Rep. 654). An innocent purchaser of real estate for value is protected against outstanding equities and secret trusts. One who loans money to the holder of the legal title of real estate, and takes a mortgage upon such real estate to secure the same, is, to the extent of his claim, a purchaser of the land, and is entitled to the same protection from all secret equities of which he had no notice, at the time of taking the mortgage, as any other bona fide purchaser. Doye v. Carey, 3 Okla. 627 (41 Pac. Rep. 432). One who takes a mortgage to secure a preexisting debt from one holding under a deed absolute on its face, which is in fact a mortgage, holds subject to the equities of the grantor in such deed. Gibson v. Hutchins, 43 S. C. 287 (21 S. E. Rep. 250). A purchaser without notice of an outstanding mortgage who has paid only a part of the consideration before acquiring notice is a bona fide purchaser only to the extent of the amount paid. Davis v. Ward, 109 Cal. 186 (41 Pac. Rep. 1010; 50 Am. St. Rep. 29). One who claims as assignee of a note and mortgage transferred after maturity is not a bona fide purchaser. British & Amer. Mort. Co. v. Smith, (22 S. E. Rep. 747). One who takes a mortgage to secure a pre-existing debt holds subject to prior equities. Frick v. Taylor, 94 Ga. 683 (21 S. E. Rep. 713). A mortgagee who takes his mortgage to secure a pre-existing debt, the consideration being an extension of time, is a bona fide purchaser. De Mey v. De Fer, 103 Mich. 239 (61 N. W. Rep. 524).

S. C.

Sec. 48. Notice-Purging equities. Where a claim to real estate can be sustained only on the ground that the party asserting it is a subsequent purchaser or mortgagee in good faith, such person is required to show affirmatively that he purchased without notice of the equities of the adverse party, relying upon the apparent ownership of his grantor or mortgagor. Baldwin v. Burt, 43 Neb. 245 (61 N. W. Rep. 601). One who takes a mortgage on lands with knowledge of another's equitable title takes subject to such equity. Gore v. Condon, 82 Md. 649 (33 Atl. Rep. 261). One who buys with notice of another's claim of title takes subject thereto. Decker v. Decker, Ia. (61 N. W. Rep. 921). Notice to the agent of one claiming to be a bona fide purchaser is

notice to such purchaser. Ely v. Pingry, 56 Kan. 17 (42 Pac. Rep. 330).

The law protects a subsequent purchaser without notice buying from one who purchased with notice, whose deed is recorded. Sayward v. Thompson, 11 Wash. St. 706 (40 Pac. Rep. 379); Webb, Record Title, § 154. Pringle v. Dunn, 37 Wis. 449 (19 Am. Rep. 772); Wood v. Chapin, 13 N. Y. 509 (67 Am. Dec. 62); Sydnor v. Roberts, 13 Tex. 598. One who deals with the holder of a clear record title will be protected against equities in favor of third persons of which he had no notice. Thompson v. Whitbeck, 47 La. 49 (16 So. Rep. 570). One who has acquired rights for value from one having a clear record title is not required to allege that he had no notice of the asserted prior title. Oliphant v. Burns, 146 N. Y. 218 (40 N. E. Rep. 980).

act.

Sec. 49. Knowledge of facts sufficient to put one on inquiry. A person who has knowledge of facts sufficient to put a prudent man on inquiry with regard to the existence of an unrecorded deed, and fails to make such inquiry, cannot claim protection as a bona fide purchaser under the recording Actual knowledge of the existence on the public records of an instrument purporting to be a mortgage of the property he is about to purchase is notice to such purchaser of the existence of the original mortgage, and knowledge of such mortgage, although the same is given by one who appears by the records to have no title to the land, is sufficient to make it the duty of the purchaser to inquire whether the mortgagor, who asserts in the mortgage that he owns the land, is not in fact the owner thereof. If, with such knowledge, he parts with the consideration for the land without making any investigation as to the title of the mortgagor, when such investigation would probably have led to a discovery of such title, he is chargeable with notice of it. But the mere recording of an instrument out of the chain of the title will not, of itself, constitute constructive notice of such instrument, so as to bind one who deals with the apparent owner of the land according to the record, in ignorance of the existence of such instrument. Doran v. Dazey, S. Dak. (64 N. W. Rep. 1023). Where one's title papers refer him to a town plat for a more

complete description, he is charged with notice of all the facts to be ascertained by examination of such plat. Depriest v. Jones, Va. (21 S. E. Rep. 478). Whenever inquiry is a duty, the party bound to make it is affected with knowledge of all which he would have discovered had he performed the duty. Means of knowledge, with the duty of using them, are, in equity, equivalent to knowledge itself. Lennig's Ex'rs

v. White, Va. (20 S. E. Rep. 831). The fact that a subsequent purchaser had notice of a prior undocketed judgment, may be inferred from circumstances as well as proved by direct evidence. Farley v. Bateman, 40 W. Va. 540 (22 S. E. Rep. 72).

BOUNDARIES.

EPITOME OF CASES.

Sec. 50. Agreements fixing. By agreeing upon a boundary and acting on the agreement, parties may estop themselves from disputing that it is the true line. Young v. Woolett, Ky. (29 S. W. Rep. 879). Where it is found that a fence or a wall was erected by agreement of the parties as a monument for a boundary and the same was so erected without fraud or mistake and afterward acted upon by them, a slight variation from mathematical accuracy in fixing its position would not affect its conclusiveness as a boundary. Beckman v. Davidson, 162 Mass. 347 (39 N. E. Rep. 38); Evans v. Kunze, 128 Mo. 670 (31 S. W. Rep. 123). An agreement respecting a boundary made by the husband of the owner of the land, does not bind such owner unless it be shown that she authorized it to be made or ratified it after it was made. Mitchell v. Brawley, 140 Ind. 216 (39 N. E. Rep. 497). In a recent case the supreme court of Michigan say: "The rule is well settled in this state that when parties by mutual agreement and for that express purpose, meet and fix a boundary line, and thereafter acquiesce in the line so established, such line will be considered the true line, although the period of

acquiescence fall short of the time fixed by the statute of limitations for gaining title by adverse possession.' White v. Peabody, Mich. (64 N. W. Rep. 41.) Citing, Smith v. Hamilton, 20 Mich. 433 (4 Am. Rep. 398); Joyce v. Will iams, 26 Mich. 332; Stewart v. Carleton, 31 Mich. 270; Burns v. Martin, 45 Mich. 22 (7 N. W. Rep. 219); Jones v. Pashby, 67 Mich. 459 (35 N. W. Rep. 152; 11 Am. St. Rep. 589); Wilmarth v. Woodcock, 66 Mich. 331 (33 N. W. Rep. 400). Location of boundary lines by an agent authorized to lease premises, for the purpose of informing the tenant as to his rights, will not bind the owner in a subsequent controversy between him and the adjoining owner. O'Hare v. O'Brien, 107 Cal. 309 (40 Pac. Rep. 423).

Sec. 51. Evidence-Estoppels-Presumptions. In cases of disputed boundaries evidence of the understanding of the occupants may be heard. Swerdferger v. Hopkins, 67 Vt. 137 (31 Atl. Rep. 153). In a recent case the supreme court of Virginia say: "In a controversy concerning the location or boundary of a tract of land patented by the commonwealth, pursuant to a survey, the calls and descriptions of another survey made by the same surveyor, about the same time or recently thereafter, of a co-terminous or neighboring tract, upon which last-mentioned survey the commonwealth issued a grant, whether to a party to the controversy or to a stranger, is proper evidence upon such question of location or boundary, unless clearly irrelevant." Reusens v. Lawson, 91 Va. 226 (21 S. E. Rep. 347). Where the controlling question is the true location of a boundary line, it is not material that a re-survey locating the line as claimed by one of the parties. was made under an unauthorized contract. Hanson v. Tp. of Red Rock, S. Dak. (63 N. W. Rep. 156). A party may by conduct estop himself from asserting the true boundary. Peterson v. Sohl, 141 Ind. 466 (40 N. E. Rep. 910). Where successive owners of a lot have occupied continuously for a period of more than 20 years up to a given line as a boundary, it will be taken as the true boundary as fixed by adverse possession. Beckman v. Davidson, 162 Mass. 347 (39 N. E. Rep. 38).

Sec. 52. Running courses-As to when the calls of a deed may be reversed. In a recent case the supreme court of North Carolina say: "It is a fact of which the courts must take and have taken notice that the measurements of boundary lines in making the original surveys for deeds and grants are often, if not always, inaccurate. Those discrepancies between the distance called for and the actual measurement occur much more frequently, too, in an undulating or mountainous section, because as a matter of general knowledge, it often happens that, in the general surveys of grants, only two or three lines of a square or parallelogram were actually run, and that the earlier surveyors, at least, universally adopted surface measurement. In running long lines from the top of one high and precipitous mountain to that of another, the area of acreage sold by the state to its citizens would have appeared much less than it actually was if the level measurement had been adopted in laying off large grants. It is therefore a well-known fact that, owing to inaccuracies in measurement, different results will follow from adopting one or the other of the two methods of surveying where many of the old monuments have perished or been removed. In determining which is correct, the courts proceed upon the idea that the object of legal investigation and inquiry is to find the lines, corners, and monuments which were agreed upon by the parties to the original conveyance, and that, in order to attain that object, the lines should be run in the direction and order adopted by them. Harry v. Graham, 1 Dev. & B. 78, 79; Norwood v. Crawford, 114 N. C. 519 (19 S. E. Rep. 349). There are some exceptional instances, in which it is manifest that reversing a line is a more certain means of ascertaining the location of a prior line than the description of such prior line in the deed, but such cases are rare exceptions to a well-established general rule. Harry v. Graham, 1 Dev. & B. 78, 79 (27 Am. Dec. 226); Norwood v. Crawford, 114 N. C. at page 521 (19 S. E. Rep. 349); Safret v. Hartman, 7 Jones (N. C.) 203. The general rule is an established law of evidence, adopted as best calculated to ascertain what was intended to be conveyed, and it is incumbent on a party asking the courts to depart from it to show facts which bring the particular case within