). The Dominions have no hereditary and ecclesiastical House of Lords. They have no combination of judicial and political functions in a Lord Chancellor and various Law Lords. And their Senators have no appellate jurisdiction over the laws courts. Other differences could easily be mentioned.

In various places the author refers to the Dominions "status of nation within the British Empire" (pp. 19, 43, 64, 408). Being without meaning, the phrase is one into which may be poured any notion one chooses to select. Whatever the author may have intended, it is not true that "Restrictions on fiscal legislation excepted, the colonies in the North American group, the colonies in the Australasian group, and the Cape Colony were, in 18671873, quite near the present status of nation within the Empire” (p. 225). In a footnote to this statement, the author quotes from Mr. Lloyd George: "The British Empire is a League of nations," a rhetorical phrase that ought to be left to the platform and the newspapers.

When explaining the meaning of the ever-recurring Canadian phrase "national policy," the author says that it included, "(1) the continuous and wide immigration propaganda for the peopling of the provinces west of the Great Lakes, and (2) the development of the national grain route, by rail, lake, and canal from all the grain-growing provinces to tidewater ports on the Atlantic" (p. 121, note). That is incorrect.

When referring to Mr. Joseph Chamberlain's tenure of the Colonial Secretaryship, the author says, "a tenure that is recalled with satisfaction in the capitals of the Dominions from the fact that it was in 1898 that the

self-governing colonies were at last freed from the fiscally hampering articles of the Prussian treaty of 1865, and of a score of other commercial treaties made by Great Britain before 1878 to which the self-governing colonies had not been consenting parties" (pp. 199-200). The Prussian and Belgian treaties were denounced in 1898. The others were not. At the Imperial Conference of 1911, a resolution was passed recommending that action in that respect should be taken. Mr. Chamberlain's tenure of office is specially remembered in Canada because of his imperializing efforts, which Sir Wilfrid Laurier successfully withstood. Mr. Chamberlain wanted contributions to the British navy; the enrollment of colonial troops for service in foreign countries; the establishment of an Imperial Council which would develop into an imperial parliament with powers of taxation, &c. Canada's "satisfaction" is that she escaped these things.

Conclusion. While it is impossible to disregard the defects of Mr. Porritt's book (some of which may have been due to failing health and inability to revise the proofs), acknowledgment must be made of its many merits, the most conspicuous of which are (1) the co-ordination above referred to; (2) the useful and scholarly collection of relevant and (upon the whole) accurately stated facts, made accessible by a good index; and (3) the appendices.of sixty-one closely printed pages, in which may be found many of the documents referred to in the text.

JOHN S. EWART.

The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary 1879-1914. By Alfred Franzis Pribram. 2 vols. English edition by Archibald Cary Coolidge. Translated by J. G. D'Arcy Paul and Denys P. Myers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920, 1921. pp. xvii, 308; ix, 271. $2.00, $3.00. Volume I contains a series of treaties, conventions and declarations that are related to the policies of the Central Powers and of Italy together with an introduction by Professor Pribram.

The main treaties that interest us are those of the Austro-HungarianGerman Alliance of 1879, which, from that time to the end of the world war, was the basis of the mutual relations of the Central Powers, and the kindred but independent and more famous Triple Alliance of AustriaHungary, Germany and Italy. This alliance beginning in 1882, was renewed with changes in 1887, 1891, 1902 and 1912. It was embodied in five distinct treaties. But we are also interested incidentally in documents, now also collected here, of the League of the Three Emperors, the Reinsurance Treaty, and various other alliances, in some of which we find Rumania having common understandings with Austria-Hungary, Germany and Italy; of Austria-Hungary with Serbia, and of Austria-Hungary with Russia on Balkan affairs; a political agreement for the preservation of the status quo in the Mediterranean which was inspired by fear of French extension

between Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and Italy dating back to 1887; and a naval agreement for united action between Austria-Hungary, the German Empire and Italy which went into force as recently as 1913.

Volume II contains an account of the various negotiations relating to the five treaties of the Triple Alliance and to Austro-Russian agreements, the Dual Alliance, and Franco-Italian agreements, with some of the documents mentioned in an appendix. The understandings of Italy and France were inconsistent not only with the supposed antagonism of those countries towards each other, but with Italy's loyalty to the Triple Alliance; and with a special treaty between Italy and Germany which in case of war followed by the taking of guaranties involved French interests in northern Africa and even looked to accessions on the Italian border of French home territory itself. These inconsistent understandings of Italy and France, however, apart from changes in political interests that developed later, gave some excuse for the participation of Italy on the side of France in the world war.

The texts of the agreements, which were written in French or German, are printed on the left hand page and the English translation on the right; so that, the reader's eye may conveniently run from one to the other at will. Mr. Myers, whose familiarity with treaties is well known, is the principal translator of the French and Mr. Paul of the German originals; both of which are rendered into smooth English.

The author's introduction, which appears in the first volume, is helpful to a clear understanding of the succession of treaties of the Triple Alliance and may suffice for the general reader if he cares to go no farther; while the story of the negotiations, which with its short documentary appendix fills the second volume, presents sufficient detail to be a valuable help to the specialist. Both volumes taken together make an exceptional source book and commentary.

Professor Pribram's information is taken chiefly from Austro-Hungarian archives which became accessible after the fall of the Dual Monarchy and is necessarily partial because it needs supplementing from the records of the German and Italian foreign offices, but though it reflects a critical spirit on the part of a patriotic scholar it is set forth in a temperate manner.

The complete texts of the treaties of the Triple Alliance were first brought to light by Professor Pribram and their publication together with the history of the negotiations is the chief reason for making his book. The exact wording of the treaties of the Triple Alliance, except for four articles, is new to the public. We now know that there were as many as fifteen articles in their later stages, the contents of some of which had not been surmised before. The treaties of the Triple Alliance were supposed to be defensive, and so they were to a large degree, but they might also have become aggressive in certain contingencies. This was particularly the case in respect to the Balkans and to questions relating to the Ottoman coasts of the Adri

atic and the Aegean Seas, which when settled on the breaking up of the Turkish Empire were to be adjusted between Austria and Italy on the basis of mutual compensations; and in respect to North African acquisitions, the settlement of which, though the Egyptian question was left undisturbed, was to redound to the benefit of Italy, even though that meant war by Germany and Italy with France, who was Italy's principal rival.

We must express our thanks to Professor Coolidge, the American editor, for his rearrangement of the material of Professor Pribram's book in order to make it less bulky than, with translations added, it might have been as originally published, as well as for certain notes and headings that he has added for American readers, and we must remark the persistency of Professor Pribram himself in carrying out his plan not only to reveal the actual contents of the treaties but to give an exhaustive account of their negotiation. Although the narrative is loaded with details, is lacking in interesting character portrayal of the individual statesmen who were connected with the transactions, and is without dramatic touches, it makes steady progress, ends with a climax, and presents a picture of the mind of a nation. That nation is Italy, to whose ambitious and clever diplomats the author pays tribute even though he doubts whether, in view of their new Slavic neighbors on the Adriatic and continued French domination in the Mediterranean, they have put their country in a better position than she held before the war. Italy, if the author's argument is to be accepted, secured by appeals, lamentations, flatteries and threats, many advantages from Austria-Hungary and Germany in the time of their necessities. She, flirting with France, England and other countries, at the same time, was suspected by the Central Powers of being an undependable partner and, in the author's mind, gained in financial strength, increased as a great Power, and carried out imperial policies which would have been impossible without the alliance; but Germany and Austria reaped some advantage from it. If Germany had become engaged in defensive war with France, Italy would have been expected to aid and in any case not menace Germany, or if either Germany or Austria-Hungary were drawn into a defensive war with a non-signatory great Power, e. g., with Russia, which was always a possibility, neither had to consider the likelihood of attack from Italy at the same time, as under these circumstances Italy was pledged to benevolent neutrality. In fact Italy kept neutral when the Central Powers began war with France and Russia. Without Italian neutrality at the outset the Central Powers could not have made their initial successes, either on the Western or Eastern front. Had their warfare been strictly defensive, Italy, under the terms of the alliance, could have been expected to stand by them.

Among the things that impress one who reads the treaties and the story of their negotiation are the secrecy about them, which was successfully maintained; the unfortunate situation in which this world has been placed by a system of independent states in which each may add the territories of

« PreviousContinue »